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The most fundamental question of political philosophy is “who should rule?” 
Socrates famously argued in the Republic that philosophers were the most precise 
guardians of the best city. The question of intelligence is not a theoretical one; it is 
relevant far beyond the building of cities in speech.  The importance we ascribe to 
measures of intelligence informs a broad range of policy questions and could 
challenge our democratic processes. This dissertation seeks to understand the 
relationship of the modern concept of IQ to Western political philosophy by 
investigating the role of intelligence for Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and 
contemporary psychometricians. Whereas intelligence has a moral dimension for the 
classical philosophers, Machiavelli emphasized the use of prudence in the service of 
ambition. Contemporary psychometrics presents intelligence as a distinct, amoral 
property. I argue that Freud and group psychology provide insight into the way 
democracy could relate to a hypothetical cognitive elite. I further suggest ways in 
 
  
which we could make use of the modern IQ test to improve the quality of our political 
leadership and make use of an important Platonic theory without abandoning 
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At this the grey-eyed goddess 
Athena smiled, and gave him a caress, 
her looks being changed now, so she seemed a woman  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Problem of Intelligent Rule 
 The most fundamental political question, and the guiding question of classical 
political philosophy, is simply: “who should rule?1” As it originates pre-
philosophically, the question is about who should rule in particular: this man or that 
man, one group or another. The root of the controversy arises from the natural 
conflicts that occur when a group of human beings come together and decide to do 
something in common. The still pre-philosophic refinement becomes “what sort of 
human being should rule,” or what qualities should be present in rulers. The 
reasonable, pre-philosophic answer to this question is also simple: the best kinds of 
human beings. The classical philosophers transformed this into a comprehensive 
question about the best political ordering, so that the object of classical political 
philosophy becomes the best regime. The best regime is comprehensive because it 
considers the whole of the city and its constituent parts, including what qualifies 
individual people to rule.  
The ability to make good decisions pertaining to both war and domestic 
matters seems to be a self-evident quality of the effective ruler. For this reason, 
Pericles is said to be a man having practical judgment2. This judgment must make use 
                                                 
1 Cf Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy?, pg. 84 




of a more general faculty of intelligence that allows one to understand and organize 
the world around one so that one is able to deliberate about what is possible. No one 
would willingly choose a stupid man to lead, unless he thought he could substitute his 
own judgment for that of the nominal leader. Because good decisions are bounded by 
our ability to comprehend, intelligence is the fundamental political quality. Other 
animals organize themselves into groups, such as bees or ants, but they have it within 
their natures to form specific kinds of communities. Human beings are unique in that 
we have the ability to form an infinite variety of political communities, but our 
variety and variability gives rise to problems that do not have solutions adequately 
addressed by instinct. Neither are our rulers conspicuously marked as with the insects. 
It seems obvious that we want the best rulers possible, but it is not obvious how to 
determine who those people are. 
Classical philosophy tells us that we do not know who the best human beings 
are, or might be. The philosophers tell us that we have a name (aristoi) for such 
people, and that there are men who have claimed the name. This ignorance of who the 
true aristoi might be does not stop many, namely the sophists, from declaring that it is 
possible to teach men to be the best; in short, they declare it is possible to teach 
virtue. It is clear to Plato’s Socrates that the sophists cannot give an adequate account 
of virtue, and so their teaching is counterfeit. The political art, however, seems to 
require both moral and intellectual virtue, because the intellectual tasks of ruling are 
not amoral. It is particularly evident in the statesmen who must deliberate about 
particular things: they must arrive at good solutions, they must be fair, their judgment 




by fear. They seem to need practical judgment, justice, moderation, and courage3. 
Practical judgment is particularly crucial because it is directed toward legislating in 
the broad sense and solving particular political problems in the narrower sense4.  
Regardless of regime, whoever rules is responsible for solving problems, 
whether those problems are external, such as war, or internal, such as famine. 
Accordingly, whoever decides must have deliberated, and to deliberate means 
choosing among options. At the minimum, good judgment would mean choosing 
actions that lead to one’s desired end. At the highest level of practical judgment, this 
would mean choosing good actions and good ends; that is, for the classical 
philosophers, choices have a moral dimension.    
 If the political art is really an art of choosing and determining what is choice-
worthy, those who rule should be those who are most able to make these choices and 
determinations5. Even in our own representative democracy, we want the President or 
legislators to be familiar with “the issues,” to have weighed and measured the 
evidence and arguments, and to arrive at a conclusion based on their deliberations. 
The common criticism that a politician decides based on polls is an indication that we 
do not expect our representatives to suspend their own judgment and become mere 
mouthpieces for their constituency.  
 In the Republic, Socrates presents the healthy city – what Glaucon calls the 
city of pigs – as the self-sufficient, small city that has no need of war or a guardian 
                                                 
3 Cf Plato, Republic, 426-435 
4 Cf Nicomachean Ethics, 1141b20-30 
5 Aristotle, in fragments of the Protrepticus, points out that determining what should 




class6. The healthy city requires only what is necessary to sustain life; as such, once it 
is brought into being it does not require any particular intelligence to guide it or 
preserve it. It is enough, as in simpler animals, that the individuals comprising the 
city perform the duties to which they are suited and that contribute to the whole. The 
city that has relish, or the feverish city, must become more complicated. Its increased 
appetite puts it in conflict with other cities and also introduces arts that appeal to the 
senses7, so that it becomes possible for the city to argue with itself. Thus Socrates 
makes the double entendre – the city now has need of swineherds where it did not 
before; that is, it needs a rational component to order the city. A further implication of 
this remark is that the general character of the people has not changed: pigs are not 
made into human beings by refining their tastes. If the city is to be more than a city of 
pigs one must go beyond arts and luxuries to find what, in actuality, makes us human 
as opposed to any other animal.  
 We as moderns recognize the necessity of government by the rejection of 
laissez faire markets and institutions; competing interests require regulation and 
ordering to maintain the social and political order. The person in the best position to 
make these determinations seems to be someone who is best able to understand the 
particulars of the things being regulated and relate that understanding to the whole of 
the political community. That is, we should not expect bankers to regulate banking, 
even though they possess the art of banking. Nor should we expect someone ignorant 
of banking to make those determinations, because the art exists in service to the 
                                                 
6 Republic, 369b-372d 




whole, and only by knowing the art and what it is capable of can it be made of use. 
Rarely, however, are the most intelligent people elected. Our system encourages the 
most intelligent people to go into lucrative professions; at best, they become 
consulting experts to those who make the final decisions. Our politicians are experts 
in the formal political process; they do not generally have in-depth understanding of 
the technical topics about which they legislate or make policy. Instead, consulting 
outside technical experts is accepted as a necessary aspect of modern rule.  
 It would be impossible to do away with technical experts, of course, but it is 
possible to accept advice intelligently. Therefore, I take Plato’s suggestion seriously 
that the best minds available are those fittest to rule. We have a tool to assist us in 
finding those minds: the IQ test. 
 
The Politics of IQ 
The concept of innate intelligence and Intelligence Quotient (IQ) testing is 
incredibly divisive.  Most of us are willing to casually admit that a person is “smart.”  
We will admit to ourselves or intimates that someone else is “slow.”  These are 
practical determinations that one commonly makes either in a consciously theory 
agnostic way, or simply without thinking through the meaning behind the speech.  It 
is once we start to question why the first person is smart and the second person slow 
that we get into trouble.  Many people will argue that differences in intelligence are 
largely environmental, that IQ tests are meaningless, and that even if they do measure 
something, it is quite different from what we generally mean when we say someone is 




result of a misunderstood fealty to liberal values generally and a strong need to 
protect one’s own self-image in particular.   
Regardless of any cultural or personal resistance to the concept of intelligence, 
it is important. Our world is becoming more complex, and the political problems we 
face reflect not only growing scientific sophistication, but also the accretion of two 
hundred years of legislation and bureaucracy. Our culture, too, has become more 
cognitively complex. It is more pressing than ever to embrace a philosophic view of 
the whole of our political life; that is to say, to embrace “knowledge with its head 
on.8” Rather than acquiring more experts or members of the academy, what is needed 
are great expectations for those in office – an expectation that they be the best in the 
way that the classical philosophers understood it. A return to this view requires 
understanding how we view intelligence now and honestly assessing whether the 
classical philosophers can teach us something we have forgotten. 
The contemporary view of intelligence has largely been from the perspective 
of economic, scientific, and engineering success, and the kind of intelligence we fund 
in our educational programs is largely of this sort. This focus on instrumental 
intelligence makes it pervasive; our economy has been transformed by the rapid 
progress of science and technology over the past century. What makes it 
economically valuable also seems to make it morally monstrous: instrumental 
intelligence pretends to be value-free and answers any question posed to it, no matter 
how inhuman. This indifference to values subsumes intelligence under present-day 
                                                 
8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1141a19-20. All quotations from the Nicomachean 




political science while alienating it from politics itself. To become political, 
intelligence must become philosophical. It is my hope that we can redeem the concept 
of intelligence; not merely in the context of intelligence testing per se, but in terms of 
recognizing that the problem of intelligence is closely related to the problem of 
ruling. 
The question of intelligence is not merely a theoretical one; it is relevant far 
beyond the building of cities in speech.  The importance we ascribe to measures of 
intelligence informs a broad range of policy questions and could challenge our 
democratic processes.  If, as Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray report in The 
Bell Curve, low intelligence is highly correlated with every sort of social evil - crime, 
disability, high birth rates, and poverty, to name a few - should our political and 
social institutions take cognitive differences into account and thereby attempt to make 
life better for all members of society?    The issue is a deeply personal one. After all, 
what could be more intimate than the capabilities of one’s own mind?  Contemporary 
arguments about intelligence that proceed into the policy domain are bound to be met 
with resistance.   
To what extent should we accept measures of intelligence as conveying real 
information?  If they do have basis in reality, what do these measures tell us, if 
anything, about social roles for those who are exceptionally intelligent? These 
questions may be uncomfortable, and perhaps they should be.  Part of my argument, 
however, is that Western political philosophy has always been concerned with this 
problem, in one form or another, but that it has almost always been hidden from view.  




recent forces that push the subject into the realm of taboo.  The controversy 
surrounding Herrnstein and Murray’s book - due to a thirty page chapter of a five 
hundred page book discussing differences in average IQ between races and supported 
by empirical evidence - is further evidence that some topics are considered beyond 
discussion. 
Classical political philosophy acknowledged differences between individuals, 
and took the problem of finding a place for exceptional individuals quite seriously. 
Plato’s arguments are highly linked to contemporary arguments about IQ, and by 
understanding Plato’s arguments in greater detail we may find a more palatable way 
to approach the issue.  Of course, any attempt to impose contemporary concepts onto 
classical philosophical systems is apt to arouse suspicion, and rightly so9.  Finding the 
new in the old carries with it the inclination to distort or misrepresent, and the 
inclination is more severe the further one is from one’s interpreted material.  With 
that in mind, the concept of IQ is a modern one, born in the 19th century and 
representing a kind of mathematical thought that was alien to Plato and Friedrich 
Nietzsche alike.  The Intelligence Quotient is, however, merely a contemporary 
means of representing a concept with which all thinking people have dealt throughout 
time: some people are able to think better than others.  
                                                 
9 As Montesquieu wrote, “To carry back to distant centuries the ideas of the century 
in which one lives is of all sources of error the most fertile. To those people who want 
to render all the earlier centuries modern, I shall say what the priests of Egypt said to 
Solon: “O Athenians, you are nothing but children!”” Spirit of the Laws, Part 6, Ch. 




 The classical philosophers, with their focus on virtue, certainly understood 
that individuals vary in capacity.  Whether through divine inspiration or nature, some 
individuals consistently excel.   Political philosophy has not only considered, but has 
been shaped by the realization that people have differing levels of intelligence.  From 
Plato’s Republic onward, what to do with the best thinkers has influenced political 
philosophy fundamentally.   
 Rather than representing a radical departure from existing thought on 
intelligence, the concept of IQ is the result of a continual honing of a philosophical 
tradition surrounding intelligence that culminated in the creation of a statistical 
method of measuring cognitive abilities. I argue that psychoanalysis provides a new 
way of looking at the opposition between the rational and irrational aspects of human 
thought, and that this perspective has important consequences for any political 
philosophy that seeks to take into account intellectual difference.  Further, this 
perspective is symptomatic of a loss of the Platonic insight that philosophical inquiry 




 The most thorough contemporary exploration of intelligent rule is Michael 
Young’s The Rise of the Meritocracy. Young’s vision is clearly a dystopian satire, but 
he contends:  
The book was, in other words, intended to present two sides of the case – the case against as 
well as the case for a meritocracy. It is not a simple matter and was not intended to be. The 




decision, one way or another, was, and is left to the reader, the hope being that, on the way to 
making up his or her mind on one of the great issues of modern society, he or she will also 
have a little fun.10 
 
 The difficulty is that by presenting both sides of the case, it is nearly 
impossible to discern which arguments Young takes seriously in meritocracy’s favor. 
For Young, hope has a powerful political importance, and he is concerned that a 
science that eliminates hope in favor of determinism ultimately extinguishes the fire 
of protest11. Reducing one another to scientifically determined positions on a 
hierarchy of human merit, it would seem, divests us of the pretense of equality that is 
necessary to defend our interests.  
Young’s analysis is ultimately the victim of his style. Because he is compelled 
to show the dark side of the meritocracy, he does not attempt to explore what the best 
version of it might look like. His hypothesized state must be ordered in such a way 
that it has flaws as well as benefits. The reader is left to determine whether the 
arguments against meritocracy are against meritocracy itself, or this particular 
dystopian vision.  
For Young, the meritocracy is driven by the discovery that merit equals 
intelligence plus effort (I+E=M)12. But this formula, despite being the basis of the 
society’s merit system, is not explained further. Young does not say whether the 
formula is prescriptive or descriptive, nor does he question whether merit 
measurements under this system comport with our ideas of what merit means. This 
absence is all the more telling when he declares that “we have come close to realizing 
                                                 
10 Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, pg. xvii  
11 Ibid, pg. xvi 




at one stroke the ideal of Plato13.”  Young’s imagined regime gives the highest place 
to value-free science and therefore finds itself incapable of justifying itself in terms of 
values, revealing the comparison to Plato’s Republic as absurd14. It is, in fact, a 
society that has made man serve science instead of the other way around15. 
The meritocracy, for Young, is not only a conspicuous ruling class, but a 
broad group of bureaucrats, business leaders, and scientists, so that the particular 
influence of individuals in the class cannot be addressed as part of the political 
process.  The question Young poses – whether meritocracy is ultimately good or bad 
– must be addressed by first asking whether a good meritocracy can be constructed. I 
attempt to provide a step toward answering that question. 
 
General Outline of the Dissertation 
 This chapter has introduced the problem of intelligence as it pertains to 
political rule, and stressed the importance of political philosophy as an answer to that 
problem. Plato and Aristotle, in addition to being geniuses in their own right, 
understood the problem of intelligence and provide a framework for its political 
expression. 
 The second chapter will go into more detail about how Plato and Aristotle 
approached the subject of intelligence and rule by philosophers.  Plato, especially, 
recognized the difficulties of philosophical rule; I consider the guardians Plato’s 
                                                 
13 Ibid, pg. 93 
14 Ibid., pp. 145-146 




Socrates put forth in the Republic, and compare the philosopher kings to teachings 
from the Laws, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, and Meno.  This chapter seeks to 
ascertain the role of intelligence in philosophy and rule, and the kind of education that 
Plato believed would be necessary for capable individuals. Alfarabi’s commentaries 
provide additional context for the discussion.  The second chapter provides a basis 
from which I compare contemporary theories of intelligence with political 
philosophy, and allows me to draw comparisons and outline the differences between 
these views. Chapter two also considers the relationship between law and 
intelligence. The political philosopher teaches legislators, who in turn teach 
statesmen, and statesmen teach citizens. A law that is comprehensive is impossible, 
but statesmen without a framework are tyrants. The second chapter considers these 
tensions to try to gain a fuller understanding of how intelligence is actually used in 
classical political philosophy. 
 The third chapter concentrates on the Machiavellian dyad of prince and 
adviser. Machiavelli makes intelligence – often in the guise of prudence – the most 
important feature of any lasting state. As Leo Strauss says, rule by gentlemen is 
meant to be open rule16, but rule for Machiavelli is always hidden. Hidden rule seems 
to be necessary for many reasons, but foremost among them is the seeming 
impossibility of intelligence and power coinciding. Machiavelli is not satisfied with a 
political philosophy that allows for the philosopher to exist outside of the city; he 
                                                 




disclaims the possibility that high ability will be left alone17. Chapter three will 
examine this adviser from the perspective of political action in the Prince and 
Discourses, but will also carefully consider the argument Machiavelli puts forward in 
his Clizia and Mandragola. Though these plays are intended for a lower audience 
than his political works, they freely show the young body with an old head, providing 
clarification to his political arguments.  
 The fourth chapter focuses on the early development of IQ tests, beginning 
with Sir Francis Galton.  Chapter four is concerned with understanding not only the 
scientific insights that led to our contemporary systems of intelligence testing, but the 
underlying ideologies and racial ideas that informed many of the discussions up until 
only recently. Many of the biases in interpreting results can be traced back to Galton 
as one of the earliest scientific, mathematically based proponents of intelligence 
testing and eugenics.  The fourth chapter engages critics of intelligence testing, such 
as Stephen J. Gould and Malcolm Gladwell, examining arguments against the 
scientific validity of intelligence tests as a unitary measurement of intelligence. 
Chapter four attempts to integrate the psychometric account with Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory and group psychology. The psychoanalytic account casts some 
doubt on any politics that places too much weight on intelligence, and emphatically 
points out the deficiencies of scientific thought and the irrational nature of our 
impulses. The fourth chapter sets forth certain limits around our expectations for 
                                                 




intelligent rule, while still providing conditions under which rational group processes 
can occur.   
 Chapter five concludes the dissertation by bringing the focus to American 
democracy and contemporary views of intelligence. I rely on Richard Hofstadter’s 
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life as an examination of how intellectuals are 
perceived in the United States. I also identify differences between the intellectual as 
Hofstadter conceives him and the intelligent human being informed by philosophy 
that I put forward as a potential solution. I argue that we make use of our brightest 
minds in a shortsighted way, and suggest some tentative prescriptions for making 
intelligent rule possible and allowing it to be guided by philosophy, if not 
philosophical itself.  
 The idea of human intelligence has probably existed since our earliest 
ancestors, and intellectual interest in it has endured for over two thousand years. 
Rather than focusing on a single understanding of intelligence from a particular 
thinker, I aim to show an outline of its relation to political philosophy over time.  As 
such, my approach is broad in scope, covering the classical philosophers, 
Machiavelli’s modern influence, modern psychology and psychometrics, 
psychoanalysis, and contemporary American views of intelligence. I hope to provide 
some indications, guidance, and justifications for bringing a classical view to bear on 




Chapter 2: Classical Philosophy and Intelligence 
 
 This chapter will introduce the role of intelligence in classical political 
philosophy. To do so, I will first briefly address Plato’s images of the soul, and 
examine the relationship between thinking and memory for Plato. I will then examine 
Aristotle’s psychology, with an emphasis on traits that make up intelligence and 
practical judgment. Next, I will look at the tension between intelligence and law, in 
terms of the defects of both law and direct rule generally. I then look to the Meno for 
a preliminary Platonic investigation of the innate differences between human beings, 
which leads into a discussion of the role of the philosopher as guardian in the 
Republic.  
Investigating the role of intelligence in Plato and Aristotle presents numerous 
difficulties, not the least of which is terminology. While in ordinary speech we are at 
least dimly aware of the difference between, for example, wisdom and intelligence, 
there is a limit to what psychometricians can measure. Psychologists talk about mind 
– or executive function, working memory, g18, and so on – the classical philosophers 
talk about a soul with intellect, practical judgment, cognition, and other aspects. 
Modern psychologists are generally uninterested in looking back to classical 
philosophy to understand human nature. To the extent they do, it is usually in the 
form of a history of science, which presupposes that what we know today is better 
                                                 
18 The general intelligence factor, which is the hypothesized underlying trait that 




than what we knew yesterday. From that point of view Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics or On the Soul are relics, objects of historical curiosity at best, and 
incompatible with the mental models that positivistic science assures us are the best 
available. This lack of continuity between the way classical philosophers described 
the soul and the way psychologists describe the mind means that it is all the more 
difficult to look back now and try to apply a modern concept – the IQ test – to a 
classical political philosophy that resisted relying too much on math to describe the 
world. There is also, therefore, no way to construct a direct mapping between Plato 
and Aristotle’s terms and our own. Even an ostensibly simple word like intellect 
(nous) becomes, in Aristotle’s hands, a complex interrelationship between the things 
that are and the perceiving self19. But a direct mapping need not be found; we should 
treat Plato and Aristotle on their own terms before attempting to establish the 
relevance of their psychological theories to contemporary investigations of 
intelligence20.  
                                                 
19 Aristotle’s nous is especially difficult because of his discussion of the active and 
passive intellects in the On the Soul, 3.5, and the extensive commentary that has 
attached to it. See Caston’s “Aristotle's two intellects: A modest proposal” for a 
summary of the debate and a tentative solution to the problem.  
20 Joe Sachs notes that Aristotle uses at least two dozen words for kinds of thinking, 
so that the vague word “mind” of Descartes does not correspond to anything in the 
Aristotelian vocabulary. See Sachs’ translation of On the Soul, pg. 202. Modern 
psychologists and psychometricians do not make much use of the homogenized 
concept of mind, but the intermediary stage seems to have been enough to muddy the 




Plato and Aristotle recognized individual differences in intellectual 
capability21, understood these differences to be natural, at least to some extent, and 
believed that outstanding intellectual ability has important consequences for who 
should rule. The last stipulation is the most controversial, insofar as Socrates is taken 
to present his city-in-speech only to illustrate the absurdity of a city that would 
embrace philosophy22. It is not necessary, however, to consider the entire city-in-
speech forthrightly spoken. Rather, Plato presents the immense difficulty of nurturing 
the best minds and natures; many of those difficulties persist even in the modern 
democratic state. Plato’s discussion of memory (memesis) and recollection 
(anamnesis) offers a glimpse of the tension between natural ability and education, and 
the limits of what even the best education can provide. This conflict is borne out in 
the accounts of law and ruling in the Laws, Republic, and Stateseman.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Differences in intelligence were certainly known to the Greeks prior to Plato: 
compare the descriptions and actions of Odysseus with those of Telamonian Ajax, for 
example. Detienne and Vernant give an overview of cunning intelligence, or metis, 
which occupied an important role in pre-philosophic Greek culture, in Cunning 
Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society. They argue that Greek philosophers 
abandoned that way of viewing intelligence in favor of strictly logical intelligence 
(pp. 2-5). Metis is exemplified in the octopus and fox. Though Detienne and Vernant 
do not venture so far forward in the future, the comparison calls Machiavelli to mind, 
who one might say picks up the thread.  




Intelligence and the Soul 
Plato did not write treatises, but dialogues, and Plato’s Socrates freely relies 
on images (or noble lies) when demonstration will not do. As such, the Platonic 
dialogues do not contain a consistent psychology. Unlike modern psychologists, he 
does not seem to be interested in reifying components of the soul, or even providing a 
scientific account. He presents differing teachings about the soul in the Laws, Meno, 
Phaedrus, and Republic23; what is important to Plato, it seems, are the lessons one 
derives about human nature from the images of the soul he paints.  The Republic 
posits three aspects to the soul: the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational (436a-b). 
The Laws mythically depicts the human being as a puppet pulled by hard and iron 
threads of the passions, and a single, soft, golden thread (644d-645d). What seems to 
be common to all of the accounts is that human beings have desires in conflict with 
reason, and even reason is in conflict with itself, so far as it is dialectical24. Plato 
provides a variety of images through which we can see aspects of akrasia – action in 
conflict with reason.  Having an orderly soul – in particular, having desires that 
conform to reason – seems to be the most basic form of virtue (Republic 443d and 
Nicomachean Ethics 1102b20-30).  
 
                                                 
23 As well as the Laches, Phaedo,  Philebus, Symposium, and Timaeus 




Thinking in the Theaetetus 
If virtue is knowledge, as Socrates indicates, and if the soul must be ordered 
around reason, what is reason? What is thinking? Plato gives us a tantalizing image of 
how thinking works through two metaphors in the Theaetetus. In the first, Socrates 
describes knowledge as a wax block that receives impressions from signet rings. The 
properties of the wax block influence the image that is left behind. Particularly, the 
wax block may be too runny, or too firm, or of the perfect consistency. Importantly, 
Socrates identifies the wax substance as being natural to the individual; it is genetic 
(194C-195B). But the wax block itself is independent of intelligence or wit; he cites 
himself as having a “shaggy heart25” (195C) or a poor memory. Socrates points out 
that those who are quick learners have fluid souls, and are therefore quick to forget, 
while those whose souls are hard are slow to learn but remember well (194E). 
Aristotle extends this argument by observing that those who are slow tend to have 
good memories, but those who are quick are better at recollecting (On Memory and 
Recollection, 449b4-10). The question of good and bad memories reminds us that we 
each have capabilities and talents, but they do not flower on their own. A naturally 
strong man might avoid exercise because he can apply his untrained strength well 
enough. The man who is naturally weak might train himself to have normal strength 
only with great effort. On the one hand, the man who is naturally weak, but trained, 
might be admired for his persistence, but he cannot be relied upon any more than a 
normal man who trains in the ordinary way. On the other hand, the naturally strong 
                                                 
25 Translations of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman are from Seth Benardete’s 




man seems liable to laziness, and he could be much stronger than he is. Our habits 
help form our character, but we are limited not only by our weaknesses, but also, in a 
sense, by our strengths: “even good fortune, when it is excessive, is an impediment” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1153b20-30). 
Like the man who is naturally strong, the good memory enables a bad habit. 
When one relies too much on memory one skips the important work of weighing and 
measuring one’s opinions. Conversely, those for whom thinking is very difficult may 
find themselves reliant on memory. The wax-block metaphor breaks down, however: 
if our sense-impressions of objects are literally represented in the soul, then we 
should never err when answering “what is 5 and 7?” if we already know 5, 7, and 12. 
Our mental processes would be like rearranging pieces of the block, and the mere 
juxtaposition of the representations of all three numbers would be sufficient for us to 
reject the answer of ‘11.’ Intelligence, then, cannot be a mere rearranging of the 
supposed facts at our disposal. Intelligence seems to be more than merely collecting 
tools with which we do intellectual work. Theaetetus does not realize that his own 
discovery of the “surds” is a response to the examples worked out by Theodorus, but 
the proof itself is not in any sense a rearrangement of those examples. Knowledge 
requires the active use of intelligence to order experience.  
Socrates abandons the wax block, and turns to a dovecote. Knowledge is now 
like birds: one must first seek them out, and then one must store them. But when one 
wishes to retrieve knowledge, one must hunt the idea birds again. The metaphor has 
become less like we would expect the soul to operate. But in changing the image, 




or searching effort of philosophy. The souls of the many might indeed operate much 
like the wax blocks, comparing what was seen before to what is seen now to establish 
identity. But the philosopher aims for something more, and this something more 
requires an active process of thinking26. The dovecote thus represents the dual nature 
of that searching: first finding beings in the world, isolating them from the 
surrounding environment, and then re-finding and comparing those beings against 
each other to know wholes and parts. This metaphor has additional implications, 
when we consider that the birds also represent the transmissibility of knowledge. If 
finding the beings in the world requires an art of hunting, and rearranging or 
recollecting these beings is also a form of hunting, these are both part of the 
philosopher’s art. But that art is not, itself, represented by a bird in the dovecote; it 
belongs to the philosopher qua philosopher, and is not directly transmissible. Perhaps 
it is trainable through dialectic27. The requirement of such an art thus preserves the 
genetic distinction made with the wax block, but in less emphatic terms; the ability to 
think is predicated upon some natural ability that may not be teachable itself – that is, 
intelligence.  
Underlying the argument is Theaetetus’ contention that knowledge is sense 
perception (151E). But as Socrates points out in the Republic, it is when our senses 
give contradictory information that we are forced to begin to think (524e-525a). 
Theodorus’ own suspect evaluation of Theaetetus’ appearance thus begins the 
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dialogue that is, chiefly, about teaching a promising student to think. Plato wants us 
to distinguish memory from thought, and thought from knowledge. The consequence 
of these distinctions is that teaching becomes more difficult; even under the 
instruction of a sophist who propounds a memory system, such as Hippias, the 
student is limited to the extent that he relies only on the things coming into being 
around him, rather than the things that are. The political art, then, cannot be learned 
by rote. Knowledge by itself, however, is not political; like the moral virtues, the 
political is relational and relative to the city in which one lives. We must turn instead 
to the intellectual virtues to provide a basis for the practical expression of knowledge 




Aristotle separates his discussion of virtue into two parts: virtue of character 
and virtue of thinking (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1103b and Book VI, 1139a). 
Virtue of character is attainable by anyone through habit, because to be virtuous is 
different from merely acting virtuously (1105a20-1105b10). Aristotle puts forward 
three requirements for actually being virtuous in this way: the actions must be 
performed knowingly, for their own sakes, and stably. In this context “knowingly” 
only means that the person acting knows what he is doing. For example, he is not 
intending to commit a crime but accidentally performs what seems to be a just act. 
Knowledge itself is not a requirement of ethical character. Instead, it is defined in 




which a person with practical judgment would determine it” (1106b10-1107a10). 
That is, it is not necessary for someone with virtue of character to have practical 
judgment himself, but to have been habituated to respond to situations in the right 
way through some sort of education.  Aristotle points out that there is an unlimited 
number of ways to err, but limited ways to get something right. Our moral judgment 
then must be able to pick the target out accurately.  
This formulation thrusts us into the political. If the person having virtuous 
character does not need to have practical judgment himself, then he must have been 
habituated by someone who had it in his stead. This much is implied by the 
requirement of an education from childhood (1104b10-20). The target metaphor 
draws our attention to another issue surrounding ethical virtue; it requires a stable 
world, hence a stable regime. Because ethical virtue is relative to the circumstances of 
the feelings and actions, it is easier to be virtuous to the extent that one avoids novel 
situations. As we see generally in the Plato’s Laws and Republic, the city should be 
constructed such that its activities are predictable and do not challenge the citizens to 
apply virtue in novel ways. Virtue of character is simply too important to political life 
to trust its coming into being on widespread possession of such a scarce resource as 
human intelligence. Alfarabi suggests that political science consists of “knowing the 
things by which the citizens of cities attain happiness through political association in 
the measure that innate disposition equips each of them for it;” what remains after this 




into actual being in the city.28 The city by itself is unable to be happy unless it is 
ordered by someone who knows.  
The natural objection is that cities are not so ordered, and life not so 
predictable, but we do not therefore assert that virtue is impossible. How could a 
habituation contingent upon practical judgment come about?  Aristotle addresses this 
by pointing out that the undemonstrated opinions of the old and experienced give the 
appearance of practical judgment (Nicomachean Ethics, 1143b10-20). If the city is 
ordered by good laws, it provides the kind of stability that is necessary to form 
experience by hindsight. A person does not need to know that light meats produce 
health if he knows that chicken is light and healthful (Nicomachean Ethics, 1041b10-
30); it is even possible for a person to give beautiful care to another single human 
being by precise observation and experience (1180b10-20).  The knowledge of 
particulars is sufficient so long as circumstances do not change. If chickens were to 
die out, the person without knowledge of both the universal case (that light meats are 
healthful) and the particulars (which other kinds of animals have light meat) would be 
unable to make a good decision unless by chance.  
It is only the person who has perfected intellectual virtue, and therefore 
practical judgment, who would be able to adjust to an unstable or chaotic world and 
still make good choices. Since the political world, as opposed to the natural world, 
does not seem to present itself as orderly from the outset, but is a product of human 
art, it requires an artisan who can craft it in such a way that citizens are able to attain 
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ethical virtue in the absence of practical judgment of their own. This argument further 
implies that a legislator is insufficient, because circumstances both within and outside 
of the city are variable and must be addressed as time goes on. It is for this reason that 
philosophers are required if citizens are to remain virtuous over time. Ethical virtue is 
wholly dependent, then, on being ordered by intellectual virtue; Aristotle finds the 
intellectual virtues so important that he spends an entire book of the Nicomachean 
Ethics discussing them.  
Possible kinds of intelligence are intellect (nous) and practical judgment 
(phronesis). Aristotle distinguishes the two by defining intellect as that which comes 
prior even to knowledge, insofar as it is a grasp on first terms that do not require 
demonstration. Knowledge is derived from reasoning29 – either demonstratively or 
dialectically - about what is necessarily so, based upon what is necessary. Practical 
judgment, however, is directed toward the changeable things. It is a process of 
deliberation that culminates in action directed at the good. Despite the way we use the 
term “intellect” in ordinary conversation, Aristotle seems to mean something very 
different. This is especially apparent in the On the Soul, in which the active and 
passive intellects are discussed. It is unclear from the discussion in the Nicomachean 
Ethics whether one’s capacity for intellect, in the sense of grasping first terms, is 
variable between human beings. That is, are these first terms available to all of us 
without qualification, or does access to them require something more? Maimonides 
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describes this difference in terms of divine overflow30; an especially telling example 
is his simile of the person who experiences continuous flashes of lightning, so that he 
lives in the dark night as though he were in the day31. Aristotle seems to imply that 
the intellect is the means through which we think and understand, but it is not the 
faculty itself (On the Soul, 429a10-30); the hammer is the means through which we 
drive a nail, but our efficiency in the task is also a matter of our accuracy and 
strength. In the being-at-work of driving nails, however, accuracy and strength are 
fruitless without the tool that brings them together and realizes the result. 
For both Plato and Aristotle, the notion of the good is inseparable from their 
concepts of intellect or intelligence.  It is with this in mind that Aristotle provides an 
account of the rational part of the soul. The rational is divided into knowing and 
calculating, or deliberating. But then we are diverted into the “three things in the soul 
that govern action and truth.” These things are broken down into sense-perception, 
intellect, and desire. Truth turns out to be the work of both of the thinking parts of the 
soul: intellect and desire (1139b10-30), calling to mind the chariot of the Phaedrus. 
In Chapter 3, the soul is revealed to disclose truth by five powers: art, knowledge, 
practical judgment, wisdom, and intellect. By the end of Book VI, the Nicomachean 
Ethics has taught us that all of the intellectual virtues are subsumed under intellect; 
what once appeared to be limited to the inarticulable indivisibles (Nicomachean 
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Ethics, 1139b30-1140a1 and Posterior Analytics, 71b20-23) is also what allows us to 
see the universal in the particular32: 
And intellect is directed at what is ultimate on both sides, since it is intellect and not reason 
that is directed at both the first terms and the ultimate particulars, on the one side at the 
changeless first terms in demonstrations, and on the other side, in thinking about action, at the 
other sort of premise, the variable ultimate particular; for these particulars are the sources 
from which one discerns that for the sake of which an action is, since the universals are 
derived from the particulars. Hence intellect is both a beginning and an end, since the 
demonstrations that are derived from these particulars are also about these. 
 
Knowledge is of things that are necessary or must necessarily be the case. It 
seems to be teachable and therefore learnable. Knowledge comes from conviction that 
is true, primary, and indivisible; it also must be better known than, prior to, and 
responsible for the conclusion. Knowledge is of things that are not changeable, and 
therefore it does not make sense to speak of deliberating over them. Still, the process 
of arriving at a valid conclusion from sound premises must have a name.  
Aristotle first looks at the way one commonly speaks of practical judgment: 
by talking about people who seem to have it. They make advantageous decisions for 
themselves in terms of living well as a whole. Since decisions and deliberations 
concern things that are changeable, practical judgment is not knowledge. Nor is 
practical judgment art, because it is unconcerned with making things. Practical 
judgment is a truth-disclosing active condition involving reason that governs action, 
concerned with what is good and bad for a human being. There is no evidence, 
according to Aristotle, intellect is present in all animals, or even human beings, alike, 
insofar as intellect is taken in the sense of practical judgment (On the Soul, 404b 1-
                                                 




10). A component of practical judgment, thoughtfulness (gnome) is a right 
discrimination of what is decent33 and thus combines the universal and the 
particular34. This discussion illuminates the distinction between intellect and 
perception, universals and particulars, and universal laws and practical judgment. 
That is, this way of being comprehends the good aimed at by the law while 
recognizing the need for exceptions in the particular, so that the application of the law 
serves the good35.  
Interestingly, Aristotle points out that in an art, it is preferable to have 
someone who makes an error willingly instead of unwillingly, but such is not the case 
with practical judgment. Here Aristotle addresses the conflict of Plato’s Lesser 
Hippias. Particularly, Socrates argued that a person who has the most virtue is also 
the most capable of vice, comparing Odysseus and Achilles. A skilled liar is skilled 
because he knows what is true, and is therefore able to say something false. A person 
who does not know the truth is only able to guess about a lie, and might happen upon 
the truth by guessing. Hippias is unable to separate his moral feelings about lying 
from the issue of excellence or virtue; clearly, one prefers a runner who runs slowly 
willingly to one who runs slowly unwillingly.  
But practical judgment is not like running. When someone makes an error in 
practical judgment, he either makes the error because it is in his advantage, or he 
                                                 
33 “Decency” is Sachs’ translation of epieikeia, which is “the attribute by which 
people recognize when particular circumstances call for a departure from strict 
justice, or from any general rules.” See Sachs, Nicomachean Ethics, pg. 203. Other 
translators give this as equity, see W.D. Ross, pg. 113 and Robert C. Bartlett, pg. 129.  
34 Nicomachean Ethics, 1143a10-30 




makes it to his disadvantage. If the error is in his advantage as a whole, then it is not 
an error – it is like lying. In that case, he has actually judged that the so-called error is 
more beneficial than the so-called correct judgment. If the error is in his 
disadvantage, and he has chosen it, then his practical judgment has failed, and 
therefore the error was not actually willing, for no one would willingly choose the 
worse result unless he thought it was in his interest.  Therefore, Aristotle asserts that 
practical judgment is itself a virtue, because it does not have any end to aspire to 
other than itself. In a brief passage, Aristotle seems to remake the Socratic argument 
that no one does wrong knowingly into “no one does wrong who uses practical 
judgment,” i.e., intelligence.  
Importantly, Aristotle contends that wisdom is intellect with knowledge. That 
is, a firm grasp of what is necessary as well as understanding the necessary things that 
flow from them. Since wisdom is independent of practical judgment, because it is not 
concerned with particulars, the juxtaposition of the two faculties raises an issue 
addressed in Aristophanes’ Clouds: philosophers are so focused on heavenly things 
that they can only be called wise, but seem to lack practical judgment because they do 
not attend to those things that appear to be in their best interests as human beings. 
Thales is the prototype: Aristotle cites him as one popularly known for being wise 
without practical judgment (1141b1-10), and Socrates gently mocks him for falling 
into a well while contemplating the heavens (Theaetetus, 174A). Yet, in the Politics 
Aristotle points out that Thales was able to establish a monopoly based upon his 




the human things (Politics, 1259a). This seems to suggest that intellect generally, and 
philosophy in particular, is applicable to the problems of ruling generally.  
Aristotle distinguishes quick-wittedness (eusunesia) or astuteness (sunesis) 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1143a10-20), ingenuity (agchinoia) (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1142b1-10 and Posterior Analytics, 89b10-89b16), and cleverness (deinotes) 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1144a23-29) as differentiated between human beings. 
Astuteness relates to practical judgment and the ability to quickly understand the 
judgment of another – a putting together of circumstances and the relation of those 
circumstances to action. Ingenuity is directed to finding the middle term having 
observed two extremes. Cleverness is reasoning from ends to means. He goes to pains 
to distinguish each of these kinds of thinking from skilled deliberation (eubolia) and 
therefore from practical intelligence.  These distinctions preserve the moral core of 
practical intelligence, while simultaneously acknowledging its dependence on 
faculties that are themselves amoral. The discussion allows us to understand how a 
person with a philosophic nature can be used for bad ends; just as food serves health 
when used well but detracts from health when used poorly, the calculating faculties 
serve practical intelligence and ultimately wisdom when they are directed to the 
proper ends, but are disadvantageous when they are used in isolation.  This is 
Aristotle’s criticism of what we would today call instrumental intelligence. The next 
piece of the argument concerns pleasure: certain people love one kind of thing more 
than another. They are musical people, or lovers of learning (1175a10-15), and 
“people who are passionately devoted to the flute are unable to pay attention to 




his final argument in book ten of the Ethics, because they prepare us for the idea that 
some human beings are better suited to lawmaking and politics than others due to 
innate capacity and training. 
Aristotle’s discussion therefore requires us to examine our own understanding 
of what intelligence is, and what intelligent rule might be. What we as moderns 
generally think of as intelligence is itself amoral, similar to astuteness, ingenuity, or 
cleverness. These are the kinds of qualities that modern intelligence tests assess: an 
ability to manipulate given information and arrive at a correct result. Aristotle 
suggests that this kind of lesser intelligence is the means through which one arrives at 
a higher kind of deliberation that considers what is good for human beings. Because 
not all human beings have these means, we have to rely on those who do, both to 
shape character and to guide lawmaking and politics.  
Even though philosophers are generally regarded as “useless to the city” 
(Republic, 487d-e), practical judgment actually arises out of the general intellect, and 
relies upon knowledge and experience. Philosophers are, therefore, the best situated 
to make determinations politically and ethically, insofar as they are able to determine 
what is changeable, what is necessary, and the relations between them. 
 
Intelligence and Law 
The dependence of the ethical upon the intellectual suggests two ways in 
which the philosopher is able to contribute to the city generally: through law and 
direct rule. The Eleatic Stranger makes a strong case against law (Statesman, 294A-




without taking into account changing circumstances. The law pretends to be a 
universal, or a kind of knowledge, but because it must be applied to particulars, it 
shows itself as lacking intelligence, “as if it were some self-willing and foolish human 
being who allows no one to do anything contrary to his own order or even for anyone 
to ask a question, not even if it turns out that, after all, something new is better for 
someone contrary to the speech which he himself enjoined” (Statesman, 294B). But 
knowledge ceases to be knowledge when it becomes law36. This can be understood as 
an indictment of religious law, which derives its authority solely from age and 
tradition, rather than legislation as it occurs in the city. But there is a quasi-religious 
element to the founding of Athens, Lacedaemonia, or Rome. To the extent that the 
laws given by Solon, Lycurgus, Numa, or further, Moses and Mohammed, are treated 
as unimpeachable and immutable due to the reputations of the men themselves, the 
laws are deficient. Just as memory differs from the active use of knowledge expressed 
in practical judgment so law differs from ruling. That is, the law in ossified form 
loses its potency in two ways. The first is entirely practical: as circumstances change, 
the law may become less relevant, or cease to be beneficial. In this way, it is like the 
prescription given by a physician prior to his long journey – it simply cannot take into 
account what might occur in the physicians absence (Statesman, 295A-E). The 
second way the law loses its potency is that the lawgiver intentionally divorces the 
law from the intelligence that produced it. In this way, the lawgiver resembles 
sophists who exhort their students to memorize rather than understand.  
                                                 




The human things are never simple, and the political is always in flux; 
naturally we wish for the best kinds of rulers. But human beings who have even the 
capacity to be the best rulers are rare; so rare, in fact, that we should not even expect 
fifty men out of a thousand to be top-notch draughts players in comparison with the 
rest of the Greeks (Statesman, 292E). In the same way Socrates persuaded Alcibiades 
to refrain from addressing the Athenian assembly, Young Socrates is forced to 
acknowledge that a statesman competes not only with his own people, but with all the 
kings of the world (Alcibiades I, 122d-124b). Socrates made this point to Alcibiades 
in material terms that were suitable to him; but his point seems to have been that the 
polis does not exist in a vacuum. The world around the city represents an existential 
threat. It is the legislator’s responsibility to take into account the nature of 
neighboring cities, and what practices or training is necessary in relation to them 
(Politics, 1325a10-20).  
This is a perspective that we as moderns seem to lack: Plato leaves open the 
possibility of an objective standard by which we might measure the best statesmen 
relative to one another. It is this objective standard that Plato appeals to in his 
selection of the guardians and which calls into question the claims of democracy. The 
images Plato uses with Theaetetus and Alcibiades are too simple, however. The 
highest performing draughts players are immediately visible to anyone with eyes to 
see, just as the best performing runners are evident by crossing the finish line37.  But 
as the allegory of the cave shows in the Republic, those in the dark are not in a 
                                                 




position to evaluate those who are in the light. The standard is objective, but not 
readily understood or accepted by those who have an interest in another outcome. In 
this sense, the adoption of objective standards, such as intelligence tests that are 
administered outside of the political process itself, would become necessary to 
identify promising people and give them the tools to be the best statesmen. 
By pointing out the rigidity of law and the high qualifications one expects of 
rulers, the Eleatic Stranger heightens the tension of the argument; it is surely 
impossible, no matter how capable the king, for him to stand beside each person and 
tell him what is best (Statesman, 295a-b). On the one hand, a ruler so perfect would 
have to have knowledge of the whole. On the other, if such knowledge were available 
to us, we could codify the law in such a way as to take into account all possible 
changes of circumstance. The Laws, too, is designed to showcase the tension between 
intelligence and law. As a creative and integrative power, intelligence molds and 
shapes the law. Like a statue, however, law is capable of providing only a limited, 
ossified image of intelligence at a particular time, and for particular circumstances. 
The Laws, then, shows Socrates (as the Athenian Stranger) to be the true heir to 
Daedalus38, breathing life into his statue and practicing a kind of phantastics (Sophist, 
236C-E)39. The laws become an automaton, and life is breathed into it as a limited 
form of philosophy is integrated. 
                                                 
38 Cf Meno, 97D 
39 Cf Bernadete,  The Being of the Beautiful, II.83, “Knowledge seems compelled, as 




The Laws is the narrative (and image) of a founding in actuality, rather than 
speech. It occurs on a day long voyage to the cave of Zeus. This progression serves to 
tie the dialogue metaphorically to the allegory of the cave in the Republic while 
providing a link to the foundation of human law after the age of Kronos. This dual 
link evinces a core theme of the dialogue: the necessity of human intelligence for the 
ordering of social and political life. Under Kronos, humanity was essentially like 
cattle40, and had no need of art or knowledge. When we see humanity after it has been 
decimated by cataclysm, those isolated individuals who escape death and come 
together after the waters have receded are happy to be in one another’s company, 
according to the Athenian Stranger. But governing becomes necessary as human 
relationships become more complex, and as proximity creates conflicts. In this sense, 
Kleinias is right when he claims that the law is created with an eye to war, man 
against man and “each in private an enemy of himself” (Laws, 626E). The Athenian 
Stranger refutes Kleinias, arguing that laws are given for the sake of peace, not war; 
but the king or legislator’s eye is still fixed on the dangers of war. His eye is on 
prevention, not on victory.  
In the Laws the statesman or legislator has already been chosen, and is 
therefore a given. It is the laws themselves that are susceptible to deliberation. The 
opposite situation obtains in the Statesman; the legislator is a historical figment, and 
one must infer from the laws to the legislator. Plato thereby shows us two ways of 
intelligently approaching the law: creatively from what might be, or creatively from 
                                                 




what might have been. In the Phaedrus, Phaedrus inquires of Socrates as to whether 
the spot they have chosen is the same one from which Boreas was said to have seized 
Oreithuia from the Ilissus. Socrates provides a natural explanation for the myth – 
namely that Oreithuia was pushed by the wind, and thus was said to have been 
snatched up by Boreas. But even this explanation relies on the assumption that there 
ever was an Oreithuia, and is therefore itself mythological. The sense, therefore, is 
that explanations are meant to persuade. But what good is persuasion to a tradition 
populated with Centaurs, Chimaera, Gorgons, and Pegasuses? Such retellings belong 
to over-clever, laborious, and unfortunate people. Who else but philosophers reluctant 
to rule? Much as Socrates retells one myth with another (Phaedrus, 229A-229E), so 
the legislator who comes upon an existent regime must recreate the mythology of the 
people he legislates for.  
The defective nature of law requires the statesman or legislator to produce 
something akin to naturalistic explanations – likely stories – of what has gone before. 
This work preserves the content of the laws and, in fact, saves them from rational 
investigation. A legislator should set up guards grounded in prudence and true 
opinion, which intelligence will knit together (Laws, 632C).  But even from the 
beginning, laws are defective. They are defective because they rely on a changing 
world that cannot be predicted far in advance, and because they must depend on 
human beings for their execution. Yet laws need to be seen as timeless and sacred if 
they are to have a chance of adequately leading the souls of those they govern. This 
tension calls to mind the difference between nature (phusis) and law or convention 




laws to suit conditions is necessary, but also makes their conventionality obvious. 
Since not all human beings are thoughtful, laws must have more of the appearance of 
nature than convention, or else human beings will disregard the law. Legislators are 
obliged to use intelligence to teach statesmen, who must use their own intelligence to 
prove the integrity of the law while maintaining the state. 
The Athenian Stranger, it seems, needs to be foreign. For it is only from the 
vantage point of an outsider that one can safely examine the arbitrary nature of the 
traditional law. Such a vantage needs a philosophical outlook. This is because, as 
human beings, we have a tendency to view everything in terms of our own individual 
advantage. It appears everyone thinks they know how to rule (or “use a fine thing”), 
but what they really mean is to use it in accordance with their own desires (Laws, 
686E-687C). Practical judgment, or intelligence rightly understood, is therefore 
necessary if we are to see to the happiness of the city, and not some one individual.  
 
Intelligence and the Meno 
The question of whether natural differences between individuals form the 
basis for rational thought is complicated by the Socratic concept of anamnesis, or 
recollection. The hereditarian view of intelligence suggests that human beings have 
varying facility for thought and understanding, and that this facility is passed on 
genetically from parents to children. The notion of recollecting information from an 
otherworldly experience is, of course, entirely alien to modern science. If anamnesis, 




best fit to rule would be absurd; the doctrine would suggest that one could provide the 
environment for each child to recollect and perfect the intellectual virtues.  
The Meno begins with a question: “Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue 
is something teachable? Or is it not teachable, but something that comes from practice 
(askēton)? Or is it something neither from practice nor from learning, but something 
that comes to human beings by nature, or some other way?41” Meno identifies three 
possible origins of virtue: teaching, practice, and nature, all of which he considers 
mutually exclusive42. The abruptness of the question underscores its fundamental 
importance to the Socratic enterprise itself. The fact that Meno formulates the 
question, as opposed to Socrates, should also suggest to us that he has erred in 
assuming that the possible origins of virtue are mutually exclusive.  
If virtue were revealed to be teachable and learnable, but independent of 
practice and nature, it would be an upheaval of all politics. Consider Socrates’ city in 
speech in the Republic; guardians are chosen based upon what is taken to be their 
potential (Republic, Book III, 413C-D). It is possible that the real noble lie is not that 
of gold, silver, and bronze, but that there are any real differences between human 
beings other than those caused by obvious physical defect and differences in 
education. A myth of being well-born is certainly pleasing to the ears of an 
Adeimantus or Glaucon as Athenian gentlemen, because they are readier to accept 
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that they are aristocrats by nature rather than birth. That such a myth is pleasing to 
Socrates’ interlocutors makes it suspect precisely in its pleasing aspects. Many 
moderns would readily argue that excellence is much more, or entirely, the product of 
environment, opportunity, and education rather than latent gifts. But revealing that 
excellence has no genetic basis would undermine the justice of Socrates’ city. Justice 
requires that the most promising are chosen and raised accordingly. If philosophy is 
truly the best way of life, then arbitrarily picking some children to philosophize and 
others to support the city through labor represents the height of injustice: it would be 
the selection of a slave class by lot. 
Meno’s question clearly presupposes that virtue exists. He does not ask 
Socrates whether there is such a thing as virtue, nor does he assume the Protagorean 
position that man is the measure of all things43. After all, it seems apparent that some 
people stand out from others (Nicomachean Ethics, 1140b1-20).  But if virtue is 
transmitted solely through teaching, would not a virtuous person teach as many as 
possible how to be virtuous, for his sake and theirs? This is the problem that Socrates 
hints at later in the dialogue when discussing the sons of Pericles and Thucydides 
(Meno, 94A-94E). If virtue is teachable, and Pericles is virtuous, would he not ensure 
that his sons were educated in virtue? By extension, would a just, moderate, 
                                                 
43 Aristotle affirms the radical relativism of the Protagorean maxim, Metaphysics, 
1007b20-30. Aristotle points out that “those who repeat the saying of Protagoras” 
mean that “contradictory things are all true of the same thing at the same time;” 
which leaves open the possibility that Protagoras either meant something else or did 
not fully believe his own aphorism, i.e., that only “those who repeat” the saying 
actually mean what it implies. Protagoras does not assume the same stance with 
regard to virtue in Plato’s Protagoras, however; virtue appears to be something 




courageous, and wise person not do his utmost to ensure that virtue was widespread? 
Clearly, if everyone were virtuous, it would be to the benefit of all. To demand 
money for such an education seems particularly base. So the first alternative calls into 
question the possibility of virtue at all, even if Meno seems to be unaware of the 
implication. 
What does Meno intend by asking after practicing? Clearly, he does not mean 
habit (ēthos), or at least, not with the same conditions Aristotle places on habituated 
virtue. Meno’s imprecision makes us wonder; how is practice different from teaching 
and learning? One becomes excellent at playing the lyre or wrestling through 
practice, after all, but the practice is facilitated by a teacher. In contrast, virtue would 
have to be something that one already knows how to do, but must exercise to perfect. 
The term askēton refers to athletic training, but seems to imply something like 
mindless repetition44. Like strength (72E), virtue would be present in everyone to 
some degree, but in need of exercise. This formulation contains within it many of the 
same problems of justice as the previous. After all, if virtue is naturally present in all, 
but only some undergo the appropriate gymnastic to develop it fully, what accounts 
for the differences between individuals? Is not the patience or inclination to practice 
itself a part of virtue45?  The suggestion of practice as the origin of virtue is probably 
the argument that Aristotle summarizes as “by performing just actions one becomes a 
                                                 
44 Kevin Robb, “Asebeia and Sunousia: The issues behind the indictment of Socrates,” 
Note 15 
45 Cf Alcibiades I, 106E; Alcibiades was unwilling to learn the aulos. Socrates brings 
this up as a prelude to a discussion of Alcibiades’ impatience to enter politics despite 




just person, and by performing temperate actions one becomes a temperate person” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b1-20). But while this argument is “well said,” it isn’t 
entirely correct, insofar as virtue requires a particular way of being (1105a20-1105b). 
Further, Aristotle’s argument is directed toward the virtues of character rather than 
those of the intellect. 
If virtue is entirely natural, however, we should wonder at why education is 
important at all. As Socrates says, we should merely be content to identify the 
exceptional youth and set them up in the Acropolis away from corrupting influence 
(Meno, 89B). Even this formulation, however, raises the question of how natural 
goodness can be corrupted if virtue, and by implication vice, is not teachable. It hints 
again at the implication made in the Lesser Hippias that those most capable of virtue 
are the same ones most capable of vice. Education, then, would be teaching in a 
limited sense: instilling the zeal for searching that characterizes philosophy, which 
leads to the possibility of knowledge and the attainment of virtue. 
Any answer that Socrates gives to Meno is suspect.  When giving an account 
of figure, Socrates gives a first definition to Meno, but must elaborate because a 
conversation between friends should take into account the premises that would be 
familiar to the other person (75D-E).  The teaching must fit the student, so already we 
have entered the territory of likely stories. Plato’s Socrates is willing to leave his 
interlocutors with an image that is less than the full truth if that image serves the 
good. Platonic dialogues are designed to stimulate the reader to think, not merely to 
absorb a doctrine. As such, what is presented to the interlocutors cannot be taken at 




Meno’s memory for prepared speeches is very good; perhaps too good46. 
Much as Theaetetus seemed to summon the arguments of Parmenides, many Socratic 
interlocutors pass off memory for knowledge. Sometimes the source is common 
opinion, or law, or the opinion of a sophist. But the juxtaposition of rote 
memorization with the searching mode of Socrates’ dialectic demonstrates that it is 
genuine thinking that leads to knowledge. Memory is the enemy, to the extent that it 
forms the boundary of our intellectual horizons and limits further inquiry. Despite 
Socrates telling Meno that he is “not a very good rememberer,” he tells Hippias that 
he “pays attention to what people say.” In maintaining proper attribution of the 
speech in addition to the argument itself, thinking is saved from being conflated with 
memory. 
The distinction is critical, because it sets a limit on what education can 
provide, and the kinds of education that can be considered as such. While the student 
of philosophy should have a good memory, learning cannot be like a wax block on 
which symbols are merely rearranged to suit the occasion. It is fitting, then, that 
Meno questions the possibility of learning at all (80D). For while Meno is able to 
memorize, he seems entirely incapable of the seeking that must accompany 
knowledge as opposed to opinion. Plato’s emphasis on the seeking or zetetic nature of 
philosophy anticipates modern distinctions between memory and intelligence. More 
than that, however, it tells us the kind of qualities that are necessary to be virtuous 
even within the definition of virtue Meno first provides: to be capable of ruling men. 
                                                 




Meno is apparently deficient is a leader47 for precisely this reason: he is incapable of 
exercising his own intelligence and relies on that of opinion.  
The sort of education that Meno has received should be contrasted with the 
mathematical education of Theaetetus. Those skilled in calculation, Socrates told 
Glaucon, are naturally quick in all studies (Republic: 526b). Socrates seems to imply 
that the quickness is on account of the mathematical education, rather than an 
inherent quality. Just as we, as moderns, often rely on education as a proxy for 
intelligence, so did ancient Greeks rely on certain proxies, such as rhetorical skill. A 
sign of this is the way many young Greeks sought out sophists based upon their skill 
in arguing. Socrates does not diminish the role of natural intelligence by his 
comment, but in effect suggests that there are better, more objective ways to evaluate 
the young. Theaetetus has demonstrated to us that he has acquired knowledge 
independent of his teacher. 
As Jacob Klein points out48, Meno appears to follow a strategy attributed to 
Gorgias by Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations, 183b15-184a9), in which the teachers 
of rhetoric had students memorize questions and answers that seemed to cover the 
arguments for both sides of a question. Students, says Aristotle, are treated like a man 
with a pain in the foot. Rather than teach them an art of shoemaking, they are instead 
provided a variety of footwear such that their pains are addressed.  One wonders if the 
distinction might be overwrought. Isn’t the purpose of memory and of learning to 
have set approaches to certain problems, without having to seek the answer anew? 
                                                 
47 Ibid. ,pp. 36-37 




But ruling, as any suitably complex and changeable human endeavor, is subject to 
deliberation. It is this very deliberation that Meno avoids in his careless, memory-
based approach to argumentation. 
Meno’s doubts about learning inspire Socrates to tell the myth of anamnesis; 
his account relies on the testimony of priests, priestesses, and poets. Importantly, 
Socrates points out that to believe with Meno would “make us lazy and is pleasant 
only for fainthearted people to hear, but the other argument makes us both ready to 
work and to seek” (81D-81E). This qualification hints to us that the myth is 
provisional. Even if we take anamnesis seriously as a Platonic doctrine, Plato 
contradicts the completeness of the knowledge acquired after death. Particularly in 
the Phaedrus, souls are differently disposed to see the truth of underlying reality 
(Phaedrus, 247E-248E). The Meno, however, has it that “the soul is immortal and has 
been born many times and has seen all things both here and in the house of Hades, 
there is nothing it hasn’t learned” (Meno, 81C-D). For the purposes of the Meno, 
every soul has learned everything. Meno does not notice that this argument is 
circular: Socrates substitutes “seeing” for learning, and then changes the terms at the 
end.  
Socrates further emphasizes this egalitarian view by choosing the slave boy 
for his demonstration. The demonstration, while convincing to Meno, should not 
convince us. Socrates uses leading words to make the slave boy answer, and in fact 
leads him into error twice before ultimately arriving at the correct solution. A more 
reflective man than Meno might have been struck by the injustice of keeping a slave 




interlocutor emphasize the important role that human thinking plays in leadership, 
and pairing his deficiencies with the image of recollection shows how little Meno has 
developed his natural capacity: even a slave seems better suited to the task of thinking 
a problem through.  
Our own system of primary and secondary education is also called into 
question, to the extent it relies on rote memory. That is not to say that the youngest 
students should be debating politics, nor that they should not use their memories, but 
that they should be exercising their critical faculties. To preserve human intelligence, 
we must have a system of education that provokes students to use it, especially for 
those who would be our future statesmen. Otherwise, they are limited to talking 
points and the opinions of experts, having only opinion and not knowledge. 
 
Intelligence and the Republic 
The true philosopher, according to Socrates, is a friend to the virtues. By 
nature, he is a good learner, has a good memory, and is magnificent and charming 
(Republic, 487A).  But Adeimantus objects: wouldn’t the many say that those who 
pursue philosophy end up entirely vicious, or at least useless to cities?  The first case 
turns out to be split in two, as the many are incapable of distinguishing between those 
who pretend to be philosophers and those who are philosophers by nature. As such, 
these degraded examples must be either those who have had their natures corrupted, 




 The nature of the philosopher is such that he is only born rarely among 
human beings (Republic, 491A-B). It is the very rarity of such a nature – much like 
gold – that imbues him with an inherent worth that is attractive to those who would 
make use of him. This seems to be the reason Socrates approached Alcibiades first by 
acknowledging the many suitors vying for Alcibiades’ affection (Alcibiades I, 103A-
104A); high capability is useful for both good and bad ends. Socrates has called the 
true philosopher a “friend to the virtues;” he has not called him virtuous49. Socrates 
hints that what is commonly called virtue does not deserve the high praise it receives 
from the many. Rather, as Alfarabi points out, the moral virtues are attainable by 
anyone given proper training50. It is the intellectual virtues that are rare, and that 
imbue the moral virtues with meaning and seriousness (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1139a20-30). In fact, Socrates argues the virtues do not exist in the individual before 
they are developed, except for prudence (Republic, 519A), which is dangerous insofar 
as “the sharper it sees, the more evil it accomplishes” in a bad soul.  
Plato points out that those with the most perfect natures are also the ones most 
susceptible to corruption; natural advantages provide greater opportunities to pursue 
one’s own perceived interests at the expense of the good.  The comment, which forms 
part of a larger argument about how the philosophical character is corrupted in unjust 
cities, underscores the urgency of the task (Republic, 491C-E).  Plato wants us to 
understand that the most capable among us also possess the most potential destructive 
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the virtues, giving recognition to virtuous men, and he should honor those who are 
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force.  Though Socrates was tried for corrupting young men, the Republic wants us to 
understand that the real corruption - and greatest danger - comes from the kind of city 
that does not thoughtfully consider the differences between individuals, and only 
relies on these differences for purposes of personal gain.   
For Plato, one of the worst dangers to the philosophical nature is to be put to 
non-philosophical use. This realization is all the more remarkable when we look at 
the highly instrumental way in which we approach primary and secondary education 
even today, largely in terms of practical outcome rather than theoretical inquiry. Even 
when the lessons themselves are theoretical, education is justified in terms of 
economic gain rather than intrinsic worth.  Despite the fact that Socrates has pointed 
out the benefits of education to soul, Glaucon still seems to insist upon justifying the 
usefulness of education in practical terms (Republic, 527D-E). The contrast between 
the two educational objectives brings to mind the difference between Ibn Tufayl’s 
Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe: in the former, a life of solitude 
yields a journey to philosophy; in the latter, the development of technological 
knowledge to master nature51.  
Plato is concerned that there is a hierarchy among rational beings. Socrates 
argued “each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but rather differs in his 
nature; different men are apt for the accomplishment of different jobs52” (Republic, 
370B).  From this recognition - that the differentiation of roles in a city is both 
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necessary for the health of the city and a consequence of the natural inequalities in 
individual endowments - Plato’s Socrates deduces three classes of citizens.  The 
guardians (rulers) are intended to be the most philosophic - the so-called philosopher 
kings of the city in speech.  Plato begins the discussion of guardianship in the context 
of military protection, but soon he divides out a class from these who he calls the true 
guardians, leaving the others as auxiliaries. This ruling class is to be determined by 
rigorous testing of the youth of the city.   
Plato’s elaboration of this hierarchy seems to be largely functional, given the 
task of constructing a city. It is helpful to turn to Alfarabi for an elaboration of rank 
that is more explicit. Alfarabi begins from the observation that people depend upon 
one another to accomplish their tasks (Book of Religion, Section 13). Of course, the 
philosopher qua philosopher (or the true king, for that matter), does not need other 
human beings for his work in the same way the farmer needs the carpenter, 
blacksmith, or cowherd. His experience may be enriched by friendship and the chance 
to exercise the moral virtues. Alfarabi’s orderly city brings to mind the importance, 
for Aristotle, of leisure (Nicomachean Ethics 1177b20-30 and Politics, 1337b5-20)53. 
While the philosopher’s work itself depends on no other individual, the maintenance 
of his body does; the extent to which the city provides for these needs is the extent of 
the leisure afforded to the philosopher. Alfarabi points out that while the theoretical 
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Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, pp. 34-37, for a 
suggestion that the absence of commentary on the Politics from the Islamic 
community was due to an attempt to protect Aristotle from religious criticism rather 




intellect is separate from the body, and represents the ultimate perfection, it “does not 
arrive at this state except by its previous need for having recourse to the bodily 
faculties and their actions for performing its [own] actions.54”  
Souls, then, are like the organs of a city. Each serves an overall purpose in 
accordance with its rank and to the benefit of the whole. The product of one organ is 
necessary for the continued function of another. This arrangement suggests that some 
souls are, by nature, directed toward the mundane more than others, so that it is even 
possible for loftier souls to do their work. 
This is a departure from the view that the city-in-speech was crafted merely to 
illustrate a city in which philosophy could be tolerated. In that view, the city is 
constructed to protect the philosopher from charges of impiety, and it is the only 
arrangement in which the city could take philosophy seriously. But in Alfarabi’s 
elaboration, the philosopher and the city are able to come into their fullest being 
through their mutual existence. Socrates points out that the city must not be directed 
toward the happiness of any one class (Republic, 421B-C and 519E-520A), ostensibly 
to placate Glaucon’s concern that philosophers would be done an injustice to be 
forced to rule. But if Alfarabi is correct in his emphasis, Socrates’ rebuttal takes on a 
different character: that the full happiness of the philosopher is, in fact, dependent 
upon a well-ordered city that provides him with the “relish” of human contact and 
affection (Selected Aphorisms, 61).  
                                                 




If souls are the organs of the city, what organ would the philosopher be in this 
analogy55? It is tempting to make him the heart (or the brain, for us), but he has an 
existence independent of the body. As a physician to the city, the philosophical king 
exists, to some extent, outside of the city. Unlike the body, which arises naturally and 
needs intervention to fix only illnesses, the philosopher arranges the city and tends to 
it continuously. Alfarabi points out that the greater the endeavor, the greater the need 
for prudence or practical judgment. And “prudence is what the public calls intellect. 
And when this faculty is in a human being, he is called intelligent56”. 
 
Summary 
It is important to note what appears to be political conservatism in Plato’s 
dialogues. It is Plato’s Socrates who tries to dissuade Alcibiades from going before 
the Athenian people and embarking on a political career. Socrates similarly hopes to 
prevent Hippocrates from beginning a political education with the sophist Protagoras. 
The Eliatic Stranger paints a terrifying portrait of the statesman for his audience, 
Theaetetus and Young Socrates, presenting political knowledge as impossible to 
attain and political power as dangerous to hold.  
                                                 
55 Thomas Hobbes identifies sovereigns as the artificial soul of the Leviathan, 
counselors “by whom all things needful for it [the artificial body] to know are 
suggested unto it, are the memory” and equity and laws are “an artificial reason and 
will”. Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction. The philosopher’s place in the Leviathan is 
no different from that of ordinary men unless he occupies one of these roles. 




The investigation into the sort of knowledge necessary to be a statesman ends 
in aporia, but in this regard political science is not sui generis; Plato always seems to 
want us to acknowledge the difficulty of making the human things fully intelligible. 
While we cannot, it seems, arrive at definitive conclusions about the highest things, 
we can arrive at provisional conclusions suitable to our circumstances. Socrates does 
not mean to suggest that philosophers cannot or should not rule, but that the proper 
orientation toward ruling should be one of reticence rather than eagerness. Political 
life requires making decisions based on limited information, and if the philosopher 
does not legislate or rule, someone else will. This is precisely the situation the 
Athenian Stranger finds himself in: either he or Kleinias must legislate.  
This view is not altogether tragic. After all, the city ruled by perfect 
intelligence seems to be like that ruled by Kronos: the inhabitants of the city – they 
can no longer be called citizens – are more like cattle than human beings. In wisdom, 
too, there must be moderation. There may be a grain of truth in the myth Protagoras 
tells Socrates in the Protagoras: to form a city, every citizen must have a share of 
virtue. It is for this reason that Alfarabi points out that no organ should operate at the 
expense of the whole body.  
Though perfect wisdom in a ruler is neither possible nor seems to be desirable, 
because such rule would have the appearance of utter tyranny57, the outstanding 
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beings, the city being one in the manner of the soul would require that all intellectual 





intellect seems to be important to political rule for Plato and Aristotle. The Laws 
gradually reveals to us that legislation cannot be an instantaneous, immutable act. If it 
were possible to legislate perfectly in such a way that the constitution of the city 
would endure, the city would resemble the ship of Theseus, reconstituted over time 
by mere replacement of its materials. The Republic would have no need of a 
philosophical guardian class, nor would the Laws require a Nocturnal Council.   
The changing circumstances of political life are exactly what legislation hopes 
to minimize, but wise rulers must always have a way to recollect the understanding 
that informed the legislation when the city is subjected to change. Though Plato’s 
Socrates uses memory as a foil, memory itself is not to blame, insofar as it is a record 
of our experiences. The way we use memory is troublesome because it blurs the lines 
between self and other, and between our own investigations and the opinions of 
others. When Socrates says that he “pays attention” to what others say, he is still 
using his memory, but it is a memory that preserves attribution to whoever has given 
a particular speech. It is also a memory being exercised in coordination with the 
searching that accompanies dialectic. When Socrates intimates that thinking is like a 
dialogue one has with oneself, he is showing the paradoxical contrast between his 
own memory and that of Theaetetus: Socrates’ memory allows him to have a 
discussion within himself as though there were many, but Theaetetus cannot think at 
                                                                                                                                           
because the ability to reason is what sets humans apart; but even if it could be done, 
the city would cease to be a city. Excessive wisdom in rule is therefore not wise, 
because it would be putting the guardians’ judgment constantly in place of that of the 




all because his memories have taken on the appearance of his own knowledge. 
Though Socrates is one, he is many; though Theaetetus is many, he is one. 
Memory is another form of seeming. It allows one to seem like one knows, 
insofar as one is able to parrot back the opinions of others. As expressed through 
tradition, it takes on the gravitas of myth and legend. Memory becomes more 
pernicious the more one relies upon it, and the more it pretends to be knowledge as 
opposed to mere record. The philosopher must always leave breadcrumbs, then, to 
allow the work of recollection. The laws have preludes not merely to educate citizens 
in virtue, but to illuminate the path back to the source of legislating. The Laws is 
narrated over the course of a bright day on the way to the cave of Zeus, though with 
stops in the shade. The laws, it seems, are the skein of thread that allows us to 
navigate our way back into the sun. This navigation must always be an intensely 
intellectual effort, limited by the combination of one’s natural intellectual abilities 
and one’s education. 
Human intelligence served an important function in classical political 
philosophy. It is useful not only for managing the passions, which allows political 
community to become possible at all, but as a means of discovering the truth about all 
things, including the best regime. Plato emphasizes the difference between memory 
and thinking, which is analogous to the difference between legislating and ruling; the 
use of thinking is what bridges the gap between opinion and intelligence in the 
Platonic sense. The ability to recollect and to think is necessary if one is to have 




circumstances in the world. One therefore needs philosophical intelligence, or 




Chapter 3: Machiavelli and Intelligence 
 
 
In this chapter, I will first provide some background as to Machiavelli’s place 
in the tradition of political philosophy, and introduce the terminology he uses to 
describe intelligence. Next, I will use Machiavelli’s comedies, the Mandragola and 
the Clizia, as domestic examples of Machiavellian political principles. I will do this 
by reference to his political works, with the intention of drawing out aspects of his 
political theory that are less clear from the overt teachings of the Prince and 
Discourses. Finally, I look more closely at the terminology Machiavelli uses to 
describe intelligence to argue that Machiavelli recognizes differences in innate 
intellectual powers, and that he feels these differences are critical to political life. 
Throughout the chapter, I make reference to a frequent Machiavellian theme: 
appealing to bold youth, guided by old prudence. This theme represents a break with 
the classical philosophers in one sense, but in another preserves the tradition by 
supplying a very different conclusion given similar premises.  
Machiavelli’s emphasis on the effectual truth and practical politics is widely 
understood as a break with classical political theory.  To what extent is his perpetual 
republic compatible with the tradition of intelligent, philosophical rule? The tradition 
is carried forward, even as it undergoes a radical alteration under Machiavelli. To be 
sure, Machiavelli does not accept Aristotle’s theory of the intellect, and utterly rejects 




dynamic, and it relies centrally on human intellect and intellectual differences. 
Machiavelli abandons the conservative character of classical political philosophy, 
appealing to youth as the engines of change, on one side, and a new intellectual elite 
to guide them on the other. 
Machiavelli is so synonymous with cleverness and social manipulation that 
the term “Machiavellian intelligence” has a special significance in psychological 
research58. The alternative term, “the social brain,” belies the benign gloss – as well 
as dramatic simplification – with which social science treats Machiavellian strategies. 
While Machiavelli or Machiavellianism is popularly associated with ruthless 
amorality and manipulation, he is less associated with the idea of the philosopher 
king, or philosophical rule generally, in part because his advice seems too evil to be 
philosophical59.  While Machiavelli clearly places an emphasis on intelligence, it is 
more controversial to associate him with anything that could be called philosophical 
rule. Machiavelli both distrusted and despised the kind of idleness or leisure that 
made Athenian philosophy possible, and particularly the “ambitious leisure” that 
characterized Italy in his time. The strange coincidence of temporal and priestly 
power has made the moderns effeminate60, assisted by the coopted Greek philosophy 
that makes men “less esteem the honor of the world.” At the same time, Machiavelli 
relied on philosophy, history, and reasoning in his own mode and with a bolder stance 
toward the political. Whereas Athenian philosophy can be said to be fenced in by the 
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fear generated by Socrates’ death, Machiavelli implies the passionate intellect cannot 
help but rule61. The question of philosophic rule is that of orientation and focus; for 
Plato and Aristotle, rule is a duty or compulsion, and the philosopher king longs for 
the repose of old age in which he can contemplate what is62. For Machiavelli, politics 
is the primary and proper focus of intellectual labor, and age is the enemy that saps 
the vigor necessary to take action63.  
Machiavelli emphasized the necessity of political involvement, and 
contemporary reliance on the civil service and scientific experts seems to bear his 
view out. Because we live in an era that expects scientific or technological solutions 
to most problems – even problems that are created by science and technology – 
science is necessarily political and cannot exist outside of political influence. In this 
sense, it is easy to side with Machiavelli’s assertions that intellectuals cannot 
withdraw from political life. Machiavelli was vexed by a Church that had coopted 
Aristotle and made his philosophy – transformed into dogma – very much a political 
presence. This, however, preceded the break between the study of philosophy and the 
study of natural science.  The contemporary view represents a return to the prejudice 
of ancient Athens, when philosophy was held to be useless to the city; the critical 
difference is in the praise of natural science. Machiavelli’s new political science finds 
ways to engage with the political process indirectly and covertly, and is therefore 
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extremely useful to influence our own democracy, especially when it may be hostile 
to what it perceives as elitism. 
Machiavelli provides hints of his new considerations of intelligence with what 
at first appears to be a throwaway line – as though Machiavelli has any throwaway 
lines – after explaining that the Prince is the result of learning “from long experience 
of modern things and a continuous reading of ancient ones.64” The Prince was a gift 
for Lorenzo de’ Medici, and was not published until after Machiavelli’s death. The 
Prince has two audiences: princes and potential princes like Lorenzo and posterity. 
He tells us that the greatest gift he could bestow is to “give you the capacity to 
understand (facultà di potere intendere) in very short time all that I have learned and 
understood (conosciuto) in so many years and with so many hardships and dangers to 
myself.65” Facultà appears three times in the Prince. The second and third 
occurrences are in chapter 16, having the meaning of resources and ability. The 
prince, attempting to be liberal, cannot help but squander his resources. We should 
understand by this that Machiavelli’s own resources are limitless, his own ability 
indefatigable. It is further interesting that the verb intendere is the same word 
Machiavelli uses to set forth the three classes of brains66. The first understands 
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(intende) by itself, but the second merely discerns (discerne) what others understand. 
To discern what Machiavelli understands is to marvel at his wisdom, or to be capable 
of instruction.  The distinction between understanding and discerning is reminiscent 
of how Aristotle distinguishes astuteness (sunesis) as recognizing the practical 
judgment of another person67. Machiavelli, however, implies that one can ascend 
from discerning to understanding by oneself.  
Does Machiavelli really mean, then, that by studying in the way he proposes 
we will be able to understand by ourselves, overcoming the mere discerning that 
seems natural to those of us without Machiavelli’s intellect? By drawing this parallel 
between the kind of cognition the most excellent brain is capable of and the kind of 
understanding Machiavelli is able to provide us, he seems to promise the possibility 
of a new brain. This seems self-contradictory, as Machiavelli uses the word cervelli 
(brains) instead of animi (minds), and altogether avoids anime (souls). He therefore 
suggests that human intelligence is situated in an organ of the body; it is a bodily 
intelligence. By discussing the types of brains as organs, he implies not only that 
intelligence has a material cause, but that intelligence varies in the same way that 
other parts of the body vary between human beings. Can we truly change our brains 
any more than we can change our height? If Lorenzo, or we, have the second class of 
brain, then what Machiavelli seems to promise is truly surprising, or he retracts his 
promise.  To keep his word, Machiavelli must supply us with the faculty of a most 
excellent brain.  
                                                 




Machiavelli’s primary mode of expressing intelligent action is through 
prudence, but Machiavelli uses the term in a wide variety of ways and circumstances. 
The only certain feature of prudence is that Machiavelli means something different by 
it than the traditional Aristotelian definition of practical judgment. For Aristotle, 
practical judgment is the bridge that links the abstract world of wisdom and intellect 
with the temporal world of particular events. The realm of practical judgment is 
variable human experience, to which what is ultimately true does not directly apply.  
Because practical judgment is reliant on wisdom, and is an expression of it, practical 
judgment is constrained within the bounds of moral virtue. Its dependence on wisdom 
further serves as a bar to the young because practical judgment requires both 
experience and wisdom. An Alcibiades can have no hope, in Aristotle’s formulation, 
of acquiring practical judgment in his youth; he is unsuitable for political life – 
whatever his other qualities – because he is young and lacks the experience of 
particulars necessary to the formation of practical judgment68. As such, the young are 
constitutionally unfit for politics - the quintessential object of practical wisdom.  
Machiavelli pulls these dependencies apart: he has seized upon an ancient 
criticism of philosophy, articulated in the Clouds: philosophy lacks practical 
application. Unlike Aristophanes, however, Machiavelli believes that the problem of 
philosophy is soluble and that he has a solution.  His political philosophy disregards 
the classical hierarchy of ways of life69, and instead focuses on the practical realities 
of ruling and government that were obscured in the ancient accounts. Machiavelli’s 
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pretense – abandoning philosophy as a mode of inquiring into political life – creates a 
radical new necessity for precisely the kinds of intelligent minds that are most 
capable of it. 
Aristotle’s characterization of practical judgment as a faculty that requires 
time and experience to develop would exclude youth from politics; Aristotle thereby 
reinforces the Socratic reticence to engage in politics until firmer conclusions can be 
drawn and spirit has dampened. Machiavelli views prudence as something teachable, 
or at least obtainable from an intermediary. Because Machiavelli is comfortable with 
acquisition, he is unconcerned about the philosophical purity of young princes. 
Rather, he wants them to approach their acquisition with both intelligence and 
boldness; if such a combination cannot be found in a single human being, the young 
prince must listen to one who can provide the intelligence and prudence that he 
himself lacks. But old prudence must make way for young boldness70. The old 
prudence may be Machiavelli himself, or his teachings conveyed by his captains who 
then directly teach the young. This formulation is almost a paean to liberal education, 
insofar as the young take counsel from the great minds before them, supplementing 
through education what nature does not supply on her own.  
Machiavelli speaks to the young and offers an end-run around this difficulty: 
he provides the reader with the experience available from history. Such a solution is 
different from the well-worn adage that those who forget history are condemned to 
repeat it, because Machiavelli is neither interested in providing faithful accounts of 
                                                 




history, nor in inductively creating a set of rules from an array of particular historical 
occurrences. Plato and Aristotle have not given us practical judgment, leaving that to 
our life experiences. Machiavelli realizes just how dear those experiences are to those 
who wish to rule and who do not have the luxury of learning from mistakes. As such, 
he embarks on a different kind of philosophical education. Since it is “good to reason 
about everything71,” he argues seemingly empirically from historical examples. In 
effect, Machiavelli supplies us with the experience in ruling that we lack, which 
would be too dangerous for us to acquire in the course of becoming rulers. 
Why does Machiavelli resort to history as the basis of his political 
philosophy? Machiavelli had before him the examples of Plato and Aristotle and 
almost two thousand years of philosophers, scholars, and imitators who used similar 
modes of expression. The classical philosophers had understood that different kinds 
of arguments should be used for different human beings; the best form of 
philosophical teaching is in person and literally ad hominem72 – to the man himself, 
not to the general audience on whom the speaker would need to rely to follow and 
understand. This need for caution73 can be resolved either by refraining from writing 
or by writing esoterically.  
The difference in Machiavelli’s mode is not identical with the dichotomy of 
esoteric versus exoteric; exoteric philosophy would look more like an Aristotelian 
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treatise than a Machiavellian history lesson. Machiavelli’s main political works adopt 
neither the mode of Xenophon, who wrote a fictional history in his Cyropaedia74, nor 
Thucydides who wrote directly of real historical events, but added his own 
commentary to the overarching narrative75. Instead, Machiavelli provides us with 
snippets of what appear to be historical object lessons that make the particular point 
that he has derived from his study. To write a historical narrative is to ground one’s 
thinking too specifically to the particular circumstances; Livy can do so, because he 
had, as it were, the whole of the Roman republic and empire to draw from, his 
criticisms were directed at the existing Roman state, and he did not appear to make a 
project of managing future captains of Rome. While general rules may be derived 
over the course of such a narrative, their presentation is circumscribed by the need for 
linear storytelling. So, while philosophy is constructed too often in the air, history qua 
history is much too close to the ground. What Machiavelli provided is instead a 
philosophy that is grounded in the experience of history, but is not constrained by the 
necessity of telling a story; nor, indeed, by the requirement that history must be 
faithfully relayed.  
 
The Political Teachings of Clizia and Mandragola 
The plots of both Clizia and Mandragola are driven by the carnal desires of 
passionate young men. Because the plays are directed toward the most private of 
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human experiences, the family and sex, they both appear to be apolitical from the 
outset; influenced by but not elaborative of Machiavelli’s political works. 
Machiavelli’s characters, however, are not Machiavelli himself. Their ambitions are 
much more parochial, so that they may rule intelligently, but not philosophically. 
Machiavelli’s political works are intentionally difficult and contain contradictions 
that require the reader to compare his varying counsels. The plays provide us with a 
rare insight into Machiavellian machinations from start to finish, with an internally 
consistent narrative.  Such a narrative, in turn, allows us some insight into the less 
accessible political works. It would be an error to assume that the plays represent a 
more concrete or final version of Machiavelli’s political teachings, but they give 
another way to examine the roles of the Machiavellian political cast: the prince, the 
minister, the priest, the captain, and the people.   
Machiavelli holds that a state may be “ruined by women76,” which is to say 
that what men, and especially princes, do on account of women represents an 
existential threat to the state.  The essential task of the true prince – of the person who 
wields judgment rather than authority – is to manage passions so that the apparent 
prince is able to gain the property and women he desires without risking the whole 
enterprise. The Machiavellian comedies depict the young who are helpless in the face 
of their passions, unable to summon the ingenuity to engineer their own success. But 
not all of the young are helpless.  
                                                 




Clizia is a comedy because of the apparent imbalance of power between 
Nicomaco as head of household and his wife and son, Sofronia and Cleandro. Were 
Cleandro himself powerful or ambitious, Machiavelli would have instead written a 
tragedy. The young are a necessity in any republic and they are the necessary 
materials with which armies are constructed, but they have a particular ambition all 
their own. Machiavelli tells us that it is better to temporize with inconveniences in a 
state than to strike them77. He begins that chapter of the Discourses by discussing the 
dictator as a means of bypassing ordinary debate and deliberation in a republic. The 
kinds of inconveniences are either external or internal, but internal inconveniences are 
far more likely, such as when a citizen gains too much strength, or a fundamental law 
has been undermined. We are confronted with a comparison of the dictator, who uses 
extraordinary powers through a legal means, with citizens who are able to seize 
extraordinary authority through extralegal means. The young are a principle threat. 
Human beings desire the beginnings of things, and they especially admire potential in 
those who are both young and virtuous. The nature of youth is such that it wants its 
own way; even more than others, they desire everything but are unable to attain it78. 
The nature of the multitude is to desire to make use of able youths and to admire them 
until youthful ambition becomes a crisis. The multitude, lacking prudence, often 
desires its own ruin79. 
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Plato’s Socrates would charge philosophers with attempting to divest youths 
of their ambition in favor of a conservative, cautious political stance. For Machiavelli, 
the question is how should one temporize with youthful ambition, and the answer 
seems to be that is harmful for the city to fail to honor a youth who has shown so 
much virtue as to become known for a notable thing; even if the post for which he is 
chosen needs the prudence of the old80. So the youth must be fitted with an artificial 
prudence, and this can come about either through “that utility for which one should 
seek knowledge of histories81” or from those who have acquired prudence through 
long experience and who can supply this knowledge as advice. 
Intelligence in the classical view is used to dampen ambition, but Machiavelli 
sees youthful energy and acquisitiveness as the vehicle of intelligence. The worldly 
conquests of youth are the material from which intellectual victories are crafted. The 
Machiavellian advisor, in his purest form, supplies new modes and orders not only to 
the prince’s new state, but to the intellectual state as well. The desire to acquire 
intellectually can then be distinguished from the desire to acquire materially, but the 
combination of the two establishes Machiavellian political philosophy as an attempt 
at comprehensive ruling.  
Machiavelli provides a series of models for the role for the advisor: Sofronia, 
Lugurio, Fabrizio, the minister or advisor, and Machiavelli himself. “Prudence 
consists in knowing how to recognize the qualities of inconveniences, and in picking 
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the less bad as good.82” Unlike Aristotle’s practical judgment, Machiavelli’s prudence 
has no moral dimension; it does not aim at choosing what is good for human beings, 
but merely that which is less bad. Any state that exists for a long time will be faced 
with a large number of inconveniences, whether imposed from without or within. 
Such is the result of living in a world populated with barbarians on the outside and 
potential tyrants on the inside. For Machiavelli, it is impossible to eliminate 
inconveniences. For every inconvenience one suppresses, another emerges83. 
Therefore, one chooses the course that presents fewer inconveniences from the outset.  
 
Sofronia and Cleandro 
The machinations of Ligurio and Sofronia are necessarily of a lower order 
because they are directed toward domestic concerns rather than matters of state. Both 
schemers are paired with otherwise helpless lovers who rely on them for satisfaction. 
While Lugurio seems to depict the more recognizable Machiavellian advisor, 
Sofronia appears indifferent to her son’s pleadings (“But I tell you this plainly, that if 
I believed I’d be taking her out of Nicomaco’s hands just to put her into yours, I 
wouldn’t intervene in this84”).  Sofronia pursues her own ambitions while attempting 
to manage the passions of both Nicomaco and Cleandro. The servants, Eustachio and 
Pirro, are partisans, each expecting to benefit from the triumph of his respective 
master. In consistent Machiavellian mode, Sofronia desires wealth and position for 
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her family; ambition that happens to have the common good as a result. The subject 
matter with which she must work is altogether poor; Nicomaco has means but can 
think only of satisfying carnal desires. If virtue is “knowing how to do something85,” 
Cleandro appears to have no independent virtue beyond whatever wealth he might 
inherit from his father.  
It appears that Sofronia’s virtue has remained hidden until this crisis. Much 
like Machiavelli’s depiction of Brutus86, she simulated the obedient wife until such 
time as she could overthrow the existing regime and take control of it for her own 
purposes. It is only when her husband has displayed sufficient vulnerability, and 
when she is able to sexually humiliate him, that she can remake the family with 
herself as head. Similar to Machiavelli’s depiction of Pacuvius Calanus, the 
humiliation is a form of election in which the existing authority is upheld in name 
only by undermining its claims to superiority87. Clizia illustrates in miniature what is 
necessary to return a state to its beginnings. Machiavelli’s audience would have 
expected that Sofronia and Nicomaco were married for advantage, not love. Cleandro 
characterizes Nicomaco as willing to put his son in prison, send his wife away, and 
burn down the family home88.  That is, he is willing to dissolve the entire state for 
shortsighted acquisition. Sofronia demonstrates the kind of intelligence necessary to 
establish a new order with the same face; the kind of intelligence that can use cruelty 
well. 
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Sofronia also shows the kind of tumult that arises from keeping intelligence 
hidden. Machiavelli sees tumult as a valuable way to keep republics healthy. For 
Machiavelli, the prudent person holds back and plans until she finds the right time to 
conquer; she accepts an outwardly subservient role that gives her the opportunity to 
wield her influence when it is most convenient for her and least convenient for those 
who hold power. It would be better in a political community, however, if we could 
know who these intelligent people are, and allow them to deliberate and order things 
from an earlier point. In the Machiavellian comedy, the revelation of Sofronia’s 
superiority is perfectly timed with Fortuna, so that Clizia’s noble birth is revealed to 
resolve the conflict in Sofronia’s favor. The comedy, in fact, depends upon internal 
conflict to provide tension and drive the plot; this theme resonates with Machiavelli’s 
political arguments.  In real politics, however, it would be better not to have to wait 
for a Brutus to reveal himself, or for intelligent people to solve political problems 
when they are at their climax. Rather, it would be preferable to have such people 
readied and involved with political life, so that they would be prepared in 
extraordinary circumstances. The life of the mathematician or scientist is no 
preparation for political activity.  
 
Ligurio and Callimaco 
Turning to the Mandragola, Callimaco is in an altogether different position 
than Cleandro. He is an orphan returning from a self-imposed exile in France. As the 
protagonist, Callimaco has not inherited a metaphorical kingdom from his parents; 




Lucrezia. Callimaco arrives in Italy with the start of what cannot yet be called a 
conspiracy, but a firm disposition89 to take Lucrezia for himself. When Callimaco 
reveals that he has left France to find Lucrezia and seduce her, his servant Siro 
responds “If you’d spoken to me about it in Paris, I’d have known what to advise 
you90,” i.e., to stay in France and forget Lucrezia. Callimaco has, in effect, chosen his 
necessity. He lived a life “with very great happiness,” but blames fortune for making 
him aware of Lucrezia’s beauty. Machiavelli denies the possibility of an Aristotelian 
stable condition of happiness, because no matter what human beings have, they 
always wish to acquire more. The play is grounded in the desire to acquire and 
conspiracy, and it is marked by the absence of external demands on the young prince 
– the scheme is required solely because he is able desire without being able to 
attain91.  
The reason Callimaco is unable to attain, in this case, is that he has exhausted 
his knowledge of how to seduce. Lucrezia’s nature is such that she will not respond to 
amorous advances, her husband is rich and the marriage has no obvious defects, she 
has no interest in social gatherings common to women her age, and there is no servant 
or tradesman he could trick or bribe into using to get close to her. His conspiracy is 
cut off because his existing modes are circumscribed by her orders, so that what are 
needed are new modes on his part to create a new order on hers. Callimaco’s solution 
is to employ an advisor, a former marriage broker and beggar, Ligurio, who is 
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suspicious precisely because he has the qualities necessary to execute the plan. 
Callimaco begins to follow the advice Machiavelli gives in chapter twenty-two of the 
Prince, promising to make him rich to “keep him good.” Ligurio, in his turn, has 
“desire for you to satisfy this desire of yours almost as much as you do yourself.92” 
Ligurio, like Machiavelli himself, is willing “to play the servant to one who 
can wear a better coat than he can.93” The advisor, who has a first rate brain, is paired 
with young man who has means and spirit. Callimaco is not altogether stupid like 
Lucrezia’s husband, Nicia, and is capable of learning from Ligurio how to execute a 
plan. But the suspicion with which Callimaco initially treats Ligurio speaks to a 
deeper Machiavellian issue. Fortune does not seem to give everything to men, so that 
those who are most intelligent have little fortune, and those who are less or least 
intelligent may have much. This difference in natures threatens war between the 
haves and the have-nots, in so far as the have-nots are capable of outwitting the 
haves. The solution seems to be to satisfy the differing ambitions of the two factions: 
the young and ambitious want power, and the intelligent want means and a different 
class of glory. This apparent solution is proven insufficient by the credulity of Nicia, 
who is convinced of Callimaco’s genius by his ability to speak Latin. Nicia’s vanity is 
such that he believes he can assess Callimaco’s knowledge and learning by speaking 
to him94. Intelligence is the instrument of intention, and the intentions provided in 
Mandragola are necessarily inferior because they originate from Callimaco and 
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Nicia. The true designs of the advisor must remain hidden and left for us to guess 
because second-rate minds only understand second-rate motives. A loftier goal is at 
best stupefying and at worst misinterpreted.  
The combination of Callimaco and Ligurio shows that their association gives 
Callimaco the appearance of having Ligurio’s talents. Under the influence of Ligurio, 
Callimaco appears intelligent and capable of reasoning from means to ends. Ligurio, 
however, is also lacking: for all of his ability, Ligurio is in a mean state. Ligurio’s 
circumstances cannot be explained by mere class differences, because it is clear that 
he is able to easily plan profitable schemes. Ligurio’s defect, then, is that he has 
intelligence but not heart. Intelligence allows us to solve problems, but it does not 
necessarily point us toward the problems to solve. The classical philosophers argued 
that the city was an outgrowth of human nature, and so the highest object of political 
philosophy is to craft the best city. Having rejected this premise, Machiavelli argues 
that the intelligent person has his own objectives, but that these are not necessarily 
political in the ordinary sense.  His focus on these seemingly impractical objectives 
comes at the expense of material ambition. Without ambition and acquisition, the 
intellect is wasted, to the detriment of the state.  Modern governments are acquisitive 
economically if not martially, and the electorate has its own desires that it expects its 
representatives to pursue on its behalf.  The combination of intelligent government 
and ambitious governed serves to create a whole through which desire and 
intelligence may be directed to the same objects. Still, we cannot forget that, even for 
Machiavelli, it is the job of the prudent to manage ambition rather than merely 




Sostrata, Lucrezia’s mother, points out that she’s “heard it said” that it is “the 
duty of a prudent person to take the best among bad courses.95” This saying reminds 
one of chapter 21 of the Prince96, but adds the uncharacteristic elements of second-
hand understanding and duty. This advice is suitable for Nicia, who is concerned with 
reputation and criminal charges rather than moral culpability for murder97. The 
prudence of third-rate men, however, is exactly of this kind: seeking to rationalize 
what they already want to do and accepting the authority of others in place of their 
own thinking. Machiavelli lays out a puzzle for us: we are often deceived in thinking 
we are prudent when we are actually the pawn of another. It is not as though Nicia 
has a trusting nature; indeed, he is worried that Callimaco will sell him “empty 
bladders” rather than a cure for his wife’s sterility. Each of Callimaco, Nicia, and 
Ligurio is obliged to place faith in others to achieve his ends, and has few ways of 
assessing the reliability of his conspirators. But Callimaco’s spiritedness and Nicia’s 
desire to have a family make them incapable of sound judgment. Machiavelli points 
out in the discourses: “the greed for dominating that blinds him also blinds him in 
managing the enterprise.98” The advisor, then, fulfills another role: he is able to 
manage the enterprise because he is not passionate about its success, or because he is 
capable of being rational enough to manage his greed in addition to the enterprise. 
But it is this impartiality or indifference that makes the advisor incapable of standing 
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alone, uno da solo, because the enterprise itself is crafted by others. Callimaco 
summons Ligurio only after having decided upon the general path he was to take, and 
it seems that advisors are constrained to correct the inconveniences that arise from the 
immoderate and immutable passions of those who must dominate. 
Ligurio is thus careful to tell Nicia to keep quiet with Frate Timoteo, saying 
that while Nicia understands books, he does not understand “the things of the world” 
(cose del mondo). His admonition calls to mind Machiavelli’s own response to the 
French Cardinal, that the French do not understand le cose del mondo. In that 
anecdote, understanding of politics, or worldly things, is opposed to the 
understanding of war. What Ligurio has in mind is subtler than war, however; it is 
conspiracy. Ligurio recognizes the Frate as a kind of rival; “whoever isn’t used to 
them [priests] could be tricked, and not know how to lead one to his purpose.99” 
Ligurio thus devises a test for the priest, asking his assistance in convincing a girl to 
have an abortion. It seems to be difficult to judge the loyalty of coconspirators against 
princes because you have to make an experiment, and the experiment must contain 
enough danger to prove their willingness to go through with the deed. But no 
experiment can have as much danger or enormity as killing the prince, and so it is 
impossible to devise such a test. The stakes are lower than this for Ligurio, and he is 
able to illustrate an experiment that tests faith – in both senses of the term – as much 
or greater than the genuine task. Nicia’s pretended deafness is used to underscore the 
importance of secrecy; Ligurio says to Frate Timoteo that speaking to Nicia would 
                                                 




require filling the piazza with noise100. The piazza is a symbol of open, honest 
discourse, and transition out of the piazza implies transcending into the palazzo101. To 
show Timoteo’s wiliness, Machiavelli makes him tell us that he understands the test 
as such; even so, he is willing to go through with the plan because he judges that the 
trick is to his profit and he will “get a lot from each of them.102”  
Lucrezia is forced into a passive role despite being “wise and good,” and is 
therefore subject to the necessities of others. One who endeavors to do good in all 
things is ruined among those who are not good. In Clizia, Sofronia believes that “one 
ought to do good all the time, and it’s so much more welcome for it to be done on 
those occasions when others are doing evil.103” But Sofronia’s idea of the good, as 
opposed to Lucrezia’s, is based on achieving advantage and not throwing away 
potential gain104.  Lucrezia’s idea of the good, based in Christian principles, is 
vulnerable to Frate Timoteo not merely because he is a confessor, but because it looks 
to moral purity without evaluating whether purity is a liability or an asset. Christian 
morality is susceptible to casuistry because it is received from an authority and seeks 
to please an authority who can give no final verdict in this world. Hence, Frate 
Timoteo can “dupe her by her goodness.105” But Lucrezia could not ultimately 
surrender to Callimaco were she truly “good” in the sense that she understands it. 
When going to meet with the Frate, she says “I sweat from passione” (Io sudo per la 
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passione). Her passion conveys a dual meaning: religious suffering and erotic desire. 
These meanings are interdependent, as her religious suffering is increased by the 
erotic tension the situation provokes. In this way, despite her wisdom and goodness, 
Lucrezia is handicapped by her inability to reconcile her natural desires with the 
demands of her husband on the one side, and the church on the other.  
Lucrezia is a Machiavellian object lesson: wisdom is ineffectual when it is 
unable to come to terms with appetite.  Frate Timoteo comments to Lucrezia that 
there “are many things that from far away seem terrible, unbearable, strange, and 
when you get near them they are humane, bearable, familiar.106” He speaks to her as 
though she were a soldier going into battle, faced with an enemy who is tricking her 
into believing it is more fearsome than it is107. But this speech also shows that he is 
speaking to Lucrezia’s hidden, erotic nature. As her captain in the endeavor, he shows 
her that the enemy offers tricks, and encourages her into battle against them. She will 
find her encounter with Callimaco humane, bearable, and familiar; her good nature 
will be overridden by the external sanction of her confessor and the internal surrender 
to desire. It is only once Lucrezia has freed herself from her morality that she is able 
to clearly see the good that may be derived from immorality. That is, her prudence is 
inhibited and blinded by the moral aim Aristotle puts at the heart of practical 
judgment.  
Machiavelli argues that what we usually consider to be goodness and wisdom 
is defective, because it is ultimately unable to come to terms with what would 
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actually make us happy. The implication for philosophical rule is that it should seek 
to satisfy appetites, and manage the inconveniences that come with them. On the 
other hand, have we not already inherited Machiavelli’s teachings in this regard? If 
counseling evil is the correction for people too cowed by the Church to recognize 
their own interests, would the moderating influence not be to counsel goodness to a 
people who are already materialistic? Intelligent, philosophical rule would need to 
take into account the character of those people it governs. It would be unfair to paint 
Machiavelli as being inflexible; his philosophy has the institution of new modes and 
orders at its very core, which requires acknowledging the totality of circumstances. 
Machiavelli’s conception of human nature is fixed, but its expressions vary based on 
the virtue of the people. If we attempt to take Machiavelli’s suggestions to heart, then, 
we must contextualize them within our own modes and orders.  
 Callimaco’s monologue, once the trap has been set, seems to be a different 
kind of “mirror of princes,” in which he reveals his vulnerability and uncertainty108. 
This is not the kind of competence one might expect from a young, Machiavellian 
prince. After all, Machiavelli depicts Manlius Torquatus as hard or even savage, 
Valerius Corvinus as humane but capable, and Fabius Maximum Cunctator as reticent 
but strategically so. But here we see into the doubts and fears of the young prince on 
the verge of accomplishing his coup, worried that “fortune and nature keep the 
account in balance; the one never does you a good turn that on the other side 
something evil doesn’t surge up.” His introspection exposes the difference between 
                                                 




captains, who have been trained in sites, and princes who endeavor to establish new 
modes and orders, which have the same danger and quality as “seek[ing] unknown 
waters and lands.109” Such a prince has an appetite for novelty that adherence to 
tradition and existing modes will not satisfy. He is capable of forming the desire, but 
incapable of achieving the result. So Callimaco’s doubts are grounded in a prudent 
fear, insofar as they recognize that perfect solutions do not exist and that one must 
anticipate future inconveniences when remediating present ones. But his need for 
Ligurio is exposed by his inability to know the qualities of those inconveniences and 
concoct a strategy taking them into account. Ligurio must even counsel Callimaco in 
how to woo Lucrezia110. Ligurio’s reassurances and schemes are not enough to alter 
Callimaco’s nature. He is immediately plunged back into self-doubt when Ligurio 
leaves to find the Frate111. 
 Callimaco’s need to either conquer or die trying exposes both his strength and 
his weakness. His youth, energy, and passion allow him to pursue his desires with 
boldness, but these same desires gnaw away at him and let him fear failure. 
Machiavelli could not have discussed this kind of princely weakness when writing to 
a prince, nor would belaboring doubt be helpful when inspiring youth to action. But 
Callimaco’s failure is one of knowledge; he does not yet know how to approach the 
large task of seducing Lucrezia and establishing a long-term state. Ligurio, initially a 
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short-term helper, has become a permanent necessity for Callimaco, displacing his 
long-term servant, Siro112. 
 Machiavelli’s emphasis on dispassionate advisors to the young prince seems, 
at first, to show him as a harbinger of value-free social science. But while 
Machiavelli’s prudence does not have a moral dimension, it does have an affective 
one; the tasks set for intelligence are created by the young and passionate and 
ultimately shaped by the needs of their nature. Any republic contains two diverse 
humors, that of the multitude and that of the great; the great desire to dominate, and 
the multitude desires not to be dominated113.  
At the beginning of Clizia, Palamede, named for the legendary Greek wise 
man, flees the play. Intelligence and the city are incompatible unless the intelligent 
person is willing to engage politically and manage the two diverse humors. Mere 
wisdom, as shown in Lucrezia, is only useful when it can be led into prudence and 
recognize the effectual truth. Wisdom is directed to things above the city, but 
provides little relief from the actual pressures and threats of political life; the Roman 
Lucretia was compelled take her own life after Sextus Tarquinus raped her. 
Machiavelli asks us whether Lucrezia’s willingness to suffer is reasonable, if the 
option to take delight in sin is available. Machiavelli makes sin a rational decision, 
making the intellect the judge of the least bad option among many.  
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By obscuring the good as an option in itself, he makes available a wider 
palette of choices. Machiavelli does not encourage evil for its own sake, in contrast 
with the ancient philosophers who praise good for its own sake. Rather, evil should 
have its usefulness; that is in part why Giovampagolo Baglioni is blameworthy in 
Machiavelli’s view. He was willing to indulge every vice, commit every sin, but 
lacked the knowledge of how to apply his wickedness to a deed that would further 
both the common good and his own114. Unlike Aristotle, who held that the 
philosopher is able to transcend habituated virtue by understanding the good in itself, 
Machiavelli turns the intellect to understanding the necessity of vice. Hence, 
Machiavelli wishes that we should all be tricked as Lucrezia was115. 
 
The Problem of Prudence and Intelligence 
 Machiavelli recognizes that prudence is dependent upon a general faculty of 
intelligence that has been unevenly distributed among human beings. Returning to the 
three classes of brains, the most excellent kind is capable of understanding by itself, 
the excellent kind is capable of recognizing what others have understood, and the 
third understands nothing and is useless. How is it that brains can be most excellent, 
excellent, or useless? One might venture that since the princes to whom Machiavelli 
writes seem to occupy the second category, the terminology is mere flattery. 
However, the comparison between the merely excellent brain and the useless one 
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reveals the gulf that separates the simple men of the multitude from the great who 
desire to dominate. The excellent brain is also the one that furnishes the subject 
matter upon which men with Machiavelli’s talents can work; it seems that a prince 
needs to know enough to get himself into trouble. The classification also provides an 
interesting contrast with Machiavelli’s “two diverse humors116,” because if they are 
exclusive, one has to wonder how prudent advisors and power can coexist. If the 
advisor merely wishes not to be dominated, he has no need of being kept good as 
Machiavelli suggests. Machiavelli thus intimates that the best advisors are those 
whose minds are fixed on a loftier goal.  
 Machiavelli uses the words “prudent” and “prudence” in a wide variety of 
ways. Sometimes prudence appears to be judged entirely by the outcome, as though 
an accidental choice could be considered prudent because it ends well. Other times, it 
appears that prudence requires assiduous study and experience to recognize ancient 
lessons in modern circumstances. It often seems that prudence is a fully creative act, 
in which the prudent person is able to concoct a scheme that will produce the ends he 
desires.  
We are told that good counsel should arise from the prudence of the prince, 
and not the prudence of the prince from good counsel117.  The prince must be capable 
of evaluating counsel in terms of the ends and inconveniences it suggests. Insofar as 
prudence comprises “selecting the less bad as good,” one is led to the conclusion that 
prudence is not itself a creative act. For Machiavellian prudence, it appears to be 
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sufficient to have alternatives laid out, and prudence selects among them to find the 
less bad option. This implies keeping one’s ultimate goal in sight and deliberating 
about the consequences that may follow, but deliberation does not seem to be 
absolutely required.  
This is aptly illustrated in the Discourses, in a chapter entitled “How the 
Romans Gave Free Commissions to Their Captains of Armies.” Machiavelli relays 
how the Senate wished to keep Fabius from entering into Tuscany, and sent two 
legates to stop him, unaware that he had already undergone the mission. Finding the 
battle already won, “instead of being impeders of the war they turned into 
ambassadors of the acquisition and the glory that was gained. 118” Machiavelli tells us 
“whoever will consider this limit well will see it was used very prudently.” The text 
appears to contradict the title, as it does not seem that the Senate considered Fabius’ 
commission altogether free, and there is the suggestion that Fabius had, in fact, 
anticipated the Senate’s reluctance and concealed his designs. What limit, then, was 
used prudently, and how is it prudence to commit an error? The limit, it seems, is that 
the Senate did not expect to make the captains proceed “hand to hand,” but rather 
allowed them to continue until given orders to stop. The prudent ordering is to make 
an interval between the Senate’s pronouncements and the captain’s legal requirement 
to obey, so that a space is provided for bold action. A parallel is found in Book I, 
chapter 32, which relays how Fabius went to battle against the Samnites against the 
dictator’s command, and how the dictator wanted him executed for it despite his 
                                                 




success. Machiavelli omits Livy’s detail that Papirius “was praising with nearly every 
other word the deed of Titus Manlius119,” i.e., killing his son for engaging in battle 
against orders120.  
But it does not appear that the Senate crafted this order in anticipation of 
similar events. Rather, the prudence seems to be accidental, raising again the question 
of whether Rome’s greatness is due to virtue or accident. As Harvey Mansfield points 
out, the Senate did not understand itself in Machiavellian terms121. We must ask 
ourselves, then, how the institutions are transformed when prudence is intentional, 
and whence the choices among which prudence might select arise.  True choice, as a 
product of creative ingenuity, appears to be tied to the quality of the brain.  
There are three mentions of intelligence directly in the Discourses. Two are 
intelligenzia, and mean understanding and military intelligence, respectively122. The 
central example occurs in the chapter entitled “Before Great Accidents Occur in a 
City or in a Province, Signs Come That Forecast Them, or Men Who Predict Them.” 
According to Machiavelli, “no grave accident” ever occurs without presage123.  How 
this occurs is left to someone who has knowledge of things natural and supernatural, 
which we do not have. However, Machiavelli puts forth a provisional solution: 
perhaps, as “some philosopher” says, the air is full of intelligences that “foresee 
things by their natural virtues, and they have compassion for men, they warn them 
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with like signs so that they can prepare themselves for defense.” The philosopher in 
question appears to have been Cicero124, who uses the word animorum, which is the 
plural genitive of the masculine “soul” or “mind.” The Italian animi would have been 
inapt, as animo means “spiritedness” or “mind,” but does not convey the sense of an 
immortal soul or ghost. Machiavelli assiduously avoids any use of the Italian anima, 
or soul in the Prince or the Discourses, although the world pusillanime occurs in 
each125.  
Of all the possible choices, however, Machiavelli has chosen the word 
intelligenze, or “intelligences.” By this choice Machiavelli conveys both the sense of 
reconnaissance and intellect contained in the other two uses. Just as excellent men in 
corrupt republics are treated as enemies and disbelieved126, these intelligences do not 
seem to be interpreted correctly or followed. Machiavelli’s final example of the 
chapter is most telling: a plebeian maintains that he has heard a voice “greater than 
human” that ordered him to tell the magistrates that the French will invade Rome. 
Livy tells us that his advice was ignored, leading to Roman disaster127. Consider how 
Ligurio was a beggar and a sponger, and Machiavelli himself a “man of low and 
mean state” suffering from a “continuous malignity of fortune.128” As Leo Strauss 
points out, Machiavelli opposes the intelligences in the air to Providence or the 
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intervention of God in human affairs129. The intelligences do not directly intervene, 
nor do they punish or cause human misfortune. Intelligent men like Machiavelli are 
resigned to a mean state and excluded from politics in such a way that they can only 
point to the outcome of events as though instructed from omens or portents. The 
products of intellect do not always have the rhetorical power necessary, of 
themselves, to become politically salutary. The deed must come first, and then the 
words to justify it will come.   This produces a dilemma for the advisor without a 
prince who is a prince without a kingdom; he is able to foresee the calamities that will 
result, but he is not in a position to overtly act.  
Intellectual gifts are not distributed by nobility of birth, and so a man with a 
most excellent brain may be ignored to the prince or republic’s peril. The coincidence 
of high intelligence and power is rare, Machiavelli tells us, so that the institution of 
entirely new modes and orders would require a man who is both “rare in brain and 
authority,130” and therefore unlikely. Machiavelli repeatedly asks us to consider how 
intelligence can be conveyed to the prince, how prudence can become informed, and 
how we are to know who to believe. The multitude is easily led into error by false 
promises of great things from eminent men, Machiavelli tells us131. Yet he seems to 
contradict himself four chapters later in saying that the multitude is wiser and more 
constant than a prince132, which, if believed, does not bode well for the wisdom or 
constancy of either. It seems that there are few good and wise princes, and so it is 
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unlikely for power and wisdom to coincide. A multitude, unlike a wicked prince, can 
be spoken to133. Machiavelli humorously informs us that when a multitude is judging 
things, provided it hears two orators of “equal virtue,” but who incline to different 
sides, “very few times does one not see it take up the better opinion.134” This is to be 
opposed to his counsel that “a prudent individual knows many goods that do not have 
in themselves evident reasons with which one can persuade others135,” a difficulty 
that must be overcome by recourse to God or religion. To maintain a republic and 
turn it back to its beginnings little by little would require a rare man having enough 
prudence to see inconveniences from afar, about which he will never convince 
others136.  
The role of advisor is not only difficult, but dangerous. The people judges 
counsel by its results137 and the reward of good counsel is outweighed by the danger 
taken on by the one who gives it when the results are not favorable, so that it is 
impossible to give advice without knowing every particular of the thing being 
counseled. One encounters the envy of others who treat one as a threat, whether to 
reputation, power, or both138. To this, one should add the danger of menacing or 
offending by words, since one makes others cautious around you, and the other 
inspires hatred139. It goes without saying that anything that will lead to bodily harm is 
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to be avoided, but the first warning speaks to the necessity of candor. Without access 
to the thoughts of others, the prudent person can hardly gather the necessary 
information to counsel; hence Machiavelli calls this advice “one of the great 
prudences.” Even when the counsel is sound, and the dangers of the enterprise 
known, one can never be sure that the advice will be followed in the field. One of the 
great errors is the failure to moderate hopes, so that one who is successful in a first 
endeavor does not know how to quiet his spirit without engaging in recklessness140.  
These dangers arise when one gives counsel openly and boldly, but the moderate 
course that Machiavelli openly advocates does not seem to comport with his own 
mode of giving counsel141.  Machiavelli’s advice is so moderate in this matter, in fact, 
that one wonders whether it is better to seek another mode altogether. 
The question arises of whether it is better to give counsel or to remain silent. 
Silence in these matters helps neither prince nor republic, Machiavelli urges, and it 
does not protect one from the danger142. Part of this danger may be in the nature of 
the silent counselor, who is so prideful, like the friend of Perseus, that he cannot 
remain silent about what he would have said. A notable man cannot even hope to 
retire and escape the prince’s notice, because the prince will not believe that someone 
exists who is willing to abstain from dominating and could possibly live otherwise143. 
There seems to be little hope for such a man; even if he measures his forces and 
overthrows the prince, he is likely to find a state hostile to philosophical rule. By 
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contrast with Plato’s Republic, in which philosophers rule out of a sense of obligation 
to the city that raised them, Machiavelli contends that a newly freed state has partisan 
enemies but no partisan friends144. 
The solution appears to be hidden rule145, and the solution contains within it 
the promise of a hidden philosophical rule.  Philosophical rule appears to be 
something entirely new, so that it would require establishing a state anew, or 
reforming far from its ancient orders. It would be better if such rule could be explicit, 
but that would require a single prudent individual to complete the task146. It would be 
better if one alone could order a state from the beginning, exercising such prudence 
that it would not need to be reordered or interfered with for a long time147. In the most 
desperate times, however, men look to whoever among them is most robust and has 
greater heart, and obey such a man without any thought to his prudence148. Even in an 
existing state, however, it is rare indeed to find someone who is able to recognize 
inconveniences from far off; so rare that not a single person of such quality might be 
born in the city149. Even if he were to be born, it is unlikely that he would be able to 
convince others of what he understands. The only possible way, it appears, to produce 
a person of rare brain and authority is in a dyad of advisor and prince. One man 
commands sufficient authority, the other sufficient brain.    
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The best kind of mind is both needful and impossible to rely on coming into 
existence. Rarely will an individual of such superiority exist, and if he does exist, he 
will not have sufficiently long life to guarantee a state its continual freedom. Even the 
possibility of a line of superior minds that, each in their turn, shape the modes and 
orders of the state150 seems impossible to distinguish from accident. We must 
prudently look for prudence, and that must be done by maximizing the talent 
available to us. The primary benefit of a republic, it seems, is that it provides the 
possibility of a churning society151.  The benefit of a churning society, in 
Machiavelli’s view, is that it provides youth with an incentive to boldness and 
disruption.  
Summary 
In the Statesman, young Socrates takes over from Theaetetus after he has been 
worn out by the Eleatic Stranger’s questioning. In the Art of War, we see a very 
different relationship between Fabrizio and his young questioners. Cosimo suggests 
that as long as Fabrizio does not tire of answering, they will not tire of questioning152. 
Cosimo and his friends question Fabrizio, in effect inverting the Socratic method. 
They question him “without respect” (sanza rispetto)153so that they may glean as 
much information as possible from his experience. Both Harvey Mansfield and 
Christopher Lynch translate sanza rispetto as “without respect,” but the phrase has a 
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fruitful ambiguity in Italian: it also means “without hesitation.” Mansfield’s emphasis 
on respect helps to underscore Machiavellian themes of social tumult and disregard 
for traditional authority. These themes are enhanced by always keeping in mind that 
hesitation and respect are entwined in Machiavelli’s writing. There is something 
detrimental about overly respecting the roles of the current state; respect leads to 
delay, and delay is not something one can afford when trying to establish new orders.  
Cosimo Rucellai and Zanobi Buondelmonti are Machiavelli’s friends who 
“for their infinite good parts deserve to be” princes154, so they are both the audience 
of the Discourses and the interlocutors of the Art of War. It is telling that Fabrizio’s 
dialogue with these young men is about war, a subject that the young are intrigued 
and energized by. Fabrizio cannot achieve his dream of reviving ancient virtue in 
military orders himself, but he can pass his project on to those who have the vigor to 
do so in his stead.  Cosimo and his friends question Fabrizio without respect or 
hesitation, so that they question both the modern captain and his ancient orders. Only 
after they have satisfied their curiosity, and only after they are satisfied that Fabrizio 
offers a teaching that itself gives way to necessity and responds without hesitation, 
can they consider the teaching their own project and carry it the rest of the way. 
 The problem that Socrates faced with Alcibiades, in its simplest form, is this: 
what is to be done with a talented, ambitious youth who has means and intends to 
enter into political life prematurely?  Machiavelli acknowledges the difficulty, but his 
conclusion is very different. Where Socrates counsels patience, Machiavelli would 
                                                 




have the philosopher show the youth that he requires the philosopher’s experience 
and intelligence to accomplish his goals. In this way, the philosopher would become a 
party to the enterprise and see it to a more fruitful end. Given Socrates’ ultimate 
failure to contain Alcibiades, perhaps this approach has merit.  
Machiavelli understands that his friends have recognized within him the 
qualities of a true prince: the knowledge of how to rule. But because Machiavelli 
himself can never come to power in such a way, nor can his intellectual descendants, 
he can make use of the young who are both bold and malleable to his designs. A 
Machiavellian education teaches the necessity of prudence, and it teaches the young 
to recognize those who have it in greater natural proportions. The young are willing 
to take on this role, because the prudent will carry them short of the goal, and it seems 
the most glory is attained by carrying a task to its completion. We could learn from 
Machiavelli how to make knowledge more accessible to power, but particularly how 
to make knowledge seem to be in power’s best interests. Machiavelli is driven by a 
natural desire to work “for the common benefit to everyone155,” but even this is an 
image of benevolence. Machiavelli’s success may depend upon transmitting 
something that is beneficial, but the benefit is his own glory as founder of new modes 
and orders. In the same way, Machiavelli wants his potential captains to understand 
the necessity of seeming to benefit others while benefitting themselves. The 
probability that a long line of such seeming benevolence may create the fact of 
benefit may seem inconsequential to those who act, but it cannot be overlooked by 
                                                 




those who think. Machiavelli has clearly shifted Aristotle’s moral practical judgment 
into a calculating prudence that exists at the service of acquisition. This is one of 
Machiavelli’s great accomplishments: to make nexus of differing ambitions into a 
common good. 
Machiavelli occupies a specific position in a line of thinking about 
intelligence in Western philosophy: that of drawing intelligence into direct contact 
with worldly ambition and acquisition.  The Mandragola and Clizia give glimpses of 
how differing ambitions can be satisfied by an organizing prudence that is able to 
choose the less bad as good. The person of prudence, however, is a natural type; so 
Machiavelli instructs us to go in search of such people when our own prudence is 
insufficient to the task. This is, assumedly, an alternative to destroying such people as 
rivals.  The classical philosophers understood that capable youths were susceptible to 
ambition. Their solution to this problem is to exhort the young to study philosophy, to 
withdraw from the visible things to the intelligibles. Machiavelli draws a very 
different conclusion: youthful ambition cannot be restrained, but it can be managed. 
His approach suggests something about the nature of a republic, like ours, which has 




Chapter 4: Political Psychology and Intelligence 
 
 In this chapter, I will introduce the problem of irrationality: that it both 
influences our scientific endeavors, and that it modifies what we can expect from 
political leadership. I will discuss the so-called IQ controversy or intelligence debate, 
in which factions argue for and against the heritability of IQ and its usefulness as a 
metric of human intelligence. Next, I will introduce depth psychology as a means of 
understanding the relationship between intelligence and the unconscious mind. I 
discuss group psychology and its applicability to leadership and the role leaders play 
in their societies. Finally, I try to apply group psychological concepts to the IQ 
controversy, with an attempt to find a middle ground for the applicability of 
intelligence to political life. 
When extolling the virtues of rationality and intellect, there is a constant 
danger of romanticizing and overestimating the extent to which human beings can be 
strictly rational. The science of intelligence testing is also closely bound with the 
ideology that preceded it, and this ideology has influenced the scientific 
interpretation. Alfred Binet, for example, began working on his intelligence test after 
he became disappointed in craniometry – a pseudoscience with a history of 
perpetuating racist attitudes. While Alfred Binet did not further these attitudes, 
intelligence testing attracted interest from the same sorts of people who were looking 
for a racial science. One must always keep in mind that our scientific notions of 




psychology, as applied to both individuals and groups, provides a helpful starting 
point for ascertaining the limits of genius in a political context.  It is also applicable to 
helping us understand the failure of intelligence testing to produce a politically viable 
cognitive elite. No account of the political significance of intelligence would be 
complete without acknowledging some of the controversies within the contemporary 
debate on intelligence. This debate is largely couched in psychometric terms in the 
literature, but it expresses a deep cultural ambivalence to the idea of general 
intelligence and its political utility. Depth psychology, particularly in its application 
to groups, provides a lens through which the theorist can understand the debate in 
terms of unconscious psychological forces. While much of the debate is centered on 
the heritability of IQ, the political importance of intelligence testing ultimately rests 
on whether IQ is a useful measure, not the mechanism of the normal distribution in a 
given population.  
 
The Scientific Theory of Intelligence and the Intelligence Debate 
 A scientific theory of intelligence did not begin to emerge until Sir Francis 
Galton published Hereditary Genius in 1869. His theory, however, lacked an 
instrument for testing intelligence, and was instead confined to a description of the 




Binet published Experimental Studies of Intelligence and ushered in the era of 
intelligence testing156.   
Galton was the first to apply statistical reasoning to the study of intelligence. 
Galton’s thesis was that eminence, or professional success, correlates with intellectual 
endowments and is heritable. Despite the lack of a formal instrument he believed 
intelligence to be normally distributed in the same way that height and other human 
features are157. He thus divided human intellectual abilities into 16 groups, denoting 
them g-a to the left of the distribution, and A-G to the right. The tails were labeled x 
and X, respectively. These classes each represented a standard deviation, such that 
one out of four people would be found in class A, one out of sixteen in class C, and 
one out of one million were to be found in class X. Given the absence of any formal 
test which could quantify these qualities, Galton collected anecdotal evidence and 
lists of accomplishments for individuals well known in various fields of endeavor. 
 His approach could hardly be called value-free.  Galton wrote Hereditary 
Genius to provide statistical proof for his theory that high achievement runs in 
families.  Comparing intellectual and scholastic achievement with physical strength, 
Galton surmised that there are natural limits to each man and a law of diminishing 
returns for efforts158.  He anticipated the argument that hard work may be used to 
overcome natural limits, admonishing that a blacksmith, no matter how hard he toils, 
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will find feats beyond his ability that are well within the grasp of even a sedentary 
natural Hercules. Considering the effects of education on intelligence, he concluded 
that for those of class G and above, their eminence is assured almost independent of 
education159.  That is, the level of ability is so high in these natural geniuses that they 
do not require external assistance to understand the world and thrive.   
 Galton’s hope was to account for how men became distinguished in their 
respective fields if cases of nepotism or sheer luck are removed.  He concluded that 
there are three requirements: capacity, zeal, and vigor. All three, he argued, were 
heritable160.  Galton felt that genius was, in fact, general; that is, a person of high 
capacity was not so restricted that he could only perform with distinction within a 
single field such as mathematics or literature. Only his passions focused him in a 
particular direction.   
 Yet, Galton recognized that there were complicating factors in determining 
who might be the most eminent individuals in a given field.  In literature, for 
example, men of even mediocre talent may be successful if they narrate to the needs 
of their times161.  On the other hand, works of literary genius may be so well received 
that the most important sayings or passages are incorporated into everyday speech, or 
repeated through other writers, such that no one remembers who originally wrote 
them.  Regarding men of science, the fact that discoveries often have rival claimants 
seems to indicate that the ideas were already ripe; science had already furnished the 
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necessary materials to arrive at the discoveries.  Therefore, being associated with a 
single great discovery could easily confer undue repute.  On the other hand, some of 
the most important contributions to science may come in the form of criticism and 
failed experiments, the substance of which are retained in the body of scientific 
knowledge, though their original authors have become anonymous162. 
 Galton’s work was inherently political. Possibly the first modern eugenicist, 
he wished to improve the Anglo-Saxon race’s intellectual capabilities by a full class 
or more.  He attempted to disprove the supposed infecundity of able men; if they were 
less fertile than the general population, this would make his social program 
impracticable.  Further, he argued that, contrary to popular ideas, able men tend to 
marry able women, i.e., marriages are assortative163.  He was concerned that the 
Church discouraged intellectuals from marriage by attracting them to life in the 
monastery, in which marriage is forbidden, and that this practice was maintained in 
the universities, which would offer able men a stipend only upon the condition they 
would not marry.  The disparity was enhanced as able men tended to postpone 
marriage until they had achieved financial stability and ensured their careers, whereas 
men of lower ability tended to marry earlier. Thus, Galton argued, those of lesser 
intellectual ability produced offspring earlier, which allowed each successive 
generation to similarly reproduce earlier, and overwhelm the population 
geometrically. 
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 Galton believed that professions and society had advanced too far and become 
too complex; it was thus imperative to raise the average level of ability to survive and 
grow in these more difficult times164. He proposed that gifted youths, regardless of 
their means, should be provided with education; that the path to vocation for young 
men be quick and smooth; that marriage should be held in high esteem; and that able 
immigrants should be welcomed to the country165. But Galton was concerned with the 
overall intellectual ability of races or nations, and not with the particular use to which 
the cognitive elite might be put. To be sure, he rests his hopes for the advancement of 
humanity squarely on the shoulders of men of greater than average intelligence (not 
necessarily genius), but he seems to believe that intelligence is sufficient unto itself to 
determine the good.  His political prescription, then, is directed toward this overall 
improvement and leaves each individual to discover his own self-interest.  
 This concern over national eugenic health was put into a practical program 
during the moral panic over immigration in the early 20th century166. Immigrants at 
Ellis Island were first inspected by physicians by means of line inspection167, with the 
intent of identifying “mental deficients.168” Since standard intelligence tests, 
including the Binet scale, could not be administered reliably to immigrants who did 
not speak English, Howard Andrew Knox developed what is now called a culture-fair 
                                                 
164 Ibid., pg. 311 
165 Ibid., pg. 325 
166 Richardson, pg. 73 
167 Ibid., pp. 39-42 




test, the Knox Cube Imitation test169.  Ultimately, however, truly culture-fair tests 
appear to be impossible, since many cultures put less emphasis on the kind of puzzles 
and games that are traditional in many Western societies.  Since performance relies 
upon motivation, students who are accustomed to being tested tend to perform better. 
The modern eugenic stance is problematic, in part, because it seeks to exclude people 
based upon perceived defects rather than make good use of people who are gifted. 
Modern eugenicists seek to raise the fitness of a people either through breeding 
programs or by excluding people who are considered poor genetic material. In a 
sense, a eugenic solution addresses the problem of what is to be done with the most 
intelligent people: if everyone is more intelligent overall, society can otherwise be left 
alone. Human beings would still go about their different jobs in society, but all would 
be more intelligent while doing those jobs. This is, of course, trading what we have 
for what might be. It is also not an approach our society is willing to entertain in light 
of our experiences with the iniquities of racism. 
 Galton’s ostensibly sterile, empirical approach to intelligence abandons both 
the moral qualities of Plato and Aristotle’s perspectives, as well as the acquisitive 
aspect of Machiavelli’s. Galton’s scientific approach removed intelligence as a 
political subject and replaced it as a political object: rather than have great minds 
wrestle with power, power should turn itself toward the productivity afforded by great 
minds. On the one side, this reflected a sense of confidence that intelligent human 
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The Social Relevance of Intelligence 
 Galton’s ideas have been carried forward into the contemporary intelligence 
debate, often without attribution. Herrnstein and Murray’s The Bell Curve is 
Hereditary Genius’ contemporary heir. Unlike Galton, Herrnstein and Murray had 
benefit of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which allowed them to 
compare educational and economic outcomes with IQ, as well as decades’ worth of 
psychometric research.  Like Galton, Herrnstein and Murray argue that intelligence 
has broad and important social effects that should lead to important policy 
considerations. 
 It is widely accepted among psychologists that higher values of g, or general 
intelligence, translate on average into higher job performance170. Herrnstein and 
Murray make much of the fact that this result holds true regardless of the job; whether 
the person elects to become a busboy or an executive, they will perform better on 
average given a higher IQ. Significant differences in performance remain even after 
long-term training in a job. The authors use this result to argue that being able to 
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select employees based on IQ or standardized tests leads to greater efficiency in the 
economy. Intelligence, they argue, has market value, and employers increasingly use 
a variety of proxies in an attempt to select the most intelligent employees they can. 
Since IQ is fundamentally related to productivity, employers are highly motivated to 
hire the most productive employees they can find171.  
However, Herrnstein and Murray point out that the correlation of job 
performance with IQ is not very strong within particular occupations.  This is due to 
the statistical issue of restriction of range.  For example, weight is not a good 
predictor of a linebacker’s performance if we choose from the population of people 
who are already selected to be linebackers.  However, if we were faced with the task 
of choosing from a pool of candidates representative of the general population, 
choosing based on weight would be highly correlated with performance.  The same 
issue arises within occupations: certain forces act to filter candidates for any position.  
Lawyers cannot become employed without first having to have been accepted to a 
university, and then to a law school, and then passing the state bar.  Each criterion 
tends to select based on IQ, so lawyers as a group have a much more restricted range 
of IQs than the population at large. 
 The authors provide a further caveat: modest correlations mean many 
exceptions.  Thus, they are careful to point out that we can only talk in terms of 
statistical selection.  If an employer is faced with filling many open positions, and has 
IQ scores available to him, choosing candidates based on IQ will give him better 
                                                 




results on average. Certainly, there will be some new employees who will perform 
poorly despite high IQ, and lower-IQ candidates who would’ve performed well but 
were not hired.  Still, they argue, intelligence tests are better predictors than narrow 
occupational tests or interviewer assessment172.  
 Herrnstein and Murray are concerned with a phenomenon they term 
“cognitive partitioning”173.  They argue that certain forces are causing a high-IQ/low-
IQ divide, which serves to separate the higher-IQ members of society and insulate 
them from the conditions in which the cognitively less fortunate must live.  They 
propose a central irony in egalitarianism: uniform opportunity increases the 
heritability of traits. That is, the more environmental conditions are equalized across 
socio-economic boundaries, the more the variation in IQ (or any other trait) will be 
attributed to heredity174.  They argue, just as Galton did, that marriages are becoming 
increasingly assortative. Partly, this is due to the ways in which people tend to be 
funneled into particular industries and jobs based upon mental ability.  Increasingly, 
however, they argue that the information economy produces entire sectors of business 
which do not contain a representative sample of the population.  They contend that 
factories, at one point, employed laborers as well as engineers, and allowed some 
degree of commingling and therefore marriage between so-called cognitive classes175. 
 The result is that rather than having what they term a “churning” society, in 
which the elite may (and do) rise from every class, we will increasingly have a caste 
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society, in which the elite are born of the elite, and social and economic mobility will 
become extinct176.  They point out that according to the NLSY, only six percent of 
persons in the top five centiles of IQ did not have a college degree and came from 
families in the lower half of socioeconomic status.  This, they argue, disproves the 
notion that there are many highly intelligent people in the lower classes who are not 
afforded the opportunity for a good education.  In fact, they argue that our current 
social systems are very efficient at identifying talent at a young age and funneling that 
talent into college and post-graduate work177. 
 Herrnstein and Murray give a litany of social ills which they believe can be 
traced back to low IQ.  For instance, according to the cited statistics, poverty is 
caused by IQ rather than the inverse178.  Their seemingly benign argument is that a 
policy response should take this into account, as IQ is fixed, and if poverty is highly 
correlated with IQ, one can hardly blame individuals for an inborn trait179.  They go 
on to show that as IQ goes down, unemployment figures and disability rates go up.  
Risk factors for divorce180 and the likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior are 
inversely correlated with IQ181.  They point out that if we compare the rate of 
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conviction with the number of reported crimes, it is mathematically impossible that 
there be a highly intelligent population of criminals who are simply too clever to be 
caught; a somewhat naïve argument in the light of recent high-profile economic 
swindles perpetrated by well-educated elites. 
 Ultimately, however, the authors are most concerned with the possibility that 
the overall IQ distribution of the country is falling182.  They point out that small 
changes in the mean IQ have disproportionate impact on the tails of a normal 
curve183.  Moreover, they argue that while it does not seem possible to raise IQ with 
better education or ‘head start’ programs, it is actually possible to depress IQ in gifted 
children by lowering the standards of education184.  As this is the most politically 
involved class185, as well as the group of individuals best suited to solve the problems 
of the future, Herrnstein and Murray argue that money should be diverted from 
remedial education programs and more focus should be placed on educating the most 
talented youth.  Thus, the ideal of the “educated man” should once again be restored 
to a place of prominence186.  
 Unfortunately, this scientific, rudderless version of intelligence is treated as a 
good in itself, rather than having a particular social, political, or moral utility. For 
Aristotle, intelligence was a means through which one could engage in the 
contemplative life. In a lower form, the various kinds of intelligence help to make up 
                                                 
182 Ibid., Ch. 15 
183 Ibid., pg. 365 
184 Ibid., pp. 432-433 
185 Ibid., pg. 261 




practical judgment, and therefore have political utility. The way Galton, Herrnstein, 
and Murray frame the discussion, it might be better to ask whether so-called progress 
is the enemy. That is, if scientific and social progress continually increases the 
cognitive load across all of society, and therefore makes it progressively more 
difficult to live as a person of ordinary intelligence, perhaps our institutions are to 
blame. If all of our buildings were built so that only people who were above average 
in height could efficiently make use of them, we would find fault with the architects. 
Along the same vein, they lament that affirmative action programs have 
ensured that education can no longer be considered a reliable proxy for intelligence or 
competence when employers look to hire minorities187.  Further, as the disparity 
increases between the cognitive classes, they believe that a custodial state will 
emerge, which will have to become increasingly centralized and intrusive188.  Such a 
state would arise as a natural consequence to the burgeoning cognitive underclass, 
which would be incapable of thriving without direct intervention by the state.  
Instead, Herrnstein and Murray argue, we should return to the American ideal of 
individualism189, and try to recapture the kinds of mixed, cognitively heterogeneous 
communities we once enjoyed.  In such communities, every person can find a useful 
and productive place and can be accepted, regardless of his or her cognitive level; 
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government at the local or community level provides much better for the range of 






The Intelligence Debate 
 The Bell Curve has been widely decried in the press and by popular authors191. 
Two of the best-known critics are Stephen J. Gould and Malcolm Gladwell. Gould’s 
The Mismeasure of Man begins from the premise that there are four basic errors in 
philosophy and science: reductionism, reification, dichotomization or Manichaeism, 
and hierarchy. His goal is to show that these errors permeate the history of 
psychometrics, and therefore taint the conclusions that successive generations of 
psychologists have drawn from psychometric testing.   
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 Gould notes that Binet’s original tests were designed in response to a 1904 
commission, the goal of which was to identify students in need of special 
education192.  Binet’s test followed years of disappointing results in craniometry, 
which attempted to correlate intelligence with the size of the skull.  In its original 
form, Gould contends, the Binet test was benign; a series of tests which could identify 
weaknesses or educational disabilities and could be used to help students ultimately 
succeed.  
 Charles Spearman, however, posited that IQ tests actually measured a single 
quantity, g (general intelligence), more or less perfectly.  The more accurate the test, 
the more perfectly it correlated with g. Gould argues that g is no more than a 
mathematical artifact; something like the average of a variety of tests that each 
measures something individual.  But the g concept tapped directly into inveterate, 
racist ideas which sought a single measure for comparing individuals and races.  With 
craniometry a failure, g was its natural successor.  These scientists further fell prey to 
the logical error of hierarchy, as they wished to categorize human beings based upon 
a single number.  Ultimately, Gould says, the goal was to compare individuals via this 
single number, g, and to further compare racial groups to show the superiority of one 
to another. 
 Even if g were to have independent reality, Gould argues that heritability is 
not equal to inevitability. Even though IQ has been shown to be highly heritable, 
there may be other factors that could influence IQ beyond simple genetics.  
                                                 




Heritability is only the measure how much variation exists in a population for a given 
characteristic, controlling for environmental effects.  He points out that if all members 
of a population are exposed to the same environment (food and water sources, air, 
housing materials, and so on), all variation will be due to heredity.   
 As such, Gould argues that even scientists confuse within and between group 
heritability.  He gives the example of a tribe of very tall (or short) people. If each 
member of the tribe is exposed to the same environment, all variation between those 
individuals will be due to heredity.  However, this does not exclude the possibility of 
a pervasive environmental influence that could account for a greater or lesser average 
height than seen in other populations.  Therefore, one cannot conclude that the 
difference between the tribe’s average height and the average height of any other 
population is due to heritable differences (genetics). 
 Ultimately, however, Gould’s argument flounders because his greatest 
objection to g as a concept is that psychometricians use it as a measure of ‘mental 
worth’.  From that perspective, certainly, it is easy to conclude that g, for all its 
mathematical ambiguity, is a faulty measure.  But that argument ignores the statistical 
features of g that make it attractive.  For instance, one could measure the average 
running times of athletes under various conditions (sprints, endurance running, uphill, 
etc).  Such an average running time would not, of course, correspond to any ‘real’ 
value.  It would mask that a particular runner was well suited to sprinting but 
performed poorly over long distances.  At the same time, however, such a number 
would allow us to compare a variety of runners to each other to determine something 




would only make sense to consult the individual scores that corresponded to the 
particular task.  But if the specific conditions of the run are unknown, and we have no 
other information on which to form an assessment, it is only reasonable that one 
would have greater success, on average, by picking runners having the best overall 
score. The same logic applies for IQ. Still, Gould’s point stands that there is no 
excuse for arguing for the superiority of one race over another based upon g or any 
other measure. 
 In Outliers, Malcolm Gladwell argues that IQ is simply not relevant to 
success.  He does not argue, as Gould does, that g or IQ are fundamentally flawed 
measures, or rooted in racist ideology.  Rather, he wants to show that while IQ may 
help in certain limited situations, success is largely due to factors within human 
control. 
 Gladwell attacks the supposition that we live in anything resembling a 
meritocracy. Everyone does not, he argues, have access to the machinery of 
success193.  Rather, “people don’t rise from nothing.194” It isn’t what people are 
“like,” but where they are from that matters.  He argues that despite the persistent 
myth of the self-made man, individuals who appear to make their own ways in life are 
actually the beneficiaries of a wide range of social and institutional biases which 
grease the path to success. A prime example is the relative age of hockey players.  In 
Canada, he argues, a very large percentage of the population plays hockey, beginning 
at a young age.  The best in each division are gradually filtered up through the ranks 
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until they reach professional status.  But Gladwell asserts that if we look at the 
rankings of these young players, it is almost always the oldest players from a given 
league who are ranked the highest.  Because size correlates highly with relative 
ability at this level, and because there are large size differences in young children 
separated by even a few months, players who are older (just young enough to have 
been born before the cutoff birth date) are given preferential treatment. They perform 
the best, and therefore are given additional coaching and promoted through the ranks.  
The younger players, he argues, never have a chance.  Gladwell argues that this 
occurs in all areas of achievement, and that small differences in ability early in life 
create self-fulfilling prophecies.  Small differences turn into large ones. 
 Gladwell maintains that there is a 10,000 hour “rule” with regard to ability in 
any endeavor that requires substantial skill. The specific example he gives is from 
K.A. Ericsson’s 1993 study of musicians in music school. Gladwell interprets the 
study to mean that players achieve virtuoso status by virtue of the number of hours 
spent practicing, and that 10,000 hours is the “magic number.195”  Gladwell insists 
that there were no “naturals” (students who performed at elite levels without investing 
as much time) or “grinds” (students who worked as hard as or harder than other 
students but could not reach the same level of ability) found in the study196. 
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 He then goes on to describe the “trouble with geniuses,” in which he gives a 
sketch of Lewis Terman’s famous 1921 study of high IQ youths throughout their 
lives.  Gladwell points out that a large number of these young geniuses performed 
significantly below expectations as the study wore on.  The narrative centerpiece of 
the argument is Christopher Langan, reportedly the smartest man in America, with an 
IQ greater than 200.  Gladwell compares Langan to Robert Oppenheimer, in an 
attempt to explain Langan’s failure to thrive in a university context.  His conclusion is 
that “practical intelligence,” which he intends to mean something like social 
intelligence, is a critical component of success197.  He argues that IQ may simply be a 
measure of how well an individual can solve certain kinds of puzzles, whereas he 
believes social intelligence can be taught.  Children therefore need a community 
around them that prepares them for the world198. 
 Gladwell then constructs a profile of successful lawyers.  He argues that 
coincidences in the early 20th century made it possible for immigrants to become 
very successful in the nascent garment industry. Jewish immigrants were particularly 
favored because of the skills they were likely to have acquired in their home 
countries.  As a result, these families were able to become financially successful, and 
the sons of men in the garment trade tended to become doctors or lawyers.  However, 
prejudice in larger, “white shoe” law firms prevented them from hiring Jewish 
attorneys, who were forced to take jobs in firms that accepted whatever kind of work 
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was available.  The white shoe firms’ disdain for hostile corporate takeovers meant 
that these smaller firms were able to take the lion’s share of the corporate “dirty 
work” that became increasingly lucrative and central to business interests.  Therefore, 
these Jewish lawyers prospered disproportionately as a result of a series of unlikely 
events.   
 Gladwell then takes on cultural issues, arguing that the particular work ethic 
required to thrive in an economy driven by rice production (as in Southern China) 
teaches the kinds of qualities necessary to do well in mathematics and the sciences.  
He argues that a longer school year is not the cause of Asian superiority in math, but 
rather the effect of a work ethic that prizes year-round diligence199. 
 Thus, Gladwell argues that the onus on society is to produce opportunities200. 
Inequities may not be intentional and they may not be rooted in racism or evil 
intentions, but they still must be eliminated in order to avoid unduly punishing 
children for mere historical accidents.  Unfortunately, Gladwell does not provide any 
specific program for achieving this end, nor does he provide an analysis of the 
economics of such an arrangement. 
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Depth Psychology and the Limits of Intelligence 
 What can depth psychology and psychoanalytic insights provide in this 
debate? Sigmund Freud’s theories are applicable for understanding both the limits of 
rationality and human intelligence in individuals as well as how we, as large and 
small groups, interact with and understand high intelligence. The individual person is 
limited not just by his cognitive power, but by the matrix of phantasy out of which so 
many of our biases are formed. The group cannot help but project phantasies onto any 
elite with which it is presented.  
In the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud mentions intelligence 
or genius a mere handful of times. In almost every case, the reason for mentioning 
intelligence is to point out that the patients under discussion are more intelligent and 
educated than the average person. The term is often a predicate of a patient: “[a] man, 
whom I can only describe as of the highest intelligence,201” which we ought to read as 
“a man, whom I can only describe as otherwise of the highest intelligence.” Freud 
doesn’t deny rationality, of course – the application of logos to the desires of the id 
and the strictures of the superego forms the basis of Freudian psychoanalytic 
technique. But his patients’ neuroses were not due to a lack of intelligence, and rather 
to unconscious conflicts that seemed somehow other than the intelligence one could 
apply in one’s daily life. So alien were these forces, in fact, that one had to employ a 
specially trained intelligence before they were more than blind spots to the ego’s 
reality-testing apparatus. Freud does not want us to mistake his theories as applying 
                                                 




only to the feeble-minded or the pathological. He goes so far as to say that “a certain 
amount of intellectual capacity is naturally required in our patients.202”  
 Freud, however, did not leave us with a theory of human intelligence. Despite 
being aware of both Sir Francis Galton203 and Alfred Binet204, he seemed uninterested 
in intelligence testing. Rather, from his vantage, it seems “men cannot be guided 
through their intelligence, they are ruled by their passions and their instinctual 
demands.205” We are left to reconstruct the relationship of general intelligence to the 
rest of the psyche. 
 General intelligence is not identical with rationality. To the extent that IQ tests 
measure an inborn trait, general intelligence must be related to physical properties of 
the brain that facilitate or hamper cognition. But even high intelligence and cognitive 
sophistication do not seem to attenuate the effects of cognitive biases – they may even 
make the effects worse206. G may be thought of, conceptually, in the same sort of 
terms that Freud spoke about libido: as a kind of psychical energy that is attached to 
different objects. Like Freud, one must always keep in mind that such terms are 
abstractions, and do not necessarily reflect the underlying physical structure of the 
brain. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the analogues. Raymond Cattell, for 
example, identified the concepts of crystallized (Gc) and fluid (Gf) intelligence. 
While crystallized intelligence is not merely a “crystallized” form of fluid 
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intelligence, it reflects the cognitive investment one has made throughout one’s life. 
Freud might say that crystallized intelligence represents the particular intellectual 
objects with which the ego has cathected. For Cattell, fluid intelligence represents the 
neural efficiency of the subject as opposed to the particular knowledge and skills he 
or she has gained and invested his intellect in over time. 
 If the neural efficiency model is accurate, then the entire brain is likely 
influenced by its effects; even the workings of the id would be able to make use of 
intelligence though not rationality. Freud points out difficult intellectual problems can 
be solved preconsciously207 and that dream thoughts may themselves perform 
intellectual operations208. In Leonardo da Vinci, A Memory of his Childhood, Freud 
argues that childhood sexual researches are the infantile antecedents of adult 
scientific and artistic work. Even in the case of sublimation, intellect is determined by 
psychosexual development. That early experiences shape and mold one’s adult work 
output is hardly surprising in artistic endeavors, but less readily accepted as the 
impetus behind scientific investigation. Our intellectual horizons seem to be 
circumscribed by our sexual phantasies. 
One note on terminology: Paul Hoggett argues that it is incorrect to label 
unconscious feelings as irrational because they have their own internal logic (what he 
calls psycho-logic)209. Hoggett’s argument appears somewhat flawed: logic is a kind 
of logos, or speech; Hoggett blurs the line between step-by-step reasoning and 
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general problem solving. If we accept Freud’s account of psychodynamic processes, 
however, Hoggett is surely correct that the word “irrational” may be taken as 
condescending or dismissive. However, there does not seem to be a good alternative 
for distinguishing between psycho-logic and a formal rationality that is free of, or 
aims to be free of, cognitive biases and logical errors. Hoggett also does not 
distinguish between rationality and intelligence, which my argument maintains as 
interdependent but conceptually separate faculties. Hoggett argues for a threefold 
distinction between rational, irrational, and nonrational, with the nonrational being 
the site of, for example, imagined identities. Such a distinction is particularly useful 
when discussing groups in conflict, but less so when interpreting groups in the 
abstract.  
In the same spirit that Sylvia Nasar called schizophrenia a “ratiocinating 
illness,” the term “irrational” is here used as “otherwise rational,” or simply to 
distinguish affective modes of thinking from formally rational thinking210. Of course, 
much like a true vacuum, pure rationality may not exist or sustain itself for very long; 
after all, the id and the ego do not have sharp edges delineating them. The fact that 
pure rationality is tenuous, however, points to the importance of acknowledging those 
factors that make it so. Thinking about an intelligent id anthropologically, as Freud 
would, puts the problem into clearer perspective. Unconscious phantasies represent a 
kind of reasoning, even if this reasoning seems alien to our formal rationality.  The id 
is not merely the repository of instinctual urges that must be mediated by the ego, but 
                                                 




also the seat of unconscious conflicts. This is vividly expressed in Melanie Klein’s 
object relations theory, in which unconscious phantasies about introjected objects are 
continually elaborated. 
 To understand the role of intelligence and the psychodynamic model, it is 
helpful to turn to Freud’s The Ego and the Id. Here Freud lays out his topographic 
model of the psyche, dividing it into the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious. 
Our own daily experiences with thinking should be enough to convince us that not 
everything that can be conscious is conscious at any given time. We have limited 
attention. Freud identifies these thoughts as being unconscious descriptively, though 
latent, as opposed to those thoughts that are unconscious dynamically and repressed. 
The ego is formed out of the id under the influence and pressure of sense perceptions. 
The ego is responsible for the critical function of reality-testing, in which our 
phantasies or ideas are tested against the world as it is; it represents reason and 
common sense, while the id is representative of the passions.  The ego is in relation to 
the id like a man on horseback (here Freud seems to recall the image of the soul as a 
charioteer driving two horses from Plato’s Phaedrus), sometimes controlling the 
destination, sometimes being forced to navigate the way the id wants to go.  But the 
ego is, first and foremost, a bodily ego; that is, it represents the boundaries of the self, 
against which it differentiates the reality to which it must yield. While this description 
might give the ego the appearance of a scientific faculty, one must keep in mind that 
the ego serves three masters: the id, Ananke, and the superego211. It is responsible for 
                                                 




managing the discharge of the id’s libidinal urges without allowing the organism to 
be destroyed in the execution, as well as for following the strictures of the conscience.   
 The ego is not, therefore, put in a position where it can be fully rational. In 
fact, the earliest psychical conflicts provide the basis for the ego’s response to 
libidinal demands. When a person is forced to give up a sex object, he sets the object 
up in the ego; this is perhaps the sole condition under which the id can give up its 
objects, according to Freud212.  The ego identifies with the lost object, and transforms 
libido into desexualized, narcissistic libido; the ego asks the id to love it as it would 
have loved the object, for it has made itself like the object through identification. The 
prototypical identification is with the father, but the complete Oedipus Complex is 
complicated by bisexuality.  In fact, the boy behaves in a feminine way toward his 
father, and resents his mother for stealing his fathers’ affections.  The precipitate of 
the abandoned object cathexes is deposited in the ego, and the two identifications 
become combined, transforming into the superego. The superego demands the ego to 
conform to the ego-ideal, but the root of the Oedipal conflict is exactly in trying to 
usurp the role of the father, on whom the ego-ideal is based. The mandate of the 
superego is thus that the ego ought to be like the father, but must not be like him.   
 The ego is caught between the irrational, conflicting, and ceaseless demands 
of the id and the superego.  As such, we utilize our intelligence often to satisfy 
impulses and rules that do not have a rational basis themselves. As Hoggett points 
out, we use our feelings, emotions, and values to think; it is the id that chooses the 
                                                 




objects the ego uses intelligence to acquire or substitute for213. This paints a dim view 
of the possibility for intelligent, philosophical rule. As Freud says, in psychology 
“mankind’s constitutional unfitness for scientific research comes fully into the 
open.214” Our egos are not constitutionally suited toward sustained, serious thought: 
“resistance stirs within us against the relentlessness and monotony of the laws of 
thought and against the demands of reality-testing. Reason becomes the enemy which 
withholds from us so many possibilities of pleasure.215” 
 Freud seems to place hard limits on what we can expect from even the most 
enlightened leaders. From an individual psychology perspective, expressing 
intelligence as rationality is limited in two ways. First, the motivations, objects, and 
affects that inform our decision-making are not themselves founded rationally. The 
work left for rational thought and intelligence may end up being the mere 
achievement of particular ends, an instrumental rationality. Second, we do not have 
unlimited reserves of the discipline and willpower necessary to sustain serious 
thought, so that even if our ends are well chosen, we are subject to something like 
what current literature often calls “ego depletion.” As such, we cannot depend on a 
cognitive elite to be fully rational by nature. Intellectual virtue may be as much a 
matter of habituation as is moral virtue, and one’s individual intelligence cannot be 
trusted to always disclose truth, no matter how assiduously logic is applied.  The 
fallibility and incompleteness of our own intellectual processes is why Aristotle wrote 
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that the wise person “will contemplate better, no doubt, when he has people to work 
with,216” even if he contemplates well alone. 
 
The Position of the Group in Relation to Intelligence 
 Groups, too, are subject to the influence of unconscious forces and phantasies. 
If intelligent, philosophical rule is to be possible in a democratic republic, two key 
questions must be answered. First, can large groups behave intelligently, or at least 
recognize intelligent leadership when it appears? Second: do the phantasies that 
emerge in the group render intelligent leadership impossible per se?  
 The idea of a “mob mentality” is no less common today than it was when 
Gustave Le Bon wrote The Crowd – A Study of the Popular Mind. Le Bon discussed 
his “collective mind” in much more literal terms than most of us would admit to: a 
collective mentality through which members of a crowd think, feel, and act 
differently from themselves. If Le Bon is correct, of course, the political is hopelessly 
unintelligent.  Le Bon argues that there is a fundamental shift in perception, affect, 
and cognitive ability; crowds are always intellectually inferior to individuals, he 
argues, though in terms of feelings or acts they may be better or worse than the 
individuals comprising the crowd. 
Because crowds only “think in images” for Le Bon - here we may recall 
Freud’s point in The Ego and the Id that thinking in images is an older, less 
developed form of thinking than using word representations - crowds are liable to 
                                                 




confuse associations between thoughts; false associations cause the crowd to link 
unrelated images and thus arrive at incorrect conclusions based upon those 
associations.  It is understandable, then, that the crowd does not crave reasoned 
discourse or a rational assessment of ability when choosing its leaders.  Rather, it 
longs for legendary heroes, demigods who are represented through mythological 
imagery, reaching to the root of the race’s archaic past.  Orators who wish to lead the 
crowd, Le Bon tells us, must exaggerate, repeat, affirm, and never attempt to use 
reason.  Crucially, the leader for Le Bon always stands on soft ground; his position is 
entirely contingent on the whim of the crowd and is only secure when his legacy has 
passed into myth.  There is no objective indicium of competence that can be relied 
upon, in Le Bon’s view, to safeguard rule or placate an angry mob. 
 Le Bon’s characterization is better seen as a particular manifestation of group 
psychology, rather than the general rule. In Experiences in Groups and Other Papers, 
Wilfred Bion extended Melanie Klein’s concept of psychological positions to the 
group setting, calling them “basic assumptions.” He suggested that a group may pick 
its sickest member as a leader under the influence of the basic assumption of 
dependence - the group seeks a leader who is as dependent on the group as the group 
is dependent upon him. Witness, Bion says, the pharaohs in Egypt whose monuments 
could be seen as a kind of group therapy, with the people tending to the pharaoh’s 
anxiety217.  C. Fred Alford points out that a less subtle explanation is that the more 
extreme paranoid-schizoid leader provides a better holding function for the group, 
                                                 




and is more practiced in imaginatively communicating anxiety218. Either 
interpretation allows for the development of groups with unhealthy, tenuous relations 
with their leaders, without generalizing the pathological situation.  
Freud begins Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego by examining Le 
Bon, but quickly dismisses the notion of an independent group mind.  In contrast with 
Le Bon’s romantic individualism, Freud argues that individual psychology almost 
always involves other people, whether they be family members, friends, or 
acquaintances; our psychology is primarily a relational one, which is overwhelmingly 
concerned with objects and relationships between people219.  It is possible to view 
Freud’s dismissal as applying merely to a theory in which a group mind exists, to 
some extent, separately from the group itself. But even if we construe the group mind 
more narrowly as a regressed or separate psychological state in which all members 
individually participate, Freud argues that group processes are fundamentally related 
to the same psychological states that dominate both quotidian and neurotic behavior.  
That is, even if there is a state such as a regressed group, its etiology is found in the 
individual psychology of each of the members, and is strictly continuous with that 
psychology. 
 The members of the group are bound through libidinal ties which recall the 
same libidinal cathexes one sees in siblings; a kind of mutual love founded on initial 
hostility, and the commandment that no individual should receive more love from the 
leader or authority than others.  This, for Freud, is the foundation of the social 
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contract, which recapitulates the formation of bands of brothers before the murder of 
the primal father, and their struggle afterward to return to patriarchal order.  Members 
of the group identify with the authority figure, who, to some extent, supplants the ego 
ideal in the psyche.  Of course, as Paul Roazen points out, the superego is not entirely 
replaced by the image of the leader220; the leader’s contributions are more like 
accretions that function alongside existing superego dictates.  As such, atrocity and 
guilt become powerful means of maintaining cohesion in the group; the leader 
commands the led to participate in violence which inspires guilt, and therefore fears 
of reprisal.  The group then clings more tightly to the leader to protect them from 
their projected guilt. 
 But groups are not necessarily, or even ordinarily, pathological. Freud argues 
that even the group is capable of expressing creative genius, a fact which is evinced 
by language and rain dances. For Freud, at least at the time he wrote Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, it was an open question how much the 
individual merely perfects the work of the group or culture.  This question had 
consequences for the kind of leader the group could choose: similar to Le Bon, Freud 
held that the leader had to have certain typical qualities that potential group members 
could recognize and identify with.  This identification with the leader is the most 
important step in establishing his hold on the people, and the rest of the group 
congeals out of a natural desire to attain harmony with the group.   
                                                 




 But Freud approaches the problem from a different angle when he writes 
Moses and Monotheism.  While Freud begins the work by asking whether the 
historical Moses even existed, the rest of the work is clearly written under the 
assumption that he did; that great men actually have existed in the past and have 
profoundly influenced their cultures.  Here we see the most dramatic break with Le 
Bon’s theory of influencing cultural attitudes.  Freud acknowledges the capacity to 
directly and profoundly influence the beliefs of a people.  Specifically, Freud argues 
that Moses was actually an Egyptian who served in the court of Amenhotep IV and 
embraced Amenhotep’s radical new monotheism.  This monotheistic idea was a 
profound innovation, Freud says, and it was only able to arise out of a culture of 
empire; still, it was not accepted by the majority of Egyptians, and people who clung 
to the new idea were forced to flee.  Moses imposed the new religion on the Israelites, 
but they eventually rebelled and killed him. Freud’s next argument is striking: later 
on, the Israelites took on a new religion imparted by a Midianite priest - the worship 
of Jahve.  But they attributed many of the qualities of the first Moses onto their new 
god, and conflated the Midianite priest’s legacy with that of the original Moses.  In 
short, the new religion which the Israelites developed was the return of the repressed.   
 It is true that such a return had, as its precondition, a similarity with the killing 
of the primal father as Freud relates in Totem and Taboo.  But Moses’ profound 
influence on the Jewish culture came in the form of a cultural trauma, which Freud 
says not only influenced culture, but genetically changed their psyches as well, 
transmitting a collective memory of their crime through the generations, even without 




truths conflict with deeply held wishes, and it is only after time that the ego is able to 
accept them as true, but painful.  He thus relates traumatic events in civilization to 
traumatic neurosis and the latency period; in a “compromise period” of the culture’s 
progress, a difference shows between the written account and the oral report or 
tradition.  Once forgotten truths, having ascended to consciousness, have a powerful 
force that bypasses logic and seizes the imagination.  And, in fact, the once dangerous 
idea becomes the people’s most treasured possession.   
  Freud goes still further to address the question of great men in history.  He 
says “it was one man, the man Moses, who created the Jews.221” From there, he 
begins to discuss the great man theory itself.  He is willing to grant that a man can 
develop such extreme effectiveness that “he can create out of indifferent individuals 
and families one people, can stamp this people with its definite character and 
determine its fate for millennia to come.”  To be sure, Freud agrees that one cannot 
discount impersonal factors such as economic circumstances, immigration, and so on.  
But historical events are like individual psychology in a further regard: they tend to 
be over-determined. Freud lacks any sentimentalism toward great men; the hero is a 
tragic figure for Freud, doomed to be destroyed by the people he would lead.  He may 
set the course of a civilization, but it is only after he has been rent apart and 
cannibalized that he obtains his mythic status. 
 As such, one cannot forget that humanity’s formative moment was, in Freud’s 
view, the murder of the primal father by a band of brothers desperate to escape his 
                                                 




despotism.  This murder had such a profound impact on humanity, Freud tells us, that 
it established the very basis of religion and civilization.  Herbert Marcuse’s 
perspective on this primal murder teaches us something else: the act of despotism was 
itself a voluntary act on the part of the primal father.  While civilization has been 
conditioned on domination - continual recapitulations of the original murder - the act 
itself was historically contingent for Freud, and so domination itself is historically 
contingent.  Marcuse wants us to believe that a new form of freedom is possible, new 
modes of being which radically alter our psyches in the same way that they currently 
bear the imprimatur of the primal father - via the Oedipus complex, totemism, and 
religion.  To be fair, Marcuse does not expect a messiah.  But an acceptance of 
Freud’s premise leaves open the possibility of individuals who can transform 
civilization into something that has never been seen before. 
 Freud’s account shows us that what we might regard as objective criteria for 
leadership are not by themselves sufficient; the great leader has to tap into the 
imagination of the people he leads, and to do so means resonating with their fears and 
hopes. One cannot, therefore, merely select the most intelligent and educated people 
as leaders, unless that selection is itself already imbued with the kind of affective 
power that would allow those people to lead. Once in leadership positions, they 
would need to be able to address problems, both real and imagined.   
In Group, Claudio Neri presents an argument that fits well with Freud’s, while 
borrowing heavily from Bion.  Neri argues that group life is a distinct process from 
individual life. That is not to say that Neri posits a group or collective mind, but he 




how we are when we are alone, or indeed when we are in a different kind of group.  
The group has a particular way of working through problems that makes it amenable 
to solving certain kinds of issues. Neri’s account never loses sight of the fact that the 
group comprises individual members who may process events in their own particular 
ways, even taking group events home with them to digest independently.  Though 
Neri does not directly address the problem of leadership in non-therapeutic groups, he 
provides valuable interpretation through his adaptation of Bion’s “alpha function” and 
the concept of a group “field.”  Particularly important for Neri is that the group 
provides a space in which particular problems may be deposited, and individuals may 
then pick up these remainders, process them unconsciously - even dream about them - 
and provide digested material back to the group at an appropriate time.   
For Neri, the individual lives led outside of the group setting inform and 
enrich the therapeutic aspects of the group, and preserve individuals’ sense of identity 
and individuality while fulfilling a work-group role.  Neri’s use of the field is 
intriguing, because it reminds us that we build interpersonal patterns of behavior 
which may vary depending on the setting and the composition of individuals present.  
The field emerges as something like a third party (in dyadic relationships) that seems 
to exist independently from the individual members and forms a container into which 
split-off parts of the personality can be deposited and enclosed in “cysts.”  Far from 
being a regressive state, Neri’s field is, in a sense, an evolution of projective 
identification. 
 Bion’s concept of a work group - as opposed to the basic assumption groups - 




group development.  A work group, for Bion, operates in a “scientific” way.  Being 
scientific does not mean that the group adheres to Popperian notions of falsifiability 
or scientific method.  A scientific outlook more closely corresponds with the group’s 
ability to take on ego functions, such as reality-testing.  Rather than expressing 
paranoid-schizoid anxieties, the work group is able to confront and address these 
anxieties while working toward common goals in a more or less rational manner.  In 
contrast, Bion’s basic assumption groups provide us with a non-scientific kind of 
group interaction, which hearkens back to Le Bon’s less favorable characterizations 
of the group as being intellectually inferior to individuals.  The basic assumption 
group is utterly incapable of forward motion.  Bion recounts an episode in which 
members of a group began to give advice to one another; each member recommended 
a course of action he himself had acknowledged only moments earlier was futile222.  
Bion thought at the time that the group’s motto should be “vendors of quack nostrums 
unite”.  It occurred to him that the group had cohered; they had formed a united front 
against him as a therapist.  He concludes: “The idea that neurotics cannot cooperate 
has to be modified.”   
 The non-scientific group, then, is more concerned with reducing tension - 
much as Freud described the conservative nature of the instincts, which seek to 
discharge tension rather than allow it to build - and may show teamwork, but only 
insofar as the teamwork resists change or development.  Even so, Bion’s example of 
the pharaoh’s monuments seems to indicate that meaningful work can be done even 
                                                 




under a dependence basic assumption, although his historical example was not fully 
qualified in a clinical sense and ought to be taken in the spirit it was written.  Perhaps 
it is fairer to say that a basic assumption group may develop some level of work 
group status, even as it is essentially directed out of anxiety.  In that formation, of 
course, the kinds of expressions of anxiety that the leader presents would, of 
necessity, become a part of the culture and lead to a kind of artistic progress of the 
group.   
 But a stricter look at scientific groups affords us another comparison: between 
what Thomas Kuhn calls “ordinary science” and “paradigm shifts.”  In ordinary 
group processes, individuals work together under common ideas and ways of viewing 
the objects of their study, and make small advances which lead to somewhat larger 
ones over time.  To a certain extent, the individual advances are interchangeable.  The 
dominant scientific culture largely informs the kinds of experiments and 
developments that take place.  But the paradigmatic shift is a radical change in 
viewing the objects, often the result of a single individual’s unique insight and 
capacity.  Of course, Freud is correct that historical events are often over-determined; 
a science may become ripe for expression in new form or under a new set of radically 
different ideas, while a small number of individuals are able to see beyond its current 
limitations to solve the outstanding problems, as in a crisis condition for Kuhn. 
 
Group Psychology and the Intelligence Debate 
 The exoteric argument one encounters in Plato’s Republic is that philosophers 




serve individual interests. But the views of Herrnstein and Murray imply that 
intelligence itself leads to moral uprightness and success, and further that high 
intelligence confers high influence; the argument becomes, in effect, historiographic. 
The intelligence debate therefore seems to be a recapitulation of the arguments for 
and against the great-man theory. 
 If Herrnstein and Murray are correct, the task of making rule philosophic 
becomes more and more urgent. Insofar as a cognitive elite has implicitly achieved 
unacknowledged influence on the political, a representative democracy must 
transform this arrangement into something explicit; to do otherwise would be to allow 
it to remain repressed. To be sure, Galton, Herrnstein, and Murray appear to overstate 
their case for the individual. A person who is smart enough seems to generate sui 
generis solutions to every situation.  Their imagined high-IQ busboys, for example, 
anticipate an optimal path through the restaurant based upon average dining times and 
observed cues.  Every human endeavor, for Herrnstein and Murray, can seemingly be 
improved upon through sheer intellectual power. Gould treats IQ as a mere 
mathematical artifact as well as a tool of social control. For Gould, there is no such 
thing as “mental worth,” and attempting to impose such a concept through a single 
number, as IQ does, is an error of hierarchy. Gould seems more sympathetic to 
something like Howard Gardner’s multiple intelligences theory, which attempts to 
remove the priority from spatial, logical, and mathematical intelligences and create a 
more expansive definition of intelligence. Gladwell argues that IQ is a very narrow 
kind of problem solving ability. For Gladwell, the individual does not seem to have 




culture in which he lives. In combination, one has a sense of American ambivalence 
to innate talent and intelligence. On the one hand, Americans want to celebrate those 
who thrive based on hard work and talent, in an echo of early protestant values; on 
the other, Americans are uneasy with the idea that individuals have equal rights but 
unequal endowments.  
 Underlying these contrasting views is a tacit faith in collectivism on the parts 
of Gould and Gladwell, and individualism on the parts of Herrnstein, Murray, and 
Galton. These extreme views require moderation to be coherent; Freud and Neri 
provide this kind of moderating influence in their treatments of group behavior.  To 
be clear, collectivism and individualism should be understood as descriptive rather 
than prescriptive labels; Le Bon, for example, believes that the human world is best 
described when we examine nations or groups and look to their underlying 
commonalities.  He believes that “heroes” are, in essence, legends fabricated from an 
underlying social framework.  Individuals, however, are more capable of real thought 
and independent expression. Galton, however, urges that men of genius are virtually 
impervious to obstacles; whatever defects in education or lack of opportunity they 
may have encountered in their lives, a true genius will educate himself and rise to the 
top of his chosen profession.  Herrnstein and Murray are somewhat more 
circumspect, holding that individuals are under a constant threat of loss of vital 
resources necessary to fully realize their genetic potential. The thrust of their 
argument is hardly different, but they emphasize the threat that collectivism poses to 




The collectivist account, as framed by Gladwell, has a large emotional 
component informed by the severe threat to the ego that exceptional individuals 
represent. In Bion and Neri, individuals feel their egos become threatened by the 
group situation; the response is a group illusion, which has as its nexus the phantasy 
that this particular group is the best group.  Group narcissism is substituted for 
individual narcissism as members experience depersonalization and disorientation. 
This defense mechanism allows us to displace our own anxieties about being 
individually insufficient; at the same time, it must be profoundly opposed to the 
concept of individuals who have no need for group membership223. Faced with the 
unsettling possibility that there are those among us who excel intellectually by dint of 
genetic lottery, the wounded ego desperately attempts to rationalize their successes 
away. 
 One such attempt, as Herrnstein and Murray have framed it, is the 
“compensating skills fallacy,” in which one posits that while intelligence has its 
benefits, other skills, such as empathy in a social worker, can compensate for the 
disadvantages of a relatively lower IQ224.  Herrnstein and Murray point out that this 
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reasoning is fallacious because it relies on the assumption that higher intelligence 
must imply that other skills (the ones used to compensate) are lower in intelligent 
subjects than in their less intelligent counterparts.  It is clear, however, that we speak 
about the benefits of intelligence ceteris paribus; absent scientific evidence that lower 
intelligence is compensated by some other faculty, it is an irrational assumption. 
 Gladwell attempts to demonstrate the inadequacy of intelligence via a single, 
powerful counterexample. Gladwell wants us to understand that if the so-called 
“smartest man in America” is unable to succeed in any meaningful sense, then any 
faith in IQ or intelligence is misplaced.  Yet Gladwell’s primary point - that neither 
IQ nor talent is dispositive of success - is undermined by his very treatment of 
Christopher Langan.  If we accept the anecdotal account that Langan, for instance, 
was able to match Jimi Hendrix “lick for lick” at fifteen, Langan surely disproves the 
hypothesis that virtuoso (or even elite) performance requires ten thousand hours of 
practice - a claim Gladwell urges earlier in the work.  The ten thousand hours thesis is 
not hedged by a requirement for “practical intelligence,” as Gladwell does when he 
compares Langan and Robert Oppenheimer.   
 Galton has a profound distrust of the bulk of the population; he argues, for 
instance, that society itself has become more complex than those in the lesser 
intellectual classes can manage.  While Galton concedes that some forms of success 
are due to the spirit of the time (such as some literary successes), he argues that those 
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successes are thereby disqualified from being true works of genius absent other 
characteristics which would render them enduring.  He gives a nod to the collective 
nature of science, but within the context of a group of already intelligent human 
beings communicating and furthering one another’s discoveries.  His hope to advance 
humanity based on the efforts of the intelligent seems to imply that society is as a 
helpless child in need of guidance by the most able members. 
 Freud’s argument that the group itself may possess creative genius allows the 
political group to be cast in a new role.  Bion’s scientific work group provides the 
prototype for functional democracy in which the electorate provides its own solutions 
rather than relying on leaders to impose policy. That is, when the group is not 
indulging its phantasies as neurosis, it is capable of intelligent deliberation and 
creative thought. Still, implicit in Freud’s formulation is an acknowledgement that 
exceptional individuals exist. Such men at the very least reshape the myths, legends, 
and products of their cultures.  In contrast with Le Bon, Freud’s leaders are far more 
capable of autonomy; as relics of the primal father who oppressed the original band of 
brothers, these leaders are like Freidrich Nietzsche’s overman.  As such, they are 
generative and self-sufficient, and need not depend exclusively upon a connection to 
hereditary ideas as in Le Bon’s account.    
 While Neri does not explicitly address exceptional individuals - the closest 
account is when he describes the group therapist as an oracle - he stresses the 
integration of individual psychic life within the context of group expression and 
fields.  Both Freud and Neri acknowledge the interdependence of the group and the 




group to provide valuable insight into particular problems while still utilizing 
individual intelligences.  Regardless of the context (individual or group), Freud’s 
concept of a rich psychological life dominated by opposing drives and instincts 
emphasizes that neither group nor individual life is “dominant” in a psychological or 
historical sense.  All psychological processes, for Freud, evolve from initial 
interpersonal relationships via the Oedipal conflict. As such, the individual can never 
be entirely removed from the group. However, how a person processes these psychic 
events is highly individual, and contradicts the notion that a large share of our mental 
lives are dominated by a primitive mentality or inherited racial ideas, as in Le Bon.   
  
Summary 
Due to the gulf between the ego’s ability to test reality and the rigidity 
imposed by the scientific worldview, objective facts about ourselves often meet stiff 
resistance. Freud encountered this as the ego avoided the repressed, but it is no less 
true when we confront painful truths such as the idea that some individuals may be 
objectively more intelligent than ourselves. It may be that the ego can only fully 
accept this idea when confronted by a crisis. Perhaps, however, a tempering and 
lowering of expectations, as well as an acknowledgement of the interdependence of 
the group and its leader is a means to resolve the tension. The cognitive elite would 
also have to recognize the character of its people, and would need to resist the 
temptation to dismiss certain fears and tensions as irrational and therefore irrelevant. 
The effective leader has to recognize the saliency of irrational impulses, and also that 




of a nation is driven by both intellect and desire. As Plato pointed out, a philosophical 
class would only lead because it loves and appreciates the city that has provided it 
with the opportunity to become philosophical. The city should love the philosophers 
for making it prosperous and healthy. When the philosopher appreciates the 
tenuousness of his position – indeed, the tenuousness of philosophical thought itself – 
he may be capable of maintaining a harmonious ordering of the city that respects both 
the heights and the limits of human intellect. Our irrational nature cannot help but 
influence our attempts to arrive at scientific knowledge, and it informs what we 
expect of political leadership. Depth psychology provides an interesting lens through 
which we can examine our biases for and against intelligence testing, as well as 
understanding the interrelationship between intelligence and the unconscious mind. 
This understanding is enhanced by looking to group psychology as a way of 
discussing the affective bonds between the leader and his people, and how these 
bonds run deeper than rational agreement that the best should rule. This chapter has 
shown that psychoanalytic concepts provide a middle ground between the denial of 
intelligent, philosophical leadership as a political goal and the overestimation of 




Chapter 5: Intelligence and American Democracy 
 
 In this chapter I will first consider the relationship of the intellectual and 
intelligence to the United States of America, using Richard Hofstadter’s Anti-
Intellectualism in American Life as a starting point. From there, I will consider to 
what extent philosophical rule is possible, and whether experts fulfill a similar role in 
our democracy. I will then consider the relationship between liberal education and 
democracy and provide a brief critique of current trends in educational focus. I will 
then address the issue of heritability of IQ and its relation to race, and the relationship 
with justice in an egalitarian system. Finally, I will conclude with a provisional 
solution that attempts to resolve these issues, taking into account the theoretical 
framework provided in the previous chapters. 
The idea of philosophical statesmanship, or of any kind of elite that has 
special privileges in the American republic, would in the best case be understood as 
anachronistic. American-style democracy largely subscribes to the founding principle 
that all men are created equal, and our claims to meritocracy largely rest upon this 
premise. The widespread distrust of IQ as a meaningful measure speaks, in part, to 
this bias.  
The founding of America represented an exceedingly rare phenomenon: the 
coincidence of intellectuals and political power225. A well-educated aristocracy made 
                                                 




their conspiracy public and involved the people in an intellectual debate226 over the 
constitution of a new union.  These men could not be called philosophers in the most 
serious sense of the term, but they were certainly intellectuals, or scholars in Leo 
Strauss’ terminology. It was in the nature of such scholarship to compare the 
teachings of the great minds that came before them and found a republic on a 
provisional settlement of those great disputes.  The fact that this settlement, 
culminating in the ratification of a short and ostensibly accessible document, is little 
understood by the electorate has produced a rift in American understandings of 
democracy and equality. Any introductory civics class makes the distinction between 
direct democracy and representative democracy, and the distinction is usually 
explained as an administrative convenience: direct democracy requires too much 
leisure time of citizens. Sometimes it is expressed in terms of class struggle, as 
safeguards developed by the moneyed classes to prevent the poor from taking full 
control.  
 America’s religious heritage and relative youth has allowed it to accept the 
idea of American exceptionalism; Alexis de Tocqueville wrote about the hand of 
Providence in American-style democracy without irony, and a religion that put forth 
good works as evidence of a good soul surely cemented the idea in the American 
consciousness.  So the American mind can easily maintain that our country is both 
predestined to greatness and that our greatness is the result of our merit; that all men 
                                                 




are created equal, but some have more merit than others, as though merit were wholly 
a matter of character as something distinct from nature or nurture.  
Richard Hofstadter’s description of this coincidence of intellect and power as 
a rapprochement signals his view of a separate America – or a separate world – 
inhabited by intellectuals, that must resume diplomatic relations with the rest of the 
country. Hofstadter’s intellectuals are abstract thinkers much of the time, but must 
descend from the light into the cave to provide practical advice to statesmen. 
Intellectuals could not maintain their power in America because they could no longer 
be omni-competent in an increasingly complex and specialized world. We should be 
especially skeptical of Hofstadter’s point. One is reminded of Hippias, who seemed to 
believe that acquiring many arts was the precondition for virtue.  Casting the 
intellectual’s role in political life as one of expertise represents an irreconcilable 
alienation of the life of the intellect and statecraft, because the expert is unconcerned 
with the good of the state generally. Hofstadter does not attempt to differentiate 
between philosophers and intellectuals, but it seems as though the intellectual 
embraces some philosophical habits of mind, namely the mixture of playfulness and 
seriousness toward ideas. The intellectual, however, does not aim to understand the 
whole or the good in a comprehensive sense, but is concerned with an area of 
expertise. 
 Hofstadter distinguishes between intelligence and intellect227, arguing that 
intelligence is generally perceived as a positive quality, while intellect is perceived 
                                                 




negatively. Intellect may even be perceived as orthogonal to intelligence, so that a 
person may be considered an intellectual without intelligence. Hofstadter’s depiction 
focuses on the kinds of mental work the intellectual performs (abstract, theoretical) 
versus the intelligent person (concrete, practical), and in this sense echoes the same 
distrust ancient Greeks had of sophists and philosophers.  Intelligence is less of a 
choice than being an intellectual is, as choosing the intellectual life is choosing 
particular habits of mind. Intelligence, insofar as it is an inherent quality, cannot be so 
easily dismissed as a character flaw; intelligence can also be directly useful to others. 
To choose to be an intellectual is to choose to turn away from political life, because 
one withdraws into a world of abstractions and theory, contemplating what is above 
instead of what is present. The criticism of intellectuals reflects that they are feared to 
be amoral; science can be safely construed as value-free, in most cases, because it 
ultimately represents concrete claims about the physical world. Intellectuals, 
however, are perceived to apply their intellects to particular movements or ideologies, 
and their peculiar style of argumentation forecloses entry to the uninitiated.  
 
 
Philosophical Rule in America 
 Strictly speaking, it is impossible for a philosopher to rule because, qua 
philosopher, he cannot put down into law as final what must always be considered 
provisional. The work of the philosopher is always explorative and never aimed at 
practice, because the nature of truth is not to be applied. The philosopher, then, is the 




moment that he rules he ceases to engage in philosophy. Philosophical rule, in the 
strict sense, is therefore self-contradictory, which is one reason why statecraft must be 
an obligation forced upon Plato’s philosophical class. Governance does not come 
about as the happy overflow of philosophical work, but as a distinct activity from 
which philosophy remains wholly outside.  
 This raises the question of whether Plato was a philosopher when he advised 
Dion, or Jean-Jacques Rousseau when he wrote the Constitution of Poland. 
“Philosopher” would be a special kind of epithet that only applies when one is 
actually engaged in philosophy, unlike a runner who is a runner even when seated, or 
a carpenter who remains a carpenter even when reading a novel. One may identify 
people by their vocations insofar as they have the capacity to exercise the virtues of 
their profession, so that we may call a man a runner who chooses to be sedentary, if 
he is capable of running excellently. A doctor is a person who possesses the medical 
art, even if he makes no use of it. But the philosopher is not called a king even if he 
has the art of ruling228, and he does not seem to be a philosopher by passively 
possessing an art of seeking wisdom.  
Philosophers can rule, then, only in the abstract sense. They create 
philosophical works or teachings which are transmitted to us and inform or influence 
political life and culture. In this way, Machiavelli establishes new modes and orders 
while writing about them, even though he does not exercise direct control over 
government or have the ear of a prince. Plato influences our understanding of political 
                                                 




life even while writing about an impossible regime. Plato’s allegory of the cave is 
therefore misleading; the philosophers seem to maintain themselves in the light, and 
rely upon the rest of us to reach out and carry their works back into the cave.  
 The restrictive semantic problems aside, a strict definition of the philosopher 
should include only the greatest minds, not merely members of the philosophy 
department faculty229. For Strauss, education is a process of transmitting 
understandings from a teacher to a student. Because there cannot be an infinite 
regress, there are some teachers who are not students230. Strauss’ argument calls to 
mind Machiavelli’s three classes of brains – the first class understands by itself. This 
point requires some consideration, because clearly Plato was the student of Socrates, 
Aristotle was the student of Plato, and Machiavelli was heir to an entire philosophical 
tradition including Aristotle and Polybius.  If these men were philosophers under 
Strauss’ strict definition, then it does not preclude learning anything from a teacher. 
What it does preclude is the work of mere scholarship, which rearranges and 
compares what others have understood independently. The philosopher understands 
something profound beyond what he has been taught, particularly something so 
profound that we cannot even be assured of the philosopher’s presence in any given 
lifetime.  If we want to speak sensibly about philosophical rule we are compelled to 
speak of the philosopher in a broader sense.  
The looser definition of philosopher would include intellectuals broadly, or 
people who are engaged in intellectual work and are therefore presupposed to be 
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capable of more educated deliberation.  Plato asked us to consider that the statesman 
is actually an image of the philosopher. Let us assume that Plato’s intention was to 
write the Sophist and the Statesman but to only imply the Philosopher. The final 
dialogue might be intended for the student to complete on his own, exercising that 
which he has learned from the prior dialogues. But it might also be the case that the 
philosopher does not exist in the same way that sophists and statesmen exist; the 
philosopher is ephemeral, and we are always forced to intimate his existence by 
showing what is not a philosopher. Sophists and statesmen are images of the 
philosopher, aspects of the whole.  
Just so, intellectuals represent a facet of the philosopher without grasping the 
whole. The closest thing we may have to the strictest definition of the philosopher is 
someone who has considered what the philosophers have had to say, and has been 
educated in that great conversation in the most thorough way possible. Even if such 
people ultimately lack the equipment to adjudicate disputes between the greatest 
minds231, ideological humility is often a virtue in a statesman.  Even if philosophers 
were more common, would we be able to recognize them? If we are not competent to 
judge in their disputes, are we competent to determine who is a philosopher as 
opposed to an intellectual, scholar, or sophist? We seem to be consigned to 
recognizing philosophers only in retrospect, and on the authority of other 
philosophers or scholars.  
                                                 




 The extent to which Plato considered it desirable or appropriate for 
philosophers to rule is an open question. If we looked to his life for practical 
examples, we would be sorely disappointed. The Academy was forced outside of the 
city walls, after all; the philosophical life was ultimately consigned to a separate 
existence beyond the city and its laws. This mode of education contrasts distinctly 
with the inherently political nature of the Platonic dialogues. Socrates took on all 
comers, as it were, and was willing to engage interlocutors publicly about matters of 
public import.  
 Creating something like Plato’s Academy today would be an unrealistic and 
impracticable exercise. The precondition of the Academy was Plato’s own genius, 
and the likelihood of finding even one person living who could fulfill this role is 
vanishingly small. Plato teaches us volumes about education, but above all, the 
objective of education is to teach the student in the best way possible. We are limited 
in providing a living embodiment of this ideal by the fact that we are all imperfect 
teachers and students. As Leo Strauss put it, “in the case of the highest form of 
education those conditions are very rarely fulfilled, and one cannot do anything to 
produce them; the only things we can do regarding them are not to interfere with their 
interplay and to prevent such interference.232” This observation contains an implicit 
criticism of the concept of gifted education. If we lack the ability to determine the 
best teachers, but we possess the ability to find the best students, we reduce the 
likelihood that any of these students will encounter the best teachers by forcing them 
                                                 




to interact with a limited subset of educators chosen by arbitrary or less than ideal 
standards. The second-best solution, it would seem, is to rely on the great books not 
merely as the curriculum, but as the teachers themselves. 
 Plato’s Socrates, when discussing a postulated natural virtue with Meno, 
makes a point that if virtue were naturally occurring, we should identify the virtuous 
and set them up in the Acropolis to be free from corrupting influences. Plato’s 
Socrates was able to speak ironically while also saying something truthful; to the 
extent that some human beings are better learners than others, disruptions to their 
education represent a greater loss. It is important to set aside a space for the best 
students to learn not only from the best teachers we can provide, but to challenge each 
other. One of the most valuable aspects of the Socratic method is that it forces the 
student to interact with others who may actively challenge his beliefs and arguments. 
This kind of education is time consuming and difficult, and it is directly at odds with 
a results-driven system of practical education that emphasizes competence in 
narrowly conceived practical skills.  
 The American preference for practical education has no more explicit 
contemporary expression than the call for more science, technology, engineering, and 
math graduates. Practical education in previous generations was certainly less 
cerebral, focusing on agriculture, hygiene, and vocational skills233. The emphasis on 
science-based education is no less practical, but finds its roots in a changing world 
economy that values mechanical skills less than so-called knowledge work. 
                                                 




Underlying this push is the assumption that we are engaged in progress in the general 
sense, as though scientific progress were also moral progress. The knowledge worker, 
however, is not a philosopher, nor even an intellectual. Such a worker may be 
intelligent, but he is unconcerned with the good; he is the epitome of instrumental 
rationality. Because science purports to be value-free, the knowledge worker can only 
supply the solution to technical problems, not moral ones.  
 We should also understand from Plato that memory is not our highest 
intellectual function. Because modern education so often rewards the memory and 
punishes novelty, our best students are often trained to argue from authority. Memory 
and tradition are inextricably linked; memory is necessary for the human being to 
function, and tradition is necessary for the city. We should not, however, confuse the 
necessary functions for the highest. In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger contemplated 
that there would be students who refuse to accept received wisdom, and who thereby 
challenge the authority of the laws and the state. The stranger’s solution for this is to 
give these students something additional to contemplate, and see if they leave 
satisfied. But if the students remain unsatisfied, if they cannot accept the reeducation 
provided by the nocturnal council, then they should be made to see the necessity of 
respecting the laws even while pursuing wisdom that may contradict the basis of 
those laws. The implication is that many students are spirited who are not intelligent, 
and they challenge authority more for sport than due to love of wisdom. Conversely, 
intelligence alone is not enough; the student must have the necessary determination 




Recently, Angela Lee Duckworth et al have shown that IQ tests do not 
necessarily show maximal intellectual ability234, but are dependent on motivation. 
High IQ scores are the product of both high intelligence and motivation to apply that 
intelligence, according to Duckworth. Duckworth’s conclusions comport well with 
what Plato implies: timid intelligence is suited to certain kinds of work, but not 
statesmanship. This result is problematic for intelligence researchers who want to 
show that intelligence is hereditary, stable, and predictive of long-term life outcomes. 
The usefulness of IQ as a measure, however, does not depend on its being hereditary. 
Rather, what matters is whether “intelligence” is a meaningful term, IQ measures 
what we call intelligence, and intelligence is useful and important in political 
leadership. James Flynn calls this a semantic argument, and points out that 
substituting “who learns fastest and best” for “intelligence” meets what we commonly 
mean by the term. Further, IQ measures for this definition well. 
This argument also applies regarding criticisms that IQ tests are not culture-
fair. The observation that different cultures place different emphasis on testing and 
compliance with procedures similar to testing scenarios means that we cannot 
accurately compare results between cultures235. However, if the tests measure 
intelligence as it is expressed in our culture, then they are still useful measures within 
our society.  
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 Plato and Machiavelli make independent cases for the importance of 
intelligence in political leadership. We can look to them, therefore, for guidance as to 
how we might order our political and educational institutions to accomplish the goal 
of rule that is both intelligent and makes use of philosophy. A reconsideration of our 
educational system after looking to Plato would yield several important results. The 
first is that we would need to identify the best, most intelligent students. IQ tests are 
one of the most efficient means of making this determination, as they indicate not 
only intelligence but zeal, as Duckworth shows. The second is that we have to 
reconsider the content of the education in light of what is most important to educating 
a ruling class.  As to political ordering, we must consider what it would look like to 
have an intelligent political class guided by such an education.  
 
Expertise 
 It is important to first distinguish a false form of intelligent rule. Hofstadter 
writes about intellectualism in the comprehensive sense of a person devoted to the life 
of the mind236, and one who has a certain predisposition to ideas characterized by the 
dual sense of piety and playfulness237. When dealing with the coincidence of 
intellectualism and power, however, he seems to be forced to conclude that the 
intellectual’s closest association with power is in the guise of the expert238.  This role 
is second-best for Hofstadter, as the highest example is that of the founding fathers, 
                                                 
236 Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, pg. 27 
237 Ibid., pg. 29 




who were both statesmen and intellectuals at once239. Within a patrician elite, “men of 
intellect moved freely and spoke with enviable authority,” and “the intellectual as 
expert was a negligible force; but the intellectual as ruling-class gentleman was a 
leader in every segment of society.” Hofstadter’s suggestion is that the influence of 
experts was negligible because the need for expertise was less keen.  
 Hofstadter’s view seems fatalistic, insofar as scientific and technological 
progress have placed us in a situation in which expertise is required and omni-
competence is impossible. It is this very need for expertise that makes the public 
resent experts240 as the constant reminder of our inability to completely manage our 
own lives. As Dorothy Dinnerstein points out, social instability and technological 
change militate against our own understanding of ourselves as competent, powerful 
adults241.  The expert, then, represents the usurpation of adulthood and agency. The 
expert, in the abstract, is not a particular expert, but a member of an elite cadre that 
instructs us relentlessly in how to perform every aspect of our lives.  
More recently, Americans rebel against the expert as largely unreliable, except 
in narrow areas. The expert can be trusted for technical advice if his 
recommendations can be tried and tested. In less straightforward domains, however, 
the cliché is that one can always produce one study to counter another. If Hofstadter 
is correct that Americans are obsessed with the practical, then intellectualism can 
only engage politically through practical expertise; but even this rapprochement is 
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tenuous because the nature of intellectualism and science is that ideas are never final. 
For any matter of sufficient complexity, expert advice cannot be relied upon as 
simply true. This sense of expertise is therefore very different from the kind of 
knowledge a physician or cobbler could be said to have for Plato or Aristotle; rather 
than representing a lower kind of perfection, experts are expected to be educated 
guessers. Such uncertainty is particularly unattractive in a statesman.  
Hofstadter is less concerned with political power, however, than he is about 
public respect for intellectualism and intellect242. The fact that intellectuals exert 
cultural and technological pressures in American society should garner recognition 
for the role they play in public life. Intellectuals exist to some extent independent of 
the practical world, but it is unjust to deride them when their works have an often 
unseen importance in how we live. The ubiquity of experts and their utilization as 
advisers to the powerful seems to be a fulcrum for Hofstadter to leverage intellectuals 
as a positive social and political force worthy of respect and support. Technocracy, 
however, is not rule by the wise. Hofstadter’s argument seems to imply that scientific 
complexity obviates the possibility of wise rule, or at least alienates this rule from 
intellectualism as such. That is, the intellectual is necessarily specialized due to 
scientific progress; because the intellectual cannot understand the whole, he cannot 
claim the comprehensive knowledge necessary to wise rule.  
In a sense, this solution to the impossibility of philosophical rule is 
reminiscent of Machiavelli’s formula: the dyad of the prince and adviser. 
                                                 




Machiavelli, however, stressed the importance of finding a single adviser on whom 
the prince could rely exclusively, ostensibly as a hedge against a confusing battle of 
advisers. The Machiavellian adviser, however, has a more comprehensive 
understanding than the expert has, and so the think-tank or brain trust becomes 
subject to a classical criticism.  
In Plato’s Apology, Socrates gives an account of his actions following the 
pronouncement from the Delphic oracle that no one was wiser than he. Socrates 
claims that he approached those who seemed to be, or were esteemed to be wise, in an 
effort to falsify the oracle’s claim. Socrates’ “cycle of labors” begins with the 
politicians and ends with the skilled craftsmen. The artisans Socrates criticizes are 
similar to the experts we have today: they possess technical knowledge in a narrow 
field243. Socrates’ criticism is that while they have a science, these experts generalize 
their proficiency and claim to have a mastery of the most important kinds of 
knowledge; they claim to be wise (Apology, 21c-22e).  
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics with an implicit answer to the 
Socratic criticism of experts. Every art is performed for some end, and this end 
appears to be higher than the work itself. For all arts, there appear to be more 
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comprehensive arts that make use of their results, and this forms a hierarchy. At the 
top of this hierarchy must be the political art, which makes use of all of the other arts 
in its work244. The artisans are tasked with creating goods in the material sense, but 
the political art is that which is responsible for taking minor goods and transforming 
them into a more comprehensive good for human beings. That is, the political art is 
what allows morally neutral proficiencies to become instruments of value and 
contributors to the good and to human happiness. Experts are necessary but 
insufficient to wise rule. It is not necessary to reify hierarchies to appreciate 
Aristotle’s argument. We form political organizations, in the broad sense, to make our 
lives easier, and the specialization of tasks eases that burden further. The availability 
of expertise affords both comfort and leisure. The modern intellectual claims more in 
common with Socrates than the cobbler, because his is primarily intellectual work, 
and because the academy seems to stand outside of the political in the way the 
philosopher can stand outside of the city. In his capacity as expert, however, the 
engineer or scientist is called upon to produce concrete results; that is, to manufacture 
a product.  
The difficulty is that we do not seem to have a science of statesmanship in the 
same way we have a science of city-planning or economics, much less physics. The 
void Hofstadter fills with intellectuals, however, is not adequately met by technical 
skill, or even by an intellectual’s stance toward ideas. Socrates does not want us to 
dispose of experts; after all, they do possess a kind of knowledge that is useful to the 
                                                 




city. Their expertise, however, must be understood as narrow and subject to the 
deliberation of someone who has a higher art. That higher art must comprise the 
understanding that experts overestimate the scope of their competence, as well as the 
capacity to take the useful product of expertise and leave those parts that overstep 
those bounds. That higher art must also understand that an expert education is 
necessarily an incomplete education; that there must be a more comprehensive 
understanding of the human things than is to be gained by a narrow specialty, even if 
this more comprehensive understanding falls short of wisdom.  
The necessity of experts places the ruler in a difficult position. If he were 
highly competent in the art to which the expert claims expertise, he would not require 
the assistance of the expert. At the same time, he is charged with ascertaining the 
value of this expertise and applying it politically. The compromise we embrace today 
is “scientific consensus,” which seems to mean accepting claims on authority, but 
only when there are enough authorities in agreement. This arrangement has a certain 
charm for a democracy, because it seems to represent science democratically, on the 
one hand. On the other, it preserves the fact-value distinction so that individuals can 
cite ostensibly value-free science in support of their political opinions.  The situation 
recalls Machiavelli’s argument that the people are wise because they are able to 
distinguish between the better of two speakers, that is, political experts245. If we take 
Machiavelli seriously in his contention, the crucial difference is that in his 
formulation the two speakers are understood to be speaking persuasively by the 
                                                 




people, not scientifically. When Machiavelli advises one how to advise, however, he 
is careful to point out that one should never appear too resolute or confident in one’s 
advice; one should not, in short, appear partisan. This insistence on the appearance of 
impartiality is an important component to hidden rule in Machiavelli, and a feature 
that we seem to have unconsciously adopted when we apply science to political 
problems. 
Of course, experts do not appeal directly to the people in our regime. Experts 
inform Senate sub-committees, or advise the President, or provide press-releases to 
journalists, but the judgment of experts is not a matter of democratic participation. 
Mansfield emphasizes Machiavelli’s use of the verb maneggiare to indicate that the 
people are managed by the true rulers – they are ruled without seeming to be ruled246. 
Hidden rule is necessary, in Machiavelli’s view, because the people are a body 
without a head; there is no form of public deliberation that does not ultimately depend 
on the suggestions of individuals. If individuals were all equally capable and 
motivated to advise one another, then it might be possible for the people to rule 
themselves. Machiavelli divides human beings into two classes, however: those who 
need to dominate, and those who wish to be secure. The need to dominate is not 
confined to the aristocracy and shows itself most conspicuously in the rise of new 
men who claim to represent the interests of the people. The men who are able to be 
the heads of overt acts must disguise their intent as the will of the people, because to 
make their ambition known would incur the enmity of the people. Rule must be 
                                                 




hidden in another way, however. The men who are able to act are not necessarily the 
same men who are the best suited to decide how to act. The vigor of youth must be 
paired with the intellect of the adviser. 
 Machiavelli would not advocate for the substitution of experts for advisers, 
because the kinds of knowledge the expert provides are not the same kinds that 
Machiavelli offers. For us, the adviser is already deeply problematic for a 
representative democracy because he is not subject to election. Further, Machiavelli 
suggests wealth and honors to keep the adviser loyal, so that the prince seems to be 
wholly dependent upon the adviser’s judgment, but the adviser is only tethered to the 
prince in material terms.  The adviser therefore seems to be capable of instituting his 
own rule beyond any individual state, in the Machiavellian sense of a state as a 
particular domination of one over another. The adviser exists outside of the 
democratic process, cannot be held to account by the people, and has nebulous 
influence. The substitution of experts into this role is even more dubious.  Experts are 
not only politically translucent; they are numerous, so that even if one were to 
identify a given expert to the people, his or her removal could hardly be expected to 
meaningfully alter the course of government.  
 Hofstadter suggests that Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration represented a 
shift in American thinking about intellectuals. Rather than using an educated civil 
service as a conservative force, experts were embraced as a way to tame an out of 
control economy, particularly as a moral backstop to capitalist excesses247. The close 
                                                 




relationship of the professoriat to power was, in Hofstadter’s opinion, illusory248. He 
contends that at the height of their power, experts did not enact any meaningful 
change that was not advocated by a suitably powerful constituency249; in short, there 
is no problem of hidden rule for Hofstadter. This objection ignores the relationship of 
the Machiavellian adviser to the young prince: the prince’s passions provide the 
impetus to act, the adviser’s intellect forms the plan to succeed. The adviser’s own 
intentions are necessarily hidden. Further, the fact that the electorate is confused or 
unable to tell the extent to which experts rule is problematic in itself. Where influence 
is unclear, where the level of authority is unknown, it is impossible to have truly open 
rule. 
 
Liberal Education and Intelligent Democracy 
Leo Strauss called liberal education the “ladder to universal aristocracy” in 
What is Liberal Education, a phrase he was asked to elaborate on in Liberal 
Education and Responsibility. Conspicuously, Strauss’ explanation of this ladder 
seems to belie the possibility of universal aristocracy; it simply does not seem 
possible that the people, in general, would become liberally educated to the extent 
necessary. He cites Rousseau to that effect as pointing out that such a form of 
government would be fit for gods, not men250. For Strauss, the universal aristocracy 
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seems to be something like the philosophical pursuit of the good. Achieving 
knowledge of the whole, or of the good in the most comprehensive sense, is almost 
certainly impossible to human beings. The abandonment of the pursuit of the good, 
however, results in the adoption of moral nihilism (or historicism or moral relativism, 
which resolve to the same thing). The pursuit of the good, then, is necessary because 
it produces salutary effects in itself. In the same way, the recognition of the 
possibility of a universal aristocracy presents us with a meaningful challenge to 
maintain the kind of education that seeks it out.  
If universal aristocracy is impossible – that is, if it is impossible for the people 
to be so well educated that they can evaluate scientific claims within their rightful 
scope and apply those claims to moral political ends – what possible remedies might 
we have without abandoning democracy? Thomas Jefferson’s letter to John Adams 
provides some instruction as to how such a result might be achieved.  
Jefferson and Adams debated the question of aristocracy; Adams asked “But 
who are these “aristoi”? Who shall judge?251” To this question, Jefferson 
distinguished between an artificial aristocracy and a natural aristocracy. The artificial 
aristocracy was first founded upon force, according to Jefferson, and later upon 
wealth and birth.  The natural aristocracy, in contrast, is grounded in virtue and 
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these virtues – each and every one of them necessarily attaining them – each would 
be serving and served, lord and lorded over. Nature would have done something in 
vain since they all would have the disposition to be lords. This is impossible since of 
necessity a lord must have someone there who is lorded over,” 69.1-10. 




talents252.  This is a restatement of what was well known to the classical philosophers: 
the dual meaning of aristoi – meaning both the “best” and the “upper class” – 
perennially raised the issue of whether those who inherited the name deserved it. 
Jefferson argues that “the form of government is best which provides the most 
effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of 
government.” The substance of his proposition is a system of public education 
emphasizing “reading, writing and common arithmetic,” from which the best students 
would be chosen and sent to a secondary school. The best of these would then be sent 
to University. “Worth and genius would thus have been sought out from every 
condition of life, and compleatly prepared by education for defeating the competition 
of wealth and birth for public trusts.” 
While we have achieved the goal of public education throughout the United 
States, the system as it stands does not filter the best students.  Public schools 
emphasize the retention of all students over the more complete education of an elite 
few253. Jefferson’s plan to educate the best students at public expense could create, as 
Plato discussed in the Republic, a sense of obligation from these students to the state 
that educated and nurtured them. This sense, however, is lost when all students are 
educated as a matter of right and not favor. That is, a sense of obligation is contingent 
upon someone feeling he has received something beyond what he deserves as a 
matter of right; that the state has conferred a privilege. Rationally, the students who 
learn best should receive the best education, and so a privileged education should be a 
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matter of merit and not favor. It is important, however, that the state appears liberal 
and not merely just.  
Herrnstein and Murray argue that education in the United States has become 
exceptionally meritocratic.  It is true that there are far more options open to high 
achieving students in terms of scholarships and financial aid. This view, however, 
appeals to justice. The student performs well, and is rewarded commensurate with his 
or her achievements. In most cases, scholarships are awarded by particular 
institutions, such as individual foundations, grants, or the universities themselves. 
Even when this money is ultimately derived from public sources, there is no firm 
psychological link between the public largesse and financial support. The state thus 
squanders its opportunity to receive gratitude from these students; in fact, as Linda S. 
Gottfredson points out, gifted students often feel resentment when placed in mixed-
ability classrooms254. Gifted students are often expected to serve as “tutors or 
workhorses,” whose own intellectual needs are considered secondary to those of the 
class as a whole.  
Such thinking reflects the common prejudice that the best minds can tend to 
themselves255. Because gifted children are capable of mastering a variety of academic 
tasks at an early age and with little or no supervision, it is easy enough to assume that 
they will continue to develop without outside intervention. Public education thus 
becomes, at best, day care that keeps gifted children occupied until they can 
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matriculate to a more rigorous academic environment. This sentiment among some 
educators may be due, in part, to a misunderstanding of Rousseau256, whose Emile: 
Or On Education remains influential today. Rousseau writes in the Emile: “Only 
ordinary men need to be raised; their education ought to serve as an example only for 
that of their kind. The others raise themselves in spite of what one does.257” Allan 
Bloom’s note for this passage states “Confessions is the description of the education 
of a genius.” To be sure, neither Rousseau nor Bloom would argue that genius cannot 
be stultified258, but that the education of the genius has a different form and object 
from that of the common mind.  
It would be unthinkable to attempt Jefferson’s project as he laid it out, because 
to do so would require the elimination of universal education. It is well within our 
power, however, to improve gifted education. Though a liberal education should be 
considered important for all students, it is especially so for the gifted. Americans are 
most comfortable with intelligence used in service of practical ends, that is, education 
in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM).  The general expectation is 
that such an education is beneficial to American society as a whole. Scientific 
advancement serves our national pride in the same way that the space program 
redeemed American technical prowess vis-à-vis sputnik. Scientific progress is 
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valuable to human beings insofar as it makes our lives more comfortable, leads to 
medical advances, and produces interesting products. We recognize science and 
innovation as drivers of our macroeconomic interests, as the products we export 
become increasingly technologically sophisticated, and we also expect that the pursuit 
of a technology-centered education helps to guarantee individual prosperity. Not, as 
Marcuse suggested, through reducing the burdens of labor, but because most lucrative 
fields require at least technical proficiency and many require specialist technology 
training.  
Last and least, we seem to expect that these fields are intellectually satisfying 
to bright minds, and provide them with creative outlets or worthwhile puzzles to 
solve. All of this encourages promising students to look out for their own pecuniary 
interests and to pursue careers that promise the most financially. If one views oneself 
as assisting the nation, or helping other human beings, to what extent does one do so 
in the context of a comprehensive evaluation of what would be most beneficial?  To 
be sure, a generation of scientists and engineers is not competent to lead the nation 
politically, even if avant-garde technological leadership relentlessly shapes and 
influences our culture through the introduction of innovative products and 
technologies.  
STEM-centered education does not prepare the brightest minds for political 
life. The kind of rigorous education that used to be required of even moderately 
talented youths of means seems outdated today, though some schools have adopted 
curricula based on the trivium and quadrivium. Embracing classical education, 




technological proficiency, and it would be foolhardy to deny gifted students the 
opportunity to pursue careers in those fields and rely on technical skill to make a 
living if compelled. Gifted students would need to be educated apart from others and 
held to a higher standard. Since gifted students are generally able to more quickly 
grasp materials designed for mainstream classrooms, it is reasonable to expect that 
they would be able to keep up with the increased science and mathematics 
requirements of modern education while still receiving a classical education. 
James R. Flynn raises important questions about the observation that IQ 
scores seem to be increasing over time – the so-called “Flynn effect.” Since IQ is a 
relative rather than absolute measure, any given IQ test must be normed against the 
population to which it is administered. As such, the average score is always 100 for 
any normed population. Something interesting occurs when one compares the norms 
over time, however: the actual performance on IQ tests has improved over time. As 
Flynn points out, it would seem that if we judged our great grandparents from 1900 
based on the norms of today, the average score would be between 50 and 70, meaning 
that the average person in 1900 would be considered mentally retarded today259.  
Flynn maintains that the weight of the evidence insists that IQ does 
approximate what we think of as intelligence260, but that intelligence as we 
understand it is largely abstract reasoning261. This has important explanatory power 
for Flynn, because it allows him to justify IQ increases as real, important, and actual 
                                                 
259 James R. Flynn, What is Intelligence?, pg. 9 
260 Ibid., pg. 55 




improvements in intelligence while solving the paradox that our ancestors would 
seem to be, on average, mentally retarded according to today’s norms. Our ancestors 
– at least those in the early 1900s – lived in a world that mostly required concrete 
reasoning, and their minds and brains were adapted to this particular environment. 
Since they were adapted to their environment and could function well within it, they 
cannot be characterized as being mentally retarded. What Flynn strangely omits is the 
intensely abstract education the students of Socrates and Plato seemed to undergo262. 
While Flynn points out that we must consider cultural forces as a whole, of which 
educational methods are at most a small part, as drivers of intelligence gains, it is 
worth considering the kind of mind that might be produced by the kind of rigorous 
searching, classifying, and rational argument that Plato advocated in the Academy. 
Even more so, it is worth wondering what a society would look like if it normalized 
rational argumentation so that it permeated the culture, rather than being confined to 
the academy. 
Flynn suggests devising new tests that measure critical acumen and wisdom in 
addition to intelligence263, with the aim that scientific categories must not merely be 
incorporated into educated language, but also understood intelligently. The 
integration of a scientific worldview would furnish the tools to more intelligently 
debate moral and social questions264. This is Flynn’s partial answer to the question of 
whether scientific progress implies or can be translated into moral progress. Flynn 
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generally disagrees with the Straussian approach to this question, because he feels it 
gives an incomplete prescription. The Straussians, according to Flynn, encourage a 
return to classical philosophy without actually refuting ethical skepticism or 
providing an explanation of what we should expect to find in classical philosophy265. 
Flynn’s suggestion is that ethical skepticism can be exposed as a logical error, and we 
can teach the kind of logical and statistical thinking that would allow students to think 
through ethical questions rationally.  
As Plato and Aristotle teach us, it is imperative that our leaders are reared 
with attention to ethics and moral values. Flynn’s suggestion of testing for what he 
calls SHAs, or “shorthand abstractions,” is a way to gauge the moral education of 
older students. Flynn only suggests the test, however, not the means by which the 
student is educated in these abstractions. It would be incompatible with both our 
current pluralistic values and with philosophy to rely on religious instruction to 
educate young minds, but ethical teaching at the earliest ages has been traditionally 
taught through the use of fables. Such fables would need to be taught by teachers who 
would then able to engage the students in ethical thinking.  As students mature, it is 
appropriate to bring in the kinds of abstractions that Flynn recommends. 
We might rely on various tests of virtue, as well. One excellent contemporary 
example is the so-called “marshmallow test,” in which a child is offered a 
marshmallow now, or if he is able to wait for a predetermined length of time, two 
marshmallows later. Those children who were able to delay gratification tended to do 
                                                 




well in life according to a variety of measures, including SAT scores and educational 
attainment266. The test is not infallible – children from dysfunctional or chaotic family 
situations may not trust the promise of a future reward, and adopt impulsivity as a 
means of guaranteeing the satisfaction of desire. An ethical education, then, means 
giving more stability to such children and teaching them the advantages of self-
restraint. Xenophon tells how Persian children adjudicated each other’s disputes so 
that they would learn about justice267. Both Xenophon and Plutarch occupy special 
places in political philosophy as teachers of practical judgment268. Physical and 
mental tests of grit and determination would also be useful; Rousseau gives the 
example of teaching an indolent boy to run by having him compete with other 
children for the prize of cakes269. Physical competition, prescribed by an intelligent 
tutor, provides important benefits for health and character. Ultimately, as students get 
older, the best ethical education is a philosophical education. We want our leaders to 
be not only intelligent, but ethical and moral; that is, to be virtuous as a whole.  
This approach would also require education to be treated less in terms of 
practical necessity. Technology-focused education is both necessary and worthwhile, 
but devoting one’s life to technological progress would need to be viewed as either 
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inferior to or less useful than a life of public service. Machiavelli is correct that 
ambition is natural to human beings, but we have channeled most of this ambition 
into business, law, and technology. The term “career politician” is often used 
derisively to promote someone who is ostensibly an outsider and can therefore be 
relied upon to do what is right as opposed to what seems politically expedient. In this 
characterization we exalt moral character as the essential qualification of a 
representative of the people and deny or deride the idea that there is such a thing as 
statesmanship or political knowledge. It is no wonder, then, that gifted children turn 
their intellects to those careers for which they are able to gain the most money as well 
as praise.  
 
Heritability, Race, and IQ 
 Up until now I have limited my discussion of heritability and avoided race 
altogether. Instead, I have concentrated on the differences between individuals, no 
matter how they may come about, with the underlying argument that intelligence is 
normally distributed throughout a population and is immutable. This position requires 
a justification. 
 IQ seems to be highly heritable, but not perfectly so270.   If it were entirely 
heritable and immutable – that is, if chance or environment did not contribute at all to 
the differences in intelligence within a population – then suggesting that high IQ 
individuals should be groomed for politics would be tantamount to creating a 
                                                 




hereditary aristocracy. The more intelligence seems to be due to random differences 
between individuals, the more such a system would appear to be designating an 
aristocracy by lot. If, however, the majority of differences are due to environment, we 
are faced with a different kind of injustice. IQ is normally distributed throughout a 
population, and there is no known intervention that increases individual IQ; Susanne 
M. Jaeggi’s approach of working memory training appeared to have promise271, but 
her early success does not seem to be reproducible272. That is, while intelligence in a 
population may be mutable, there is no known mechanism to significantly improve 
IQ scores in individuals.  
If individual IQ were entirely changeable – if individual talents were entirely 
based upon environment – then we would have to adopt a different approach. In that 
case, we would need to find out exactly what kind of environmental enrichment is 
necessary to yield the highest IQ scores and make such an environment available as 
widely as possible. We would also need to determine whether IQ still corresponded 
with what we think of as intelligence after the intervention is applied. That is, we 
would need to find a solution that raises actual intelligence and not merely one’s 
ability to score well on an IQ test. Such a result would radically change not only our 
politics, but the world itself, and it would obviate the notion of IQ altogether. 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that such an intervention exists. 
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Because the heritability of IQ is such a contentious topic, and because there is 
no clear cut genetic or environmental explanation for the differences in intelligence 
between individuals, I must remain agnostic on the issue. Instead, I argue that the 
mere fact that there are differences in intelligence, and that these differences have 
practical consequences for our abilities to think problems through, predisposes some 
people to be in a better position to rule than others. This result holds whether or not 
IQ is heritable. In an otherwise homogeneous culture, such a result would probably 
not be very objectionable. However, there is a long history of using science to justify 
racial ideology, as Stephen J. Gould took pains to point out; there is also significant 
evidence of differences in IQ between ethnic populations273.  
 Herrnstein and Murray’s The Bell Curve has received most of its criticism as a 
result of its inclusion of a chapter arguing that there is a large average difference 
(about one standard deviation) between the IQs of African Americans and Whites274. 
Much of this criticism is undoubtedly due to the fact that they ascribe this difference 
to genetic factors rather than differences in environment. The data appear sound: 
whatever the cause, African Americans do tend to score lower on IQ tests than white 
Americans. The fact that IQ is highly heritable within a group, however, does not 
imply that differences between groups are also due to genetic variation. A population 
uniformly deprived of nutrients might have a mean male height of five feet, and the 
differences between members of that population may be entirely due to genetic 
difference. Another population with no nutritional deficits might have a mean male 
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height of six feet, with all variation ascribed to genetic differences. However, the 
difference in mean height between the two populations may be entirely 
environmental, despite the exceptionally high heritability of height within each 
population. This fact should make us hesitate to conclude that ethnic differences in IQ 
are due to genetic, rather than environmental, effects.  James R. Flynn suggests that if 
IQ is, in part, driven by wide cultural forces, African Americans may be subjected to 
impoverished intellectual environments throughout their lives in such a way that 
educational initiatives alone cannot hope to counteract275. Flynn’s model seems more 
plausible than the genetic explanation because there is no known set of genes that 
would explain the difference, and because of its explanatory power; the same kinds of 
influences that explain the Flynn effect would also explain ethnic differences in IQ. 
 If the so-called Black/White difference in IQ is real, then selecting a ruling 
class based on IQ would disproportionately disadvantage most minorities in the 
United States.  On this important problem, I have two suggestions. The first is that we 
make it a political priority to improve the cognitive environment for minorities. The 
second is that, in the meantime, we treat between-group differences of IQ as 
incommensurable. That is, if we select students from the 98th or 99th percentiles as 
gifted students, we do so based upon the distribution of IQs in each group. We would 
then take the top students from the African American population, the white 
population, Hispanics, and so on. The counterargument to this scheme is that, if 
differences in IQ have real significance, one is intentionally selecting less intelligent 
                                                 




students from populations that have lower mean IQs. However, I refer back to 
Jefferson’s letter to John Adams. Jefferson did not suggest that we take the best 
subjects from a national pool of candidates; rather, he suggested dividing counties 
into wards each containing a school, and from each school the best subjects would be 
chosen. That is, each population furnishes its own best students who can best 
represent it through public office.  
 
 
Toward Intelligent, Philosophical Rule 
It appears that democracy is ill-suited to picking the most competent 
candidates276, but it would be anti-democratic to suggest an automatic selection of 
government leaders from the ranks of the gifted, or to limit who runs for office on 
such a basis. It is perfectly compatible with democracy, however, to educate the most 
intelligent students with an eye to encouraging public service and thereby flooding 
the market with candidates having the best minds available. Such an approach 
recognizes that there are other qualities attractive in a representative of the people, 
such as charisma and emotional intelligence. It would be indulging in the 
compensating skills fallacy to suggest that gifted individuals are less likely, as a 
group, to have these qualities in the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary. On 
the other hand, human beings may excel in areas other than intelligence, and should 
be able to compete to rule on that basis. Overall, however, there is no reason to 
                                                 




believe that intelligent individuals are any less empathetic, emotionally intelligent, or 
have any lesser propensity to leadership than the population in general277.  
If the best students are raised to value public service, then it seems more likely 
that they will become public servants. Clearly, such a plan would not guarantee that 
all politicians come from the natural aristocracy; even Jefferson acknowledged that 
the pseudo-aristocracy had sufficient means to provide its own representation. 
However, neither would the scheme require that all politicians are the brightest. 
Following Flynn, a culture that values rigorous argument and thought – in ethics and 
all areas of life – is a rising tide that elevates our political discourse. Even if that fails, 
however, ensuring that some of the brightest minds have key political positions 
provides a hope of creating a scientific work group, as Bion describes.  
In fact, there is some evidence that for certain kinds of problems, small groups 
seem to perform better than individuals278. Laughlin et al proposed four criteria under 
which the group is able to perform at this heightened level: “(1) group consensus on a 
conceptual system; (2) sufficient information; (3) incorrect members are able to 
recognize the correct response if it is proposed; (4) correct members have sufficient 
ability, motivation, and time to demonstrate the correct response to the incorrect 
members.” Critically, the high performance of small groups relies upon high 
demonstrability in the tasks chosen. Mathematical results that can be proven correct 
by a demonstrating group member are more likely to be accepted by other group 
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members. Where tasks required individual discretion or judgment, however, group 
performance suffered. Group members were asked to rank objects for usefulness for a 
group of downed astronauts on the moon, and their results were compared with the 
ordering provided by NASA experts. Since the task was less intellective and the 
answers were less clearly demonstrable, groups performed at the level of the second-
best member279.   However, the given tasks required only elementary arithmetic and 
logic. The results seem to hold as a function of demonstrability, rather than 
confidence or charisma280.  
Laughlin’s research reminds us of Machiavelli’s dueling speakers, each 
attempting to persuade the people that his proposed course of action is the better. 
Unfortunately, the political is not demonstrable in the same way that simple 
mathematical puzzles might be. But Laughlin’s research does suggest that in less 
demonstrable fields, groups tend to perform about as well as the second best group 
member. This should give us hope; we cannot expect that a democratic body will 
always perform at the highest levels of individual achievement. A slight lowering of 
the bar, however, may promise a large improvement over what we currently accept as 
the inevitable course of political events. 
Western views of intelligence have taken a path, a relentless winnowing that 
has ultimately left us with an operational definition of intelligence but not a human 
one. Looking at intelligence from Aristotle’s and Plato’s perspectives, we see a 
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definite moral dimension; intelligence, as used in practical judgment, is concerned 
with what is good for human beings. Machiavelli eliminates the moral dimension, and 
instead emphasizes the acquisitive use of intelligence: by itself, intelligence has no 
concrete material ambitions, so the combination of old prudence and young ambition 
provides the means upon which the intellect acquires its loftier ends. The scientific 
era, however, completely unmoors intelligence from its moral and acquisitive 
elaborations, treating it as though it were a good in itself and disclaiming any ability 
to find a definite place for intelligence politically or socially. We should do what we 
can to restore the pursuit of the good, so that intelligence is once again seen as a 
means to the highest forms of understanding. At the same time, we live in an 
acquisitive society, and that is unlikely to change. We should take our cue from 
Machiavelli that there are many ways to arrive at good things, and democracy 
provides the voice of the people as projects on which the intellect can work. To be 
politically salutary, these projects should be more than economic or technological 
answers to the people, but real political work. A cognitive elite would need to 
understand its own limitations, as well as the limits of its society, recognizing that the 
relationship between a leader and the lead is not a strictly rational one, but the heir to 
longstanding psychodynamic forces.  
The approach should be tentative and provisional. If, as Strauss says, liberal 
education is the ladder to universal aristocracy, it suggests that none of us are in a 
position to provide a final prescription to the greatest problems of ruling. Socrates 
himself does not suggest a solution that does not require either remaking the entire 




citizens to provide the environment through which the leaders of tomorrow can 
improve upon existing institutions and create or rediscover the important lessons of 
human nature that will take us closer to philosophical rule. Only once the 
omnipotence of economics is denied, only once students learn to understand 
themselves as political, is this improvement possible.  
Our republic will improve to the extent that we have greater expectations for 
those we elect into office, and to the extent that those elected prove themselves to be 
the best in the way that the classical philosophers understood it. We can approach this 
goal only if we acknowledge that the ancients may know something about the 
relationship of intelligence to political life that we do not, that they can teach us 
something that we have forgotten. While we have ample evidence of technological 
progress, moral and philosophical progress is not so apparent; what we know today is 
not necessarily better than what we knew yesterday. Ultimately, however, the search 
for the best rulers must be similar to the way the philosopher approaches morality: we 
need not have an absolute morality laid out before us, but we must persistently search 
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